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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
1
Oil spill response in the marine environment has become
increasingly important in the past few decades as the threat
of major oil spills from both oil tankers and offshore oil
exploitation activities has increased. Although man has been
attempting to deal with human-induced oil spills in the
marine environment for many years, oil spill response today
remains an inexact science. Much research has been conducted
in the past in order to develop technologies to provide the
most effective means of oil spill response, and such research
is currently ongoing. Today's available technologies differ
in their method of operation. For example, mechanical
methods are designed to physically remove oil from the
water's surface; chemical treating agents may help disperse
the oil throughout the water column or herd the oil for
enhanced mechanical recovery; and burning may be used to
remove many of the components of the oil from the water
through combustion. Each method ha s it s advantages and
disadvantages . The best method to employ depends on the
specific spill conditions, and oftentimes a combination of
the available technologies provides the best response in
terms o f removing the oil from the water's surface a nd
minimizing damage. For this reason, it is vitally important
that the nation's oil spill response policy allow for the
ability to make use of all available response technologies.
Otherwise, the capability to effectively respond to marine
oil spills off the coasts of the United States is severely
limited.
Chemical dispersants are one oil spill response method
that has in the past been virtually precluded from effective
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use in the United States. The concerns surrounding
dispersant use have centered mainly around their potential
toxicity, a fear sparked by the Torrey Canyon l incident of
1967 during which the dispersants used caused more ecological
harm than did the spilled oil. As a result, the policy
established in the United States to govern dispersant use was
extremely conservative . It required that numerous agencies
grant approval before dispersants could be used on any oil
spill. Such a cumbersome decision process basically
prevented dipsersant use because these agencies could never
come to an agreement, or, if they did, the decision always
came too late to conduct effective dipsersant application.
In recent years, however, this prohibitive dispersant
use policy has been recognized as a hindrance to effective
oil spill response in certain situations, especially
situations involving large amounts of oil spilled offshore.
Advances in dispersant technology have created less toxic
dispersants, and much research has been conducted to
lThe Torrey Canyon was a Liberian flagged tanker that ran aground off the
coast of the British Isles in 1967 . The vessel spilled over 100,000 tons of oil
which caused extensive damage to the British and French coastlines. During
the response, large amounts of first generation dispersants were used to
combat the spill. They were highly toxic and caused severe ecological damage.
Since this incident, both second and third generation dispersants, which are
much less toxic, have been developed for use in oil spill response. See U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency. Use of Chemical Dispersants for Marine Oil
.s..u..w.s.. EPA/600/R-93/195 (November 1993), 28 .
3determine conditions under which dipsersant use would be most
effective in terms of minimizing overall spill damage. In
light of these advances, yet the continued inability of
responders to use dispersants, it became apparent that the
United States was perhaps missing opportunities to conduct
the best response to oil spills due to the archaic dispersant
policy. This problem was highlighted during the Exxon
Valdez2 disaster. As a result the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
enacted as a result of the spill, attempted to improve the
dispersant use policy. This law required that new oil spill
contingency plans include procedures for obtaining expedited
dispersant use decisions . Subsequent implementing
regulations called for the development of dispersant pre-
authorization plans. Under specified conditions, these plans
allow persons in charge of the response at the federal level
to make single-handed dispersant use decisions at the time of
a spill.
The development of these dispersant pre-authorization
plans could potentially make great progress with regard to
increasing the viability of dispersant use for oil spill
response in the United States. However, the manner in which
these plans are developed is crucial to their successful
implementation, both over the short and long terms. While
the law requires that the appropriate government agencies
2The tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound. Alaska, in
March of 1989, creating a spill of over eleven million gallons, the largest spill
to date in U. S. waters. See National Response Team, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,
A Report to the President, (May, 1989) , 1.
approve the dispersant pre-authorization plans before they
are considered valid, the role of other interested parties in
the dispersant use planning process is not so clear. The
involvement of other interests, such as environmental groups,
local citizens, resource users such as fishermen, etc., is
largely left to the discretion of each government official in
charge of planning in specific regions around the country.
This presents a potential problem for the likely success of
4
the dispersant pre-authorization plans. Interest groups are
a formidable political force and their voice cannot be
ignored at spill time. Logically, if such interests have not
been involved in the dispersant pre-authorization planning
process, the potential e xists that they will emerge at the
time of the spill or afterwards to express their views and
ultimately to undermine the ability of the plans to produce
the expected expedited decisions.
Based on this premise, the future success of the new
dispersant pre-authorization plans in attaining e xpedited and
effective dispersant use decisions may be forecast based on
the involvement of appropriate interested parties in the
planning process . Because dispersant pre-authorization plans
in the Northeast United States are currently in the final
stages of development and approval, it would be useful at
this time to e xamine the involvement of interest groups in
this process to predict the likely success of these
individual plans. To examine this issue, a study was
conducted to identify appropriate interest groups in the five
planning Areas of the Northeast region, and to survey them
regarding their interest in oil spill response issues and
activities, their involvement in oil spill response planning
(including dispersant use), and their satisfaction regarding
this involvement. Based on the results of this study, the
likelihood of the dispersant pre-authorization plans in the
Northeast to be successfully implemented in the future can be
assessed. Also, recommendations for steps to improve the
likelihood of success, if needed, can be provided.
The purposes of this paper are thus four-fold. First,
dispersant use as an oil spill response option and the issues
5
surrounding dispersant use will be discussed. Second, the
past dispersant use policy will be revie~ed, as will the
recent changes to the policy in terms of the attempt to make
dispersants a viable response option in the United States.
Third, the role of interest groups in oil spill response
issues and the importance of including them in contingency
planning efforts, specifically dispersant planning, will be
discussed. Lastly, the results of the study to determine the
involvement of interest groups in the dispersant planning
processes in the Northeast will be given, along with an
analysis regarding the implications of the findings, as well
as pertinent recommendations to promote the future success of
dispersant pre-authorization plans, both in the Northeast and
elsewhere in the United States.
Chapter 2 OIL SPILL RESPONSE GENERAL
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2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL SPILL RESPONSE
"Oil s p i l l s are complex and there is almost no way for a
response to be perceived as successful.,,3 Stated another way,
"no one comes out of a spill looking good. There are no winners
when you go up against Mother Nature.
. the results depend on
luck and God.,,4 These are basic truths of which oil spill
responders are well aware. Yet, being capable of implementing
the most coordinated, effective, and efficient response possible
can help to minimize the aesthetic, economic, and ecological
damage of an oil spill. Therefore, the capability to respond
quickly with the best technology is of the utmost i mp o r t a nc e in
terms of oil spill response .
Proper planning for oil spill response and the ability to
make use of the best available technologies is becoming
increasingly important as the likelihood of large oil spills in
the world's oceans grows. There are many sources of oil in the
marine environment due to human activities at sea. Offshore
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas present the threat of
blowouts and considerable spills. In fact, several major spills
due to such blow-outs have occurred historically.5 Another
30ary L. Ott, June Lindstedt-Siva, and Ann Hayward Walker. "Evolving Spill
Managment Systems Under OPA 90 Could Reduc~ Response Effecti,,:eness ," in
1993 International Oil Spill Conference Proceedmgs. by the American
Petroleum Institute (Washington, D. C., 1993): 78.
4Robert Mottley, "Owners Seek Sweeter Deals from Responders," Marine Log
100 (Feb 1995): 20.
SJ. Doerffer, Oil Spill Response in the Marine Environment (New York:
Pergamon Press Ltd., 1992): 76 .
7source of potential release of oil into the marine environment is
marine transportatl'on, whl'ch has . d .lncrease enormously In recent
years. Presently over 1.5 billion tons of crude oil and
petroleum products are transported each year by more than seven
thousand tankers. 6 In addition, the size of tankers has
increased dramatically. In the fifteen years between 1965 and
1980, the average size of world tankers grew from 28,000
deadweight tons to over 100,000 deadweight tons. 7 Today there
are tankers over 200,000 deadweight tons in operation . This
increase in the amount of oil carried in one vessel corresponds
to the potential for more massive oil spills if one of these
vessels were to have an accident . Larger oil spills are also
evident in the statistics. From 1967 to 1990, the world
experienced sixty-six spills that exceeded two million gallons,
both from offshore oil and gas e xploration and marine
transportation activities. 8 In addition, the years 1978 to 1993
have shown a general increasing trend in the number of worldwide
oil spills between one and ten million gallons.9
Once a significant oil spill does occur, the response
becomes critical in attempting to minimize damage from the spill,
whether it be trying to remove the oil from the water or somehow
6Doerffer, 76.
7David M. Bovet and Charles R. Corbett, "Federal Tanker Oil Spill Legislation:
Implications for Marine Transportation," in Oil Spills : Management and
Legislative Implications, eds. Malcolm L. Spaulding and Mark Reed (New York:
American Society of Civil Engineers, 1990): 51.
SU. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Coping With an Oiled Sea:
An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1990): 4 .
9Jeff Welch, "Oil Spill Intelligence Report International Oil Spill Database,"
in Proceedings of the 1995 International Oil Spill Conference, (Washington,
D. C., American Petroleum Institute, 1995): 1008 .
8treating the oil so that certain impacts are lessened. Oil spill
damage can take many forms. Biological effects include hazards
to human health through eating contaminated seafood; decreases in
fisheries resources and damage to wildlife such as seabirds and
mammals; modification of marine ecosystems by elimination of
certain species with an initial decrease in diversity and
productivity; and modification of habitats which may delay or
prevent recolonization. IO Aesthetic and economic damage also
results. Oil spills often contaminate coastal areas, creating
unsightly messes on recreational and beach areas, soiling and
staining harbor areas and vessels, contaminating commercial
shellfish grounds, and posing problems with regard to intake
sources for desalination and power plants. I I Although damage
resulting from oil spills is usually of limited and local
duration, exceptionally large spills (such as the Torrey Canyon
spill of 117,000 tons or the Amoco Cadiz spill of 230,000 tons)
can persist for several years, especially if they take place in
Arctic or subarctic regions. I2
Thus, it is apparent that the potential for catastrophic
spills is ever increasing due to society's dependence on oil
and the subsequent technological advances in both offshore
oil and gas exploration /exploitation and the maritime
transportation of oil. In addition, the damages that can be
wrought as a result of such a spill can be devastating. In
IODoerffer, 79 .
11 National Research Council , Using Oil Dispersants on the Sea (Washington.
D. C.: National Academy Press, 1989): 6.
I2Doerffer. 79 .
9light of these circumstances, effective oil spill response is
vital for the well-being of both the world's oceans and
resources, as well as for the world population and future
generations.
2.2 THE DIFFICULTY WITH OIL SPILL RESPONSE
While the above information stresses the importance of
effective oil spill response, it must be recognized that removing
oil from the marine environment once it has been released is
extremely difficult, and effective methods to accomplish such a
task have remained somewhat of a mystery, even in today's highly
technological society.
The characteristics and behavior of oil spilled in water
contribute largely to the difficulties encountered when
attempting to clean it up . First, crude oil or petroleum
products undergo a variety of processes once released into
the marine environment. These include spreading and drift,
evaporation, natural dispersion into the water column,
microbial degradation, etc. Some of these processes
actually aid cleanup. For example, evaporation can account
for the removal of up to forty percent of some spills from
the water's surface. 13 Many spills involving lighter
petroleum products evaporate so readily that the need for
spill cleanup is precluded. Other processes, however,
severely inhibit effective response. The most noteworthy is
the spreading process. As a result of spreading, the
I3U. S. EPA , Use of Chemical Dispersants. 12.
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thickness of freshly spilled oil can rapidly approach an
average of 0.1 millimeter or less within a matter of a few
hours. I4 Although spreading depends on several factors such
as the type of oil, the amount of oil, and wind and sea
conditions, a spill similar to that experienced with the
Exxon Valdez can spread over six square miles (almost four
thousand acres) during the first twelve hours. 15 Obviously
rapid spreading vastly complicates cleanup efforts both
because the oil begins to impact a very large area very
quickly, and because the oil spreads into an extremely thin
layer which is difficult to remove from the water's surface.
Numerous response methods have been developed and are
continually being improved upon to tackle these difficulties.
The various response options include mechanical containment
and recovery, use of chemical dispersants to transfer the oil
from the surface of the water into the upper water column,
burning the oil in place, accelerating biological treatment
of the oil in place, using sinking agents to move the oil the
ocean floor, and allowing natural processes alone to combat
the oil. 16 The following sections describe and compare
mechanical oil spill cleanup methods, the traditionally
favored U.S. response technology, with dispersants in terms
of their utility as oil spill response options. As will be
seen, dispersants offer significant advantages over
mechanical cleanup in certain respects, and their use
14Ibid., II.
15U. S. Congress, OT A, II.
16U. S. EPA , Usc of Chemical Di spersants, 5.
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provides the highest potential for minimizing damages under
certain spill conditions.
2.3 MECHANICAL CLEANUP METHODS
Mechanical containment and recovery has been the preferred
response method in the United States. 17 The goal of mechanical
response is to contain the floating spill and to physically
remove as much of the oil as possible from the marine
environment.
The basic components of mechanical recovery systems consist
of booms and skimmers. Booms are barrier devices placed in the
water to contain the oil spill (to reduce spreading and
facilitate recovery), to divert the oil to areas where recovery
is possible, or to prevent the oil from reaching environmentally
sensitive areas. 18 They are composed of a means of flotation, a
skirt, a freeboard, a tension member, and weighted ballast. 19
Other types of barrier s e xist, such as those that rely on forced
air to contain the slick, but they are used much less frequently
than traditional booms. 20 Skimmers are the devices that remove
the oil from the water's surface, of which there are many types
such as the weir type, suction devices, sorbent surface devices,
etc. 2I Together, boom and skimmer combinations attempt to
17Ibid.• 4.
18Doerffer, 133.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21 Ibid.. 179.
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collect the slick into a compact area where the slick thickens
and is removed from the water's surface.
Such mechanical recovery devices are subject to severe
limitations. The performance of these devices can be inhibited
by oceanic conditions and weather, including currents, waves, and
wind, as well as by the nature of the oil slick itself.22
Containment using booms becomes highly ineffective unless the
currents moving against the boom are less than one knot. 23 In
cases where the current exceeds that speed, the oil tends to dip
beneath the boom and escape, a process called entrainment. In
addition, booms are limited as far as their utility in the open
seas. For the boom to be effective, the maximum wave height
should be less than the freeboard of the boom or else the waves,
and the oil, will splash over the top of it. Thus most boom
barriers lose their effectiveness in wave heights greater than
four feet.~ In addition, booms lose their effectiveness quickly
as wind speeds approach twenty miles per hour. 25 Skimmers are
limited by the same conditions; they work best in calm water with
little or no wave action and if the current velocit y exceeds 0.7
knots, the oil is likely to be swept underneath the skimmer.~
Other limiting factors are that the recovery rate of skimmers
decreases as the oil slick thickness decreases, being negligible
in thicknesses of less than 1.0 mm, and recovery rate is also
22National Research Council, 14.
23Ibid.
24Ibid., 16.
25U. S . EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants. 4 .
26Doerffer, 159.
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impacted by the presence of debris in the water which can clog
the skimmer. 27 Lastly, the use of booms and skimmers is limited
by the logistical problems of first moving the equipment to the
site and then maneuvering and anchoring the devices, as well as
coordinating the activities of the various vessels needed to
accomplish these tasks. 28
The removal of oil spills from the marine environment
with mechanical methods has thus been likened to "emptying a
very large swimming pool with one, two, or a hundred eye
droppers. "29 In fact, mechanical recovery operations rarely
collect more than ten to fifteen percent of oil in open sea
conditions. 3D Moreover, the future for advances in mechanical
recovery technology do not look promising. There have been
advances with regard to the development of integrated systems
whereby high capacity mechanical recovery systems are
designed as either temporary or permanent accommodations
aboard vessels . These advances have improved the mobility
and utility of traditional mechanical recovery systems.
Examples include the new vessel of opportunity skimming
systems, which can be placed onboard any "vessel of
opportunity" for spill response, and single-purpose,
specially designed oil spill response vessels, which are
designed and maintained specifically fo r spill response. 31
27National Research Council, 16.
28Ibid.
290tt, Lindstedt-Siva. and Walker, 75 .
30U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants, 2.
31U.S. Congress , OTA, 17.
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However, these new designs continue to use conventional boom
and skimmer principles and are therefore subject to the same
limitations and inefficiencies of those devices as described
above. 32 Basically, mechanical recovery techniques have
remained on a technological plateau for the past decade and
the technologies they employ are still considered primitive
by many.33 Because the behavior of oil in the environment
which limits mechanical recovery of oil in water is well
understood, the prediction is that no major breakthroughs are
like ly to occur. 34
2.4 DISPERSANTS
With not much light at the end of the tunnel with regard to
mechanical recovery techniques, other oil spill response
techniques must be considered. Dispersants, while not highly
regarded in the United States as a response method, do offer a
reasonable option to other response methods in certain
circumstances. Dispersants are "those chemicals that emulsify,
disperse, or solubilize oil i nto the water column or p r omot e the
surface spreading of oil slicks that facilitates dispersal of the
oil into the water column. ,,35 In more simplified terms, they
break up the oil into small droplets and, through mixing energy
32Ibid.
33U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
Investigation of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Prince William Sound, Alaska. 101st
Cong., l st Sess.• 18 July 1989: 67.
34U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Q.il
Spill Response Technology, 102nd Cong. , 1st Sess., 18 June 1991: 7.
35U . S. EPA. Use of Chemical Dispersants, 13.
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provided by the sea, cause these droplets to quickly disperse
into the upper ten meters of the water column. 36
There have been many issues surrounding the use of
dispersants as a "cleanup" method. Dispersants do not actually
can be toxic.
remove spilled oil from the water and were thought to potentially
increase adverse effects of oil spills because they themselves
In addition, questions have arisen concerning the
effectiveness of dispersants in terms of their ability to
actually disperse oil, thereby removing it from the water's
surface. Innumerable studies have been conducted in the recent
past to satisfy these toxicity and effectiveness concerns, and
both the National Research Council and the Environmental
Protection Agency have compiled available research information
into useful findings regarding the utility of dispersants in oil
spill response. These findings are summarized below.
The toxicity of dispersants alone, as well as that of
dispersed oils compared to undispersed oils, is important in
determining whether dispersant use will cause more harm than good
during a response. As far as biological effects, the lethal
toxicity of most dispersants currently considered for use in the
United States and Canada is low compared to the toxicity of the
various components of crude oil and refined oil products. 37
Although sublethal responses to dispersants have been observed,
36Ibid.• 14.
37National Research Council , 257. First generation dispersants were highly
toxic' their formulations were derived from engine room degrcasers. Today's
dispersant formulations, however, are much less toxic. They use nonaromatic
hydrocarbons or water-miscible compounds such as ethylene glycol or glycol
ethers. as the solvent, and also use less toxic surfactants. See National
Research Council, chapter 2, on th e physics and chemistry of dispersants .
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the National Research Council states that it is unlikely that
dispersants would contribute significantly to lethal or sublethal
toxicities. 38 Dispersants themselves, however, can cause adverse
effects on birds and mammals as they reduce the water repellency
of fur and feathers and may reduce the hatchability of eggs.39
With regard to the toxicity of dispersed oils, it has been
found that the acute toxicity of dispersed oils is generally
similar to that of oil in the water column alone. 40 However,
dispersing an oil slick may impose temporary stresses to
organisms in the upper portion of the water column in the area of
application due to higher short term exposure to the toxic
components of the oil. 41
Ecologically, chemically dispersed oils do not adhere as
readily to some organisms or habitats as untreated oil.
Dispersants also tend to increase the rate of biodegradation of
oil in some cases. 42 Because of these facts, dispersants are
likely to reduce the chronic impact of oil on many habitats. 43
However, the acute effects of chemically dispersed oils on
organisms and habitats vary depending on several factors such as
type of habitat, types of organisms present, frequency of water
exchange, etc. 44 Thus any decision to use dispersants when
38Ibid. 257. Information regarding determinations of dispersant toxicity
and the results of toxicity tests on a variety of organisms appears in National
Research Council, chapter 3.
39Ibid.• 262.
40Ibid., 259.
41 U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants, 26.
42National Research Council, 259. 260 .
43U. S. EPA. Use of Chemical Dispersants. 14.
44National Research Council, 261.
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dispersed oil may impact various species and habitats must be
considered on a case-by-case basis. 45 The American Petroleum
Institute (API) has developed ecologically based guidelines which
describe the desirability of using dispersant in various
habitats. (See Figure 1.) The guidelines suggest, for example,
that dispersant use is the preferred response method in open
water offshore/nearshore areas, is viable in enclosed bays and
harbors, and should be avoided on sheltered sandy beaches. Such
a matrix, along with information regarding potential impacts on
various species present, can help decision-makers decide on the
best response options for various habitat conditions.
To summarize, the principle biological/ecological benefits
of chemically dispersing an oil slick are to:
-prevent stranding of oil in the intertidal zone, especially
when environmentally sensitive habitats are involved;
-reduce the hazards of discharged oil to marine birds and
mammals by preventing the oil from reaching them;
-enhance the degradation of oil components;
-and reduce the chronic impact on some habitats because of
shorter persistence of oil. 46
The potential biological/ecological disadvantages of
dispersant use include :
. of the surface area of slicks
-the possible expans~on
h l ' ke l ' hoo d that marine mammals andwhich can increase t e ~ ~
45Ibid .
46Ibid., 255.
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seabirds will be impacted;
-the potentially increased effect of dispersed oil on marine
life in the water column near the sea surface;
-and the effect of oil dispersed offshore that may reach
coastal marine habitats and communities. 47
with regard to the various ecological and biological
impacts, then, the decision to use dispersants obviously involves
trade-offs, and the advantages of dispersant use must be
carefully weighed against potential disadvantages.
Along with toxicity concerns, the effectiveness of
dispersants on oil spills has also been a source of controversy .
The ability of dispersants to effectively break up an oil slick
depends on numerous factors. These include the physical
properties of the spilled oil, the amount of weathering that the
slick has undergone, the chemical composition of the oil, and the
dispersant formulation and dosage rate. 48 Weathering of the
slick is an extremely significant factor. The longer the oil
, h t and the more viscous it becomes due toremains ln t e wa er
weathering, the less impact dispersants will have as far as
breaking up the slick. 49 Thus decisions to use dispersants must
be made quickly in order for the dispersants to work as expected.
47lbid.
48Ibid .• 256.
49U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants. 7.
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High effectiveness is possible and has been documented in
laboratory experiments. 50 In field experiments, however,
effectiveness has been relatively low, a fact attributed to
conditions not being proper for effective dispersion, or to the
monitoring method being inaccurate. 51 Presently, the Minerals
Management Service is conducting research to provide
effectiveness data for a variety of test oils, as well as working
to reformulate dispersant chemicals to enhance their
effectiveness on a wider variety of spills. 52 The effectiveness
of dispersants is becoming less questionable and today the
general consensus is that dispersants can remove as much as
thirty percent of a large spill from the surface under good
conditions. 53 Therefore the National Research Council has
recommended that the use of dispersants should be considered as a
first response method for oil spills along with mechanical
recovery. 54
Dispersants definitely have a place in oil spill response .
Probably the biggest advantage from a damage mitigation
50Nalional Research Council , 254 .
51 Ibid, 254. Dispersant effectiveness during field tests h~S been ~easured
by visual observation, sampling of water-column concentrauon of dlspers.~d
oil or mass balance calculations. While mass balance measure~e.nts provi e
the' best evidcnce of dispersal of oil at sea, they are extremely difficult to
accom lish in the field as they require a .ve.ry large set of .wate~ samples to be
taken p covering the entire water mass withi n which the 011 ~Ig~~ ~ecome
dispersed. as well as an .accu ralc mcasurement of the amount 0 01 ost
through evaporation. Ibid., Chapter 4.
52U. S. Congress, Oil Spill Response Technology , 112. . .
53U S EPA Use of Chemical Dispersants , 2, based on worldwl.de observallons
. , , fi ld t of dispersant
of oil spill response using dispersanls . Note that ie tes s 0 5 d 78o/t
effectiveness have reported effectiveness . percentages b~tween . an o ,
See Table 4-3 in National Research Council, 180, and chapter 4.
54National Research Council, 255 .
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perspective is that proper dispersant use can prevent spilled oil
from reaching sensitive shorelines. As was written by the EPA,
"the least controversial use of dispersants is on an oil slick in
deep water that is heading toward an ecologically sensitive
coastal area."55 Allowing an oil spill to reach the shoreline
and then attempting to remove it can cause significant
environmental and economic impacts. 56 Moreover, once the oil has
stranded on the shoreline, there may be little that can be done
without further damaging the environment. 57
In addition to the potential for damage minimization due to
preventing oil from reaching critical areas or shorelines,
dispersants can offer significant advantages over traditional
mechanical recovery methods in terms of efficiency, cost, and
waste minimization. With regard to efficiency, dispersants
perform favorably with regard to both effectiveness and encounter
rate, the two factors used to assess efficiency in oil spill
response.58 As already mentioned, the effectiveness of
dispersants in removing oil from the water's surface can be on
the order of thirty percent while mechanical methods average only
ten to fifteen percent. 59 Because dispersants can be applied by
l' n relatively short amounts of time,aircraft over large areas
55U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants. 29 .
56Ibid .. 9.
57Ott Lindstedt-Siva. and Walker. 76, . .
580tt' Lindstedt-Siva. and Walker. 75. Effectiveness refers to fthe ablll~~ to
• . f f h water. and encounter rate re ers to e
remove 011 from the sur ace 0 t ~l' . short amount of time. According to
ability to affect large amounts of 01. I~ ~hat have high effectiveness and high
the authors . oil spill response options "
h Id be chosen to best combat 011 spills .encounter rate s ou
59U. S. EPA. Use of Chemical Dispersants. 2.
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they have an extremely high encounter rate compared with that of
mechanical methods. In fact, dispersants are one of the few
spill countermeasures that can be applied to a large area in a
timely manner. Because of these characteristics, dispersants,
more than any other method, have the potential to influence the
outcome of a significant spill event. 60
The use of dispersant s can also result in savings in cleanup
costs. The National Research Council noted that while "costs of
oil spill cleanup are high, they are an order of magnitude more
for mechanical cleanup than for dispersants, and another order of
magnitude more for the cleanup of immediate and obvious damage
done once the oil has corne ashore. ,,61 A study conducted to
compare the cost of oil spill cleanup using these two methods
provides further evidence. The results of the study found that
the cost of removing oil mechanically from a shoreline ranged
from $65 to $5000 per barrel of oil. By contrast, the cost of
intercepting the oil at sea by spreading dispersants from a four-
engine fixed wing aircraft ranged from $15 per barrel to a
b 1 62 The case for dispersant use ismaximum of $65 per arre .
t h a t shoreline cleanup costs in thefurther supported by the fact
United States are expected to increase. Thi s is due to the fact
of Dispersants to Combat Oil
Approaches , ed . L. Michael Flaherty
60June Lindstedt-Siva,." Approaches to PElan~in~ fO~ ~~~;a~r~:;t e~se."M?;~ael
Spill Response," in Oil Dispersants: New co oglca p .
Flaherty (Philadelphia: ASTM, 1989), 112.
61 National Research Council, 8.
62Albert H. Lasday, "Economic Evalua~ion
Spills," in Oil Dispersants: New Ecological
(Philadelphia: ASTM, 1989), 41.
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that oiled debris is currently classified as hazardous waste
which is expensive to haul and dispose of. 63
The fact that dispersants do not create waste materials is
yet another advantage. If the goal of oil spill response is to
minimize overall ecological damage, the fact that dispersants do
not create tremendous amounts of waste material which will
eventually have impacts elsewhere must be considered. In fact,
Ferriere argues that waste minimization concepts should be
addressed as a means of providing for the most ecologically sound
oil spill response. M While mechanical response creates problems
in terms of waste, dispersants do not and are therefore highly
compatible with waste minimization principles. 65
Obviously dispersants are no panacea for oil spills and
their use requires careful consideration. Decision-makers must
determine whether the dispersants will be effective on the slick
in question, and must make important trade-off decisions
regarding the impacts of both the oil and the dispersants on the
b ff t d The Po i n t to be made is thatresources expected to e a ec e .
dispersants in some situations can contribute significantly to
minimizing damage from oil spills and therefore should be
available as a viable option when conditions warrant their use.
To be an effective and viable tool, however, certain
prerequisites are necessary. Much has been written about what is
feasible given their controversial
needed to make dispersant use
63Ibid. 42.
64Dale Ferriere "Waste Minimization Concepts Applied to Oil Spill
". 199'3 International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
Response. III American Petroleum Institute, 1993), Ill.(Washington, D. c..
65Ibid, 113.
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nature and the technical requirements necessary to apply them.~
The first prerequisite is a functional decision-making process so
that the decision to use dispersants on a spill can be made
quickly. This is a must as dispersants lose their effectiveness
over time as oil becomes weathered (see above) . Contingency
plans are also necessary. The purpose of such planning is to
settle conflicts and to make decisions regarding dispersant use
prior to a spill, a process which facilitates decision-making at
the time of the spill. Lastly, an appropriate logistics
capability to apply the dispersants must be present. Again, due
to the time critical nature of dispersant application, the
chemicals, the application platform (i.e. boat or aircraft), and
technical information regarding application rates and such must
be compiled/positioned and ready to go when "the bell rings."
This logistical capability, however, will only be developed once
the other prerequisites are in place. No company can be expected
to make such an investment unless it can be sure that dispersant
use is indeed a viable response option.
Given these facts, it is no wo nde r dispersants are never
used in the united States . Up to this point, planning for
use has been slow and haphazard, and the dispersantdispersant
use policy has involved a cumbersome decision process unable to
, These problems, and the consequentproduce quick decislons.
66Robert Pavia and CDR Lindon A. Onstad , :'Plan~ for Integrating Dispersant
Use in California," in Procecdings of the 198~ all SQllI Conf~rcnce,
(W hington 0 C' American Petrolcum Institute, 1985) 85, and Mark L. . Ias I ,. .. . .. ' 0 '1 D' ersants: New EcologlcaL ache "Dispersant Use Considerations, In ~ILJld..!1ISU;p~.~.!ll. .:.....-::-~~~~~~=
A
av roa~hes, ed . L. Michael Flaherty (Philadclp~ia: ASTM, 1989), .1~2 . Bothar~i~les which describe wcll what is needed In terms of prcrequlsltes for
effective dispersant use .
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reluctance to prepare logistically for dispersant use, have
basically precluded dispersant use as a response option. The
next section discusses the past policies surrounding dispersant
use, as well current changes in the policy which attempt to
address these problems.
Chapter 3 Dispersant Use Policy
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3.1 THE HISTORY OF U. S. DISPERSANT USE POLICY
As one Coast Guard Admiral stated during a post-Exxon Valdez
congressional hearing, "the use of dispersants is always
controversial and poses problems when they are considered."
Also, "the U. S. as a body of organizations and agencies has been
very reluctant to get off into dispersants. ,,67 This reluctance
was in part a direct result of the British response to the Torrey
Canyon incident, during which the dispersants used to combat the
immense oil spill caused more damage than good. The dispersants
used during that incident were highly toxic; they were developed
as degreasing agents to clean tankers and were not suited for oil
spill response. The results were an ecological disaster and
natural recovery remained incomplete over ten years later. 68
Therefore, as a result of the Torrey Canyon response,
dispersants acquired a poor reputation and were feared for their
potentially toxic effects . U. S. policy developed to govern
dispersant use as an oil spill response option was subsequently
exceptionally conservative. The Water and Environmental Quality
Improvement Act of 197 069 called fo r the development of a
National Contingency Plan (NCP) that was to "provide for
efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage
from oil discharges," which could include "containment,
67U . S. Congress , Investigation, 4, 85.
68U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants, 28.
69The Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970 amended
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). See U. S . Statutes at Large,
vol. 84, pt. 1, (1970-1971) : 91.
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dispersal, and removal of oil.,,70 Specifically, the plan was to
describe procedures and techniques for dispersing oil, and was to
include a schedule that (1) identified dispersants that could be
used, and (2) identified waters in which dispersants could be
used and the quantities of dispersant that would be considered
safe. 71 The intent of this National Contingency Plan was not
only to enhance the ability of the United States to respond
effectively to large oil spills, but to protect against the
irresponsible use of dispersants. In considering the adoption of
this law, the Congress clearly stated that one of the objectives
of the NCP was to "insure that the waters, beaches, and
shorelines, including the marine environment, would not be
damaged through the use of harmful chemicals or other
materials. «r; The National Contingency Plan that resulted,
promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality in 1970,
reflected these very sentiments. 73
First, the plan advocated the development and utilization of
mechanical and other oil spill control methods that would remove
oil from the environment, and allowed that dispersants be used
70FWPCA, as amended in 1970. Sec. II(c )(2).
71FWPCA, as amended in 1970. Sec. 11(c)(2)(f) and (g).
72Water and Environmental Ouality Improvement Act of 11970. Legislative
History. U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, vol. 2 (1970): 2703.
73 This was not the first National Contingency Plan. The first was the 1968
National Multi-Agency Oil and Ha zardous Materials Contingency Plan. This
plan, however, only discussed dispersant use in general terms, establishing
overarching principles to govern the use of chemical dispersants. The 1970
NCP was the first plan to delineate specific requirements for dispersant use.
See Harold 1. Snyder, "Federal Regulatory Control of Oil Spill Removal
Methods," in Proceedings of the 1975 Conference on the Prevention and
Control of Oil Pollution, (Washington, D. c.: American Petroleum Institute,
1975), 33.
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only if other control methods were jUdged inadequate or
infeasible. 74 It also delineated specific conditions under which
dispersants could be used, as well as specific authorities who
were required to be involved in the decision to use dispersants.
Basically, dispersants were authorized for use only if: (l) the
Federal On-Scene Commander (FOSC)75 judged it necessary to reduce
hazards to human life or substantial hazard of fire to property;
(2) the Federal Water Quality Administration (FWQA), in
consultation with the concerned states, judged that dispersant
use would prevent or reduce substantial hazard to a major segment
of the population(s) of vulnerable species of waterfowl; or (3)
the FWQA, in consultation with the concerned states, judged that
dispersant use would result in the least overall environmental
damage, or interference with designated uses. 76 The FOSC was
also required to obtain the concurrence of the Department of
Interior (DOl) representative to the Regional Response Team
(RRT)77 before using dispersants. Specifi c conditions during
which dispersants could not be used were al so s p ec i f i e d . Those
restrictions were based on the type of oil spilled, the amount of
74Council of Environmental Quality. "National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan. " Federal Register (2 June 1970) vol. 35. no. 106. p.
8513. Annex X. Sec. 2001.3 and 2007 {hereinafter cited as 1970 NCP) .
75 According to the 1970 NCP. the Federal On-Scene Commander (FOSC) was
the single executive agent predesignated by the NCP and regional plans to
coordinate and direct pollution control activities at the scene of a spill or
potential spill. The name of this position has since been changed to Federal
On-Scene Coordinator. but the role remains essentially the same.
76 1970 NCP. Annex X, Sec . 2005.
77Regional Response Teams (RRTs) are responsible for regional planning
and the coordination of preparedness and response actions. Presently RRTs
consist of members from USCG. EPA . FEMA. DOD. USACE. US Navy SUPSALV, DOE,
USDA. DOC through NOAA. HHS. DOl. DOL. DOT. DOS . NRC. GSA. as well as state and
local agencies.
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oil, the depth of the water, whether the dispersed oil was likely
to impact the shore, and the presence of marine life in the
area. 78 Lastly, stringent requirements were established
regarding dispersant data that was to be provided to FWQA for the
agency's review prior to use of the dispersant. 79 Thus a system
was designed in which dispersants were basically to be used as a
last resort, and only after various individuals and agencies had
both reviewed pertinent data on the specific dispersant to be
used, and had collectively agreed that the stipulated conditions
in the Plan were present in order to justify its use .
After the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, the National Contingency Plan underwent some
changes. First, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
given responsibility for preparation of the Dispersant Schedule
(i.e. the dispersant guidelines) under Executive Order 11735. 80
Second, the EPA representative to the RRT was required to grant
concurrence to the FOSC before dispersants could be used (vice
the Dor representative). The advice of this representative was
to be binding on the FOSC.81 Third, an "and" was placed between
the stipulated dispersant use conditions listed in the 1970 NCP,
11 th co nd i t i o n s be met instead ofthereby requiring that a ree
just one, as had previously been the case. Therefore, although
d the Plan continued to reflectsome of the players had change ,
78 1970 NCP, Sec. 2006.
79Ibid., Sec. 2007. .
80Council on Environmental Quality, "National ad and Hazardous Substan1cSeSsR · (13 AU CTust 1973 ) vol. 38, no. ,Pollution Contingency Plan," Federal eglSler E
p. 21888, preamble {hereinafter cited as 1973 NCP) .
811973 NCP, Sec. 1510.36(a)(3).
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fear of dispersants and to place significant hurdles in the path
of dispersant use through the 1970's and the 1980's.
The responsibility for changes to the National Contingency
Plan was delegated to the EPA in Executive Order 12777,82 and
the Plan has since undergone numerous changes. It will suffice
for the purposes of this paper to review the status of the
National Contingency Plan just prior to passage of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) so that the impact of that law may
be demonstrated .
A revised National Contingency Plan was published in the
federal register as a final rule on March 8, 1990 (just months
prior to the passage of OPA 90). This plan required that the
FOSC receive concurrence from the EPA representative and the
affected state(s) representative(s) to the RRT, and consult with
the Department of Commerce (DOC) and Department of Interior (001)
natural resource trustees83 when practicable, before authorizing
dispersant use. 84 (This team of decision-makers is informally
referred to as the "concurrence network.") In addition to these
chemical or
may be
To have a
specific authorizations, particular dispersants were required to
be listed on the NCP Product Schedule i n order to be considered
for use. 85 The FOSC, however, was authorized t o use dispersants
82U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, " Federal Register (8 March 1990) vol.
55, no. 46, p. 8826, Statutory Authority {hereinafter cited as 1990 NCP}.
83Natural Resource Trustees are officials of federal natural resource
management agencies designated in subpart G of the current NCP, or
designated state officials or indian tribes , who may pursue claims for natural
resource damages due to oil or hazardous substance releases.
84 1990 NCP, Sec. 300.91O(a).
85The NCP Product Schedule is a list of dispersants and other
bioremediation products maintained by the EPA . These products
authorized for use on oil discharges as per guidance in the NCP.
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not on the Product Schedule, and without the appropriate
concurrences, if the use of the product was necessary to prevent
or substantially reduce a hazard to human life. 86
Another significant provision in the 1990 NCP stated that
RRTs "shall, as appropriate, consider as part of their planning
activities, the appropriateness of using the dispersants.
listed on the NCP Product Schedule. . Regional Contingency
Plans (RCPs) shall, as appropriate, address the use of such
products in specific contexts.,,87 rf such plans were approved in
advance by the concurrence network (i.e. EPA and state RRT
representatives and ooc /oor natural resource trustees), the FOSC
could authorize dispersant use at the time of a spill without the
approval of the concurrence network as long as the specific
conditions as laid out in the RCP were followed. 88
Thus through time the National Contingency Plan continued to
maintain a conservative posture toward dispersant use, requiring
that several agencies agree to use them in any specific
circumstance. In comparison with the earliest editions of the
NCP, the latest revisions prior to OPA 90 actually added an
additional layer of hierarchy onto the already burdensome
decision process by including DOC and 001 natural resource
trustee consultations to the concurrence network.
product placed on the Schedule , certain tests must be undertaken and the
results, as well as other data on the product, must be submitted to EPA. For
dispersants, only those which attain a 45 percent effectiveness value from the
Swirling Flask effectiveness test will be placed on the product schedule . See
the current NCP, Section 300 .915, for all product information and testing
requirements .
861990 NCP, Sec. 300.910(c).
871990 NCP, Sec. 300.910(e).
88Ibid.
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Some progress was made, however, with regard to the
provisions requiring RRTs to consider pre-planning. Plans which
pre-approved dispersant use under specific conditions could
tremendously reduce the time necessary to make a dispersant use
decision. This would help to make dispersants a viable response
option in light of the fact that they are effective only if
applied rapidly after a spill has taken place (explained above.)
Still, the language in the planning provision was such that RRTs
could decide to what extent, if any, they wanted to pre-plan for
dispersant use. Also, even if pre-planning were desired,
reaching agreement among the agencies and states with varying
interests proved to be a difficult task.
Despite the best efforts of RRTs across the country to
streamline the dispersant use decision process, often the result
at spill time had been no decision at all or a decision that came
too late to affect the outcome of the spill. 89 Events during the
Exxon Valdez spill underscored these problems and spurred some
needed change in the form of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
3.2 DISPERSANTS AND THE EXXON VALDEZ
Shortly after midnight on March 24 , 1 989, the 987 foot tank
vessel Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, and what followed was the largest oil spill in
u. S. history.90 This tragic accident not only demonstrated the
inadequacy of the U. S . National Response System as a whole to
890tt, Lindstedt-Siva, and Walker, 75 .
90National Response Team, 1.
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respond to such an incident, but more specifically pointed out
lessons with regard to the dispersant use policies then in place.
At the time of the Exxon Valdez incident, the Regional
Contingency Plan (RCP) for the area of Alaska was actually quite
progressive in terms of its dispersant use policy. In one of the
first planning efforts of its kind, this RCP included chemical
dispersant pre-authorization procedures for use in Prince William
Sound. These provisions were intended to allow the FOSC to make
timely dispersant use decisions by providing him with the
authorization to allow dispersant use in certain areas, under
certain conditions, without going through the normal concurrence
network. 91 The Plan divided Prince William Sound into three
zones. (See Figure 2.) In zone 1 dispersant use was acceptable
and the FOSC was pre-authorized to use them without RRT/state
concurrence and resource trustee consultation.
dispersant use was conditional and normal
In zone 2,
concurrence/consultation was required. Waters within zone 3 were
not recommended for dispersant use, however, dispersants could be
authorized through the normal concurrence network. 92
The following chronology was extracted from the Federal On-
Scene Coordinator's Report, T/V Exxon Valdez oil spill, and
serves to demonstrate the dispersant use decision processes that
occurred during that incident. When the Exxon Valdez initially
ran aground and began to leak oil, the oil was present in zone 2,
an area of conditional dispersant approval.
91Ibid.. 6.
92Ibid.. 17 ..
The FOSC, realizing
Figure .2
Zones Of Dispersant Use In Prince William Sound
2 -(Mar 1-0ct.15)
2
1 -Acceptable and OSC preauthorized
2 -Conditional. RAT concurrence required
3 -Not recommended . RAT concurrence required
Source: Na tional Response Team, The Exx:on Valdez Oil Spill, A Report to the
President, May 1989, p. 18.
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that dispersants might have been an option and that normal
concurrence would have been required, prompted Alyeska, the
terminal from which the vessel departed, to formally request
approval to use dispersants from the RRT. This occurred at 0630
on March 24, approximately six hours after the commencement of
the spill. A ten page formal request for dispersant use was
submitted by Alyeska at 0842. The FOSC then convened a
conference for 1000 to discuss the dispersant issue. Delays in
the arrival of key personnel resulted in the meeting being
postponed until 1200. Deliberations continued until 1510 because
the Coast Guard had many concerns regarding whether or not the
dispersant would work, and those concerns were being weighed
against concerns of local fishermen regarding the potential
impact of the dispersants on the fisheries, among other things.
By the adjournment of the meeting, the leading edge of the spill
had entered zone 1 and the FOSC approved a trial application of
dispersant on the leading edge of the slick. The initial trial
application was administered at 1800 (approximately sixteen hours
after the onset of the spill) and the results were inconclusive;
observers had difficulty in determining the effectiveness of the
dispersant due to cloudy skies and fading light. Over the next
two days discussions on dispersants and trial applications
continued with little success. By the third day of the spill,
the weather had deteriorated and precluded the application of
34
dispersants by airplane. By that time, the window of opportunity
for successful dispersant use had passed. 93
The issue of dispersants became a source of bitter
controversy during the post-incident litigation. Both Exxon and
Alyeska claimed that the decisions for dispersant use in this
particular incident were too slow and had hindered their ability
to make use of the dispersant option. 94 This was an important
point of contention for these companies because if the decisions
had been quicker, and if they had been able to effectively
utilize dispersants, they might reasonably have been able to
preclude at least some percentage of the shoreline damage
experienced. Others agreed that the dispersant decision process
was a problem. For example, the FOSC himself later observed that
the long delay leading up to the first dispersant test may have
handicapped its chances for success. 95 During post-incident
congressional hearings, many witnesses acknowledged the problem
with the existing dispersant use policy in light of what happened
in Alaska. For instance, the Director of the Chemical Emergency
Preparedness and Prevention Office of the EPA stated that one of
the lessons learned from Valdez was that the decision-making
f d . , what technology to use needed to beprocesses or eterm~n~ng
streamlined. 96
93U. S. Coast Guard. Federal On-Sccnc Coordinator's Report TN Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill (Washington, D. C.: GPO. 1993 ): 40-45 . .
94U. S. Congress, House. Committee on Public Works and .~r~nsponatlon.
National Oil Spill Contingency Planning and Response CapahIlltlcs, 101st Cong ..
1st Sess., 18 June 1991: 103.
95U. S. Coast Guard, Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report, 41.
96U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries , Oil
Spill Response, 101st Cong.. 1st Scss.. 26 July 1989 : 106 .
and effective
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Ironically, Alaska was one of the few places that had an
actual dispersant pre-approval plan in place and the management
of the dispersant issue was actually handled much better than in
previous spills. Dispersants were considered as an option and a
consensus regarding their use was ultimately reached. Although
the initial decision was delayed and probably prevented the first
trial application of dispersants from being effective, sixteen
hours was a record in the United States as far as reaching a
dipsersant use decision. 97 Despite these facts, the Exxon Valdez
incident simply served as a dismal reminder that U. S. dispersant
use policy continued to preclude the effective operational use of
dispersants as an oil spill response option . Consequently formal
legislation was called for to attempt improvement.
3.3 OPA 90 CHANGES TO THE DISPERSANT USE POLICY
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed August 18, 1990, was a
direct result of Exxon Valdez oil spill. The law sought to
comprehensively address many of the problems associated with both
. t' and response that were brought to lightoil splll preven lon
d Wl' t h regard to dispersant use policy, OPAduring that trage y.
90 made only slight changes, but ones that could be significant
nonetheless.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 did not change the basic
of t h e National Contingency Plan. The purposes remainedpurposes
as before to provide for efficient, c oordinated,
action to minimize damage from oil and hazardouS substance
97 Ferriere , 114,
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discharges. Again, such action could include containment,
dispersal, and removal. Also, the requirement for a schedule of
dispersants that may be used, identification of waters in which
such dispersants may be used, and identification of the
quantities of dispersant that could safely be used did not
change. 98
OPA 90 did, however, establish a new planning entity within
the National Response System. Area Committees, comprised of
appropriate qualified personnel from various Federal, State, and
local agencies, and under the direction of the Federal OSC for
each Area99 , were established and tasked with developing Area
Contingency Plans (ACPs) .100 Area Committees were also
specifically tasked with working with "State and local officials
to expedite decisions for the use of dispersants and other
mitigating substances and devices. ,,101 In addition, the Area
Contingency Plan was to "describe the procedures to be followed
for obtaining an expedited decision regarding the use of
di spersant s . ,,102 Thus these new planning bodies were strictly
mandated by law to address dispersant issues prior to a spill so
that rapid deci sions during a s p i l l were possible.
Consequently the National Contingency Plan was revised to
reflect these changes. Under the new Plan dated September 15,
980il Pollution Act of 1990, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
vol. 1 (1990), Section 4201(d) {hereinafter cited as OPA 90}. .
99"Areas" designated for the purposes of Area Contingency Plans, l~ the
coastal zone, coincide with the Coast Guard Captain of the Port boundanes as
outlined in 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 3.
1000PA 90, Sec. 4202(a)(4) .
101Ibid., Sec. 4202(a)(4)(b)(iii).
102Ibid., Sec. 4202(a)(4)(c)(v).
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1994, RRTs and Area Committees are to address the desirability of
using dispersants listed on the NCP Product Schedule. RCPs and
ACPs shall, as appropriate, include applicable pre-authorization
plans and address the specific contexts in which dispersant
products should and should not be used. As before, if such plans
are approved through the concurrence network during the planning
phase, the FOSC is authorized to use dispersants in the
prescribed circumstances without formal concurrence at the time
of the spill. I03 Members of the concurrence network are mandated
to review and either approve, disapprove, or approve with
modifications the pre-authorization plans. I04 This provision
forces the concurrence network to seriously consider dispersant
use; they are no longer allowed to leave the dispersant issue
unresolved by failing to make a decision . The NCP also states
that the Area Contingency Plan shall provide for the pre-approval
of specific countermeasures or removal actions that, if
expeditiously applied, will minimize adverse spill-induced
impacts to fish and wildlife resources, their habitat, and other
sensitive environments. 105
Thus the revised NCP maintains the previous concurrence
whl' c h has been the traditionalnetwork decision process,
stumbling block to dispersant use, but only in cases not
addressed by pre-authorization plans. More importantly, it
mandates that RRTs, Area Committees, and members of the
l03U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Nation~l Oil ~ndS HaZa~ou\994)
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan," Fcderal . Re£lster (1 eptern er .
1 59 178 Section 300.910(a) {hereinaftcr cued as 1994 NCP} .vo. ,no. ,
l04Ibid.
l05Ibid., Sec. 300.210(c)(4)(ii)(D).
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concurrence networks work through the dispersant issues prior to
a spill event, and that Area Committees develop pre-authorization
plans as a component of the new Area Contingency Plans. The
intent of these requirements is to allow for expedited decisions
regarding response options during a spill so that the most
efficient and effective method can indeed be used . If
successful, these new pre-authorization plans should help to
quicken dispersant use decision-making and thereby to overcome
the primary obstacle that has in the past precluded the United
States from the capability to use this important oil spill
response tool.
Chapter 4
Policy
Implementation of the New Dispersant Use
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4.1 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - GENERAL
Despite these new statutory requirements for the development
of dispersant pre-authorization plans and procedures for
expedited decisions, it is the actual implementation of these
policies that will determine whether or not they will be
successful. Implementation is the stage in the policy process
when the policy is moved from the political realm to that of
administration, and the bureaucracy is actuall y r esponsible for
filling in the details, or putting the n e w program into effect. 106
In the case of the dispersant policy, implementation may be
viewed as the development of the actual pre-authorization plans,
documents which outline specifically where and under what
conditions dispersants may be used in each Area, and which allow
the FOSC alone to make the decisions concerning the use of
dispersants on a particu lar spill based on the stipulations in
the plan. The succe s s of these plans, then, can be determined
based on the abilit y of the plan t o allow the FOSC t o make rapid
dispersant decisions without outside interference using
information in the plan. This will increase the viability of
dispersant use, providing a functional decision process, as well
as increased confidence in the decision process needed for proper
logistical preparation a s explained above .
106Charles O. Jones. An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy. 3rd cd.
(Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co .. 1984 ), 164.
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with this is mind, the process of developing the pre-
authorization plans is a vitally important component contributing
to the ultimate success of the new dispersant pre-authorization
plans. In this case, the process must allow for the
participation of all interested parties in the development of the
plans, that is, in the decisions regarding the use of dispersants
in a particular area. Otherwise, the potential actions of such
parties or groups, if they disagree with the contents of the
plans, could undermine the plans and thereby sabotage their
chances for success at the time of a spill. The following
sections will describe the role of interest groups in oil spill
response in general and the importance of incorporating these
groups in the spill response planning processes, both for overall
oil spill response activities, as well as those involving
dispersants.
4.2 OIL SPILL RESPONSE MANAGEMENT - GENERAL
In order to understand the impact that interest groups can
have on spill response decision-making, it is first useful to
understand some of the dynamics of oil spill response in general.
As was stated above, significant oil spills often have far-
reaching impacts and cause extensive damage, both in economic and
ecological terms. Thus, when an oil spill occurs, a large number
of individuals and groups of people become impacted in some way
and they therefore have an interest in the spill response and its
ultimate outcome. These groups and individuals are termed
"stakeholders" in that they have a stake in the outcome of an oil
4 1
spill. 107 One important group of stakeholders is the
environmental stakeholders, or those concerned with the perceived
adverse effects of oil spills on the natural and man-made
environment. Such stakeholders include environmental
conservation groups, citizen advocacy groups, resource users, and
community groups . (See Figure 3) .
Since the goals of any oil spill response include satisfying
the goals and objectives of the government, the responsible
party, and the pUblic (which includes the interest group
stakeholders named above) ,108 the optimum method of response
management would seem to allow for all of these groups to be
involved in the decision-making that occurs during a spill. This
is indicative of an "open" spill response management system,
which is characterized by flexibility, improvisation by spill
responders, and decentralized decision-making . 109 While this type
of response management system is beneficial in terms of including
all interests in the decisions, it is relatively ineffective in
terms of reaching quick decisions that are necessary during the
emergency/crisis situation of a significant spill. The more
effective type of management system for oil spill response is the
"closed" system which is characterized by centralized decision-
107 "Stakeholde rs" are more precisely defined by the Coast Guard as those
individuals or organizations that have a vested interest in an event or the
actions being taken in response to an event, and also have the power ~o .
directly or indirectly influence the actions being taken or the . orgamzauons
involved. See U. S. Coast Guard, Stakeholder Lesson Plan, OSC Crisis
Management Course, (Yorktown, VA. 1995) .
108Ann Hayward Walker, John R. Harrald, Donald L. Ducey, and Stephen J.
Lacey Implementing an Effective Response Management System, Tech Report
IOSC:001 prepared for the 1995 International. Oil Spill Conference .
(Washington, D. C. : American Petroleum Institute , 1994), 20.
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Figure 3
Examples of Environmental Stakeholders and Their Concerns
Tvne of Stakeholder Form of Concern Effect on Response
State Trustee/RRT Rep Regulatory; official lead Significant Influence on the
local area rep. for public timing and type of proposed
response actions - can employ
political and permitting
controls
Federal Trustee/RRT Rep Regulatory; rep. of the Significant influence on the
public interest for certain timing and type of proposed
resources response actions - can employ
political and permitting
controls
Conservation Group Established groups; Potentially significant
custodial in approach; may depending upon the incident;
have have the resources to sustain
national/international their activity for the duration
membership of the incident
Advocacy/Citizen Group Established groups; broad Usually high profile -
environmental concerns; generally intense but more
often adversarial or short-term involvement; have
confrontational; may have the resources to sustain their
national! international activity if they choose
membership
Resource Users Economic/Recreational! Very vocal; sustained interest
Cultural dependency upon and involvement because they
resources at risk are dependent upon potentially
galvanizes their concern affected resources; direct
effect on them
Media Assertive efforts to obtain Intense involvement for as
information; it is their job long as the incident is
to obtain information newsworthy
Citizens, community Informal groups; very Can be very vocal, but may be
groups, academia concerned about less visible to the media and try
environmental effects; for direct contact with
direct or indirect responders.
inquiries, may volunteer
assistance
Source: Adapted from Concerns of Environmental Stakeholders table from OSC
Crisis Management Course, USCG Marine Safety School, Yorktown, VA: 1994.
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making and the direction of operations by a single person. The
problem with this type of system is that it fails to account for
interests outside of the formal response organization, and
therefore its actions are less likely to be perceived as
successful by external organizations, including the pUblic. 110
Because neither of these oil spill response management
systems in the strict sense is practicable, oil spill response
planning has emerged to bridge the gap between these two methods.
The process of planning serves to bring together all appropriate
interests in order to set goals, to agree upon courses of action
that will be taken in the event of a spill, and most importantly
to resolve conflicts, before the spill actually takes place.
Pre-spill planning allows for the identification of stakeholder
interests that can reasonably be anticipated to emerge at spill
time, and the incorporation of these concerns into planning
decisions. This type of approach gives various stakeholder
interests "full involvement in setting priorities and other
strategic issues, while recognizing the compelling need,
, h i f ,,111heat of battle, to have only one commander In c le .
Considering that pre-spill planning is critical in terms of
resolving potential conflicts during oil spill response and
providing for an effective decision-making c a pa b i l i t y at spill
l09Ibid, 1.
110Ibid, 2. . '
111J h E Lees "Contin(Tcncy Plannina, Contractor Requ irernents. and 011
osep . , 0 0 1 'I 0 '1 Sni llPollution Act of 1990 Implementation," in 1993 nternapona I I'"
. D C American Petroleum Institute,Conference Proceedings, (Washington. ' .:
1993), 52.
Over
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time, it is equally critical that all interested parties, or
stakeholders, that are likely to emerge with concerns at spill
time, be involved in this planning. Special interest groups,
especially environmental interest groups, have emerged in this
sense, as will be discussed below, and therefore comprise a
significant group of organizations whose views must be considered
during spill response and spill response planning.
4.3 WHY SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN OIL
SPILL RESPONSE - PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
"Special interest groups are demanding a larger role in
making spi ll-related decisions. 11112 In fact, interest groups can
be expected to emerge at the time of a spill to make their views
known and to attempt to influence spill response decisions. The
reasons underlying this phenomenon are not known exactly, yet it
can likely be attributed in part to certain fundamental societal
trends that have evolved over the past few decades in the United
States.
The first reason centers around the general desire of
Americans to be involved in governmental de cision-making.
d A , ha e demanded a more directthe past several deca es, merlcans v
role in governmental decision-making, thereby increasing
likelihood that the y will demand t o parti c ipate in oil spill
response decisions.
1120tt, Lindstedl-Siva, and Walker, 75.
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"In democratic society, it is an accepted value that
individuals and groups will have the opportunity to participate
in or be represented in decisions that affect them."113 While
this value is generally accepted and is rather obvious, the
public has only relatively recently demanded to be more directly
involved in governmental decisions, and this has been in response
to general dissatisfaction with government and society.114 As one
author wrote in the 1970's, "there has been a growing concern
that the public, or at least significant portions of it, has
developed an increasing feeling of alienation towards
governmental decision-making. In some instances, a profound
distrust of the entire system has developed. "liS As a result,
pressure groups have increasingly been established as a means for
the public to influence planning and policy-making. 116 This
establishment of groups is considered part of the "citizen
initiated participation movement," a movement characterized by
citizen action (in the form of grassroots organizations, public
interest groups, consumer groups, etc.) which influences and
monitors government .117 The point here is that "there is a limit
113Helen M. Ingram, "Information Channels and Environmental Decision-
Making," in Environmental Concern , cd. Arvin W. Murch (New York: MSS
Information Corp., 1974), 159. .
114Stuart Langton, "Citizen Participation in America: . Current ReflectIOns
on the State of the Art," in Citizen Participation in America. cd. Stuart Langton
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1978), 1. .
115W. R. Derrick Sewell and J. T. Coppock, "A Perspective. on Public
Participation in Planning," in Public Participation in Planniaa. eds. W. R.
Derrick Sewell and J. T. Coppock (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Lid.. 1977), 1.
116Ibid, 2.
117Langton , 1.
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to how much the public will tolerate in silence,"1I8 and citizens
have come to expect the ability to participate in and to
influence government decisions. Logically, if government
officials fail to consider public opinion, they can expect vocal
opposition, a situation which may lead policies and programs to
be perceived as failures, and almost definitely leads to a
decrease in their effectiveness.
In fact, the government has recognized the importance of
involving the public in decisions in order to promote the success
of programs. The "citizen involvement" movement, which was
initiated by government and stressed the importance of involving
citizens in improving and gaining support for administrative
decisions and government programs, emerged in the 1940's in the
form of the Administrative Procedures Act. 119 According to the
Act, agencies developing rules and regulations to implement
legislation were required to, among other things, provide for
public notice and comment during the rulemaking process. In
enacting these requirements, Co n g r e s s apparently recognized the
vested interest of people directly affected by public programs,
and professed that participation was henceforth a right rather
than a privilege. 120 Thi s ideal has been repeated time and time
118Arvin W . Murch . "Who Cares About the Environment?" in
Environmental Concern , ed . Arvin W. Murch (New York: MSS Information
Corp., 1974), 17.
119 Administrative Procedures Act. U. S. Code Congressional Servi ce. (1946),
p. 228.
120Walter A. Rosenbaum, "Public Involvement as Reform and Ritual: The
Development of Federal Participation Programs," in Citizen Participation in
America, ed. Stuart Langton (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1978),
83.
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again and today almost all new major federal legislative programs
contain citizen participation requirements. 121 In addition,
requirements for active participation in administrative policy-
making have proliferated at all levels of government. 122
One important example of participation requirements in
environmental policy is seen in the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) .123 This law requires that agencies prepare
environmental impact statements (EISs) to accompany proposals for
legislation and other major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. 124 These EISs
must then be made available to the public and to other federal
agencies with environmental responsibilities, so that these
entities may comment on the proposal. While the substantive
impact of NEPA in terms of impact on decisions has been called
into question, 125 the law itself demonstrates the recognition by
policy-makers that citizen and public interest group
participation is important and necessary in order for government
policies to work.
Besides increasing public desire to partic ipate in
governmental decisions, the second overarching societal trend
121Langton, 3.
122Nelson M. Rosenbaum, "Cit izen Participation and Democratic Theory," in
Citizen Participation in America, ed . Stuart Langton (Lexington, Mass : D. C.
Heath and Company, 1978), 43 .
123National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. U. S . Code Congressional and
Administrative News. vol. 1 (1969), p. 950. 42 U. S. C. pp.4321-4347.
124National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, (NEPA), Section 102(c) .
125Helen M. Ingram and Scott J. Ullery, "Public Participation in
Environmental Decision-Making: Substance or Illusion?" in Pub lie
Participation in Planning, eds. W. R . Derrick Sewell and J. T . Coppock (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. , 1977), 130.
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that has led to the increased involvement of interest groups in
oil spill response is the growth of environmental concern in the
United States and the subsequent emergence of environmental
organizations. Since the 1970's, there has been a "remarkably
widespread upsurge" of interest i n the quality of t h e
environment. 126 Also, there ha s been evidence that a large
segment of the American public has come to share a level of
concern for the environment great enough to become personally
committed to the problem and willing to do something about it. 127
Some obvious reasons for the i nitial rise in concern over
the environme nt have been cited as the deterioration of certain
easily perceived environmental conditions, such as urban smog,
the proliferation of solid wastes, the endangerment of many
wildlife species, and oceanic oil spills. 128 Another factor
contributing to elevated environmental concern deals with
increased e xpectations concerning what the environment should be
like and therefore dis satisfaction with "the s y stem" in place to
address these ma t t e r s . 129 This rise in environmental concern was
manifest in the development of public e nv i r o nme n t a l interest
groups, which b lossomed in the 1 960's and grew rapidl y in the
1970 'S.130 As a lluded to above, the s e g r o u p s e me r g e d as a result
of a wave of skeptici s m surrounding governme nt institutions, a
126Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology. the Issue-Attention Cycle,"
In Environmental Concern, ed . Arvin W. Murch (New York: MSS Information
Corp., 1974), 78.
127Murch, 17.
128Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology," 83.
129Ibid, 84-5 .
130Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups in the United States , (New York:
Oxford Univers ity Press, 1981), 86, 101.
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substantial decline in trust in government in the 1960's and
70's, and the feeling of environmentalists that their common
interests could only be protected by such groups.131
Notwithstanding the emergence of environmental interest
groups in the 1970's, concern over the environment and the growth
of environmental groups continues. While the issue of
environmental protection has had its ups and downs, it has been a
persistent concern. Not only has public support for
environmental protection persisted, it has risen substantially in
recent years. 132 In addition, when viewed in terms of the issue-
attention cycle,133 the issue of environmental quality has certain
characteristics which are expected to keep it from moving to the
"post-problem stage," that is, when the issue is replaced at the
center of public concern and enters a prolonged limbo. The most
prominent factors that are expected to prevent a rapid decline in
public interest in environmental issues are: (1) many kinds of
environmental pollution are much more visible and clearly
threatening to people than most other social problems; (2)
environmental disasters such as oil spills spark and help to
sustain public interest; and (3) environmental degradation is an
issue that threatens almost everyone, not just a small percentage
of the population, and it is not a strictly politically divisive
I3lIbid. 13,87.
132Christopher J. Bosso, "After the Movement: Environmental Activism in
the 1990's," in Environmental Policy in the 1990's, eds. Norman J. Vig and
Michael E. Kraft (Washington, D. c. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994), 31.
133The "issue-attention" cycle is a model which describes the progression of
public attitudes and behavior concerning most key domestic problems . Instead
of remaining focused on anyone issue for very long, the American public
moves through the cycle and becomes continuously engaged in new issues as
time progresses. See Downs. "Up and Down with Ecology."
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issue.I~ Also, if reaction to oil spills is a symptom of current
environmental concern, the fact that even minor spills today
attract a high degree of public attention is evidence that the
public is increasingly aware and vigilant over environmental
damage. 135
Environmental interest groups themselves are also on the
rise. There are thousands of these groups currently in existence
and their membership numbers into the millions. 136 Figure 4 shows
the increasing membership trends among selected national
environmental groups from 1970 to 1990. In addition, there has
been a substantial rise in the absolute number of environmental
organizations over the past several years. I37
Thus it has been shown that both environmental concern and
environmental interest groups are on the rise in the United
States, and the public in the form of these groups increasingly
desires to participate in governmental decisions, especially
those concerning the environment. These societal trends provide
the foundation upon which increased public interest in oil spill
response, and the potential for increased public/interest group
involvement in spill response activities, is built. It is these
trends which create the potential for the interference of
I34Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology," 86.
135Karen Zuidinga, Noel Boston. and Ian Robertson. "Managing Public
Support During Oil Spills." in Oil Spills: Management and Legislative
Implications. eds. Malcolm L. Spaulding and Mark Reed (New York: American
Society of Civil Engineers, 1990). 335.
I36Daniei H. Henning, Environmental Policy and Administration. (New
York: American Elsevier Publishing Co. Inc.. 1974), 24.
I37Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann, "Interest Groups and Environmental
Policy," in Environmental Politics and Policy - Theories and Evidence, ed.
James P. Lester (London : Duke University Press. 1989), 136.
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Figure 4
97090talGS 1 dN' alE .M b hiT dAmem ers LP ren 5 onz e ecte ation nvironmen roups 1 -
Group 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Sierra Club 150,000 170,000 181,000 364,000 600,000
Nat'l Audubon 105,000 275,000 400,000 550,000 575,000
Society
Nat'l Parks & 50,000 @50,000 31,000 45,000 100,000
Conservation Assoc.
Wilderness Society 44,000 50,000 35,000 150,000 350,000
Nat'l Wildlife 3.1 mill. 3.7 mill. 4 mill. 4.5 mill. 5.8 mill.
Federation
Environmental nonmbr 30,000 46,000 50,000 150,000
Defense Fund
Natural Resources nonmbr 35,000 42,000 50,000 125,000
Defense Council
Source: Bosso, Christopher J. "After the Movement: Environmental Activism
in the 1990's." In Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds., Environmental
Policy in the 1990s. 2nd ed., (Washington D. c.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
1994):36.
interest groups in oil spill response management.
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Thus these
concepts will be extended below to specifically demonstrate the
importance of the oil spill response planning process, as well as
the involvement of appropriate interest groups in that process.
4.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN OIL SPILL
RESPONSE PLANNING
It has been established above that interest groups,
especially environmental interest groups, are currently
interested in oil spill response decisions and are likely to
increasingly desire involvement. Despite the fact that their
involvement may compromise the efficiency of spill response
management decisions, their views cannot be ignored by spill
managers. This is due to the political power of these groups, as
well as the obligation of government officials, especially
administrators in this context, to account for the views of these
public entities, both to uphold the values of democracy, but most
importantly to maintain support for the agency.
First the political power of these groups will be discussed.
In the words of one author of the environmental movement, "in the
political arena, the environmentalist s have become an interest
group of sufficient power that the y cannot be ignored. "138 These
groups exert powerful and continuous force upon policy
formulation as well as implementation through formal and informal
138Stan L. Albrecht, "Legacy of the Environmental Movement, " in
Environmental Concern, ed. Arvin W. Murch (New York: MSS Information
Corp., 1974), 259.
5 1
interactions with congressmen and administrators. 139 And while it
is true that the current organizations lean more toward political
activity (such as lobbying, campaigning, electioneering, etc.),
they are beginning to extend their involvement to all stages of
the policy process. They are increasingly realizing the
importance of following through to ensure that programs are
implemented as intended, and to monitor the activities of
administrators who take charge of implementation after program
approval. 140 In addition, local environmental groups are
proliferating and these groups are aggressively involved in
modifying and influencing local policy decisions through
expressions of their values and opinions. 141 Other ways in which
environmental interest groups exert political pressure is through
the media and the courts. 142 As a viable political force, then,
both congressmen and administrators now more than ever, must be
sensitive and responsive to the needs of these groups. While
administrators are not popularly elected and may seem to be less
influenced by political pressures than congressmen, they too have
political concerns, which will be discussed below. Knowledge of
these concerns are important in the context of this paper because
they help to demonstrate the necessary components of successful
administrative policy and program development, concepts which
139Henning, 22, 25.
140Jack D. Kanez, "Crisis Response Planning," APA Journal (Winter 1984),
17.
141 Henning, 27.
142Wilson, 95.
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apply to dispersant use policies and the implementation of those
policies in the new dispersant pre-authorization plans.
Administrators must be responsive to public interest groups
for two reasons. The first is to support the democratic ideal
that the government's job is, in essence, to serve the wishes of
the people. Probably the more influential reason, however, deals
with the practical reality of agency survival. It is well known
that bureaucracies compete with one another for portions of the
finite government budget and spend inordinate amounts of time and
effort in the pursuit of obtaining "turf" to ensure their
survival. 143 Bureaucratic agencies are caught up in the muddled
soup of politics.
elected officials.
They are paid by taxpayers and are overseen by
They rely on the support of legislators in
terms of gaining the legislation that is beneficial to them as
well as the appropriations that they need to successfully carry
out their programs. The support from the legislators, however,
comes indirectly via the public (and public interest groups) in
that the public has control over whether or not the politician is
re-elected. To sum this up, public and interest group approval
is critical for agencies because these groups influence who gets
elected into Congress, which ultimately determines the support
that the agency receives from Congress in the form of legislation
and appropriations. This is no secret and it has been said that
Department s (and therefore a ge n c i es ) are "subservient" to the
143Much has been written on the politics of agency survival. Two good
sources on this subject are: Chapter XVII "Bureau Territoriality" in Anthony
Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 4th ed . (Boston : Little, Brown, and Company, 1967),
and Matthew Holden, "Imperialism in Bureaucracy," American Political
Science Review (December 1966): 943-51.
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relevant interest groups,IM with the r esult that bureaucrats are
reluctant to make unpopular and controversial decisions. 145
Oil spill managers have in fact recognized the importance of
involving interest groups in oil spill response management and
planning . One of the critical success factors for oil spill
response is said to be accounting for stakeholder interests.l~
Clearl y t he prevailing v iew in the oil spill response literature
is that interest group views must be taken into account for spill
responses to have the slightest chance of being successful.
point was also made several times during the Congressional
This
hearings on the investigation into the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
During t he hearings, one congressman said of oil spill response,
planning, and decisions, "the notion that this problem is going
to be solved by keeping the environmentalists on the outside is a
huge and costly mistake, a huge, huge costl y mistake. ,,147 This
recognition is also evident in the implementation guidance for
the Area Contingency P l a n s . In this guidance, Area Committees
are strongly encouraged to solicit advice, guidance, and
expertise from all appropriate sources, which include
environmental groups, concerned citizens, etc., in the
development of the Area Cont i n ge n c y P l ans . 148 La stly, the
importance o f stakeholders i s stressed during the On-Scene
Coordinator' s Crisis Management Course given by the Coast Guard.
144Wilson, 124 .
145 Langton, 7.
146Walker, Harrald, Ducey. and Lacey, 47.
147U. S. Congress. Investigation , 103.
148U. S. Coast Guard. COMDTNOTE 16471, Establishment of Area Committees
and the Development of Area Contingency Plans, dtd 30 SepL 1992 ..
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During the course, two days are spent discussing the importance
of taking stakeholder interests into account during oil spill
response management, and examples are given to demonstrate
possible ramifications of not doing so.149 Four basic words
written in the course lesson plan sum up the situation quite
well. With regard to ignoring stakeholders during a spill, "try
and you die" is the advice given.
Still, while the importance of accounting for stakeholder
views has been realized, their inclusion in the spill response
management team is not highly effective, as discussed above.
Thus the emphasis has been placed on involving these groups in
the spill planning process instead. The goal of this approach is
ultimately to reduce or eliminate the likelihood that these
groups will emerge at the time of a spill, demand that their
views be taken into account, and thereby decrease the efficiency
of spill management decisions. Coast Guard Admiral Henn
explained that, by widening the community that is making the
decisions in the planning process, "when the balloon goes up and
you have a spill, you don't have folks that have local community
concerns trying to override decisions that the government
149The three examples of problems that have arisen due to failure to
account for stakeholder interests are (1) the U.S. Department of Energy
became involved in a spill due to complaints of oil companies that the Coast
Guard was "freezing out New England" by closing a waterway in New Jersey;
(2) After feeling that they had been ignored, several small environmental
groups loudly raised complaints about medical waste washing up on the shore.
As a result, the Coast Guard was required to survey hundreds of miles of beach
which yielded only two shopping bags of garbage (none of which contained
medical waste; and (3) A Coast Guard office in Savannah was subject to
Congressional hearings in 1987 due to a 1986 spi II of 50,000 gallons simply
because the manager of a wildlife refuge felt he was not being heard. See U. S.
Coast Guard, Stakeholder Lesson Plan .
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officials have made in preparation for responding to that
spill. ,,150 This is because the participants, in being involved in
the planning, understand better the risks involved, and become
aware of compromises and trade-offs that must sometimes be made
in both spill response and planning. 151 They are forced to
confront the realities of policy-making and may develop more
realistic judgments about what can be expected from spill
response. 1S2 The basic assumption is that if interest groups or
the public is involved in planning, even if their advice is
rejected, they may feel that they have at least had their day "in
court" and are more likely to accept policy decisions, 153 thereby
decreasing the likelihood that they will interfere at spill
time. 154
Although the preceding has predominantly focused on the
importance of interest group participation in general oil spill
response planning, the same concepts hold true, albeit to a
greater extent, for dispersant use planning . The criticality of
interest group participation in dispersant planning is perhaps
150U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Qll
Pollution Act of 1990 National and Area Contingency Plans, 102nd Cong., 2nd
Sess., 24 Sept 1992: 31 .
151 U. S. Congress, National Oil Spill Contingency Planning, 21.
lS2Timothy Bcatley, David J. Bower. and William H . Lucy, "Representation in
Comprehensive Planning," Journal of the American Planning Association, vol.
60, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 195.
153 Ingram and Ullery. 123.
154 It should be noted here that although participation should logically
prevent or at least decrease the potential for emergence, this "participation
thesis" has not been proven . In fact. in many studies greater citizen
involvement in agency planning did not necessarily lead to greater public
acceptance and therefore greater ease in program accomplishment. See
Rosenbaum, Walter. 92 . Still, the assumption by spill responders and
government officials in general is that participation is positive and at least
increases the potential for program success.
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greater than that in general oil spill response planning due to
three factors, each of which tends to escalate the potential for
conflict regarding dispersant use decisions.
First, there is a basic dichotomy between the views of the
oil industry and those of environmental groups on dispersant use.
Typically the oil industry has been in favor of more liberal
dispersant use, both because dispersants are a cost effective
response option, and because they (dispersants) have the
potential to significantly reduce ecological and economic damage
(see above) . In fact, the American Petroleum Institute (API) has
been highly involved in dispersant research. The organization
conducted numerous field studies on dispersants and published the
results in a booklet entitled The Role of Chemical Dispersants in
Oil Spill Control. I55 In addition, API contributed in large part
to the development of effective methods for the application of
dispersants by air. I56 As a result of its research, API espouses
the belief that the use of chemical dispersants should be
considered as a primary response option for major offshore oil
spills. I57 Another industrial entity, the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port (LOOP), has also been active with various agencies trying to
advance the knowledge and understanding of dispersants. I58
155U. S. Congress. Investigation. 57.
156U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Science. Space. and Technology. Q.il
Spill Research Needs. lOlst Cong.. 1st Sess .. 7 Sept 1989. 162.
I57Ibid.
I58U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Science. and
Transportation. Exxon Oil Spill. lOlst Cong.. l st Sess.. 10 May and 20 July 1989.
304.
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On the other hand, other interest groups, namely
environmental groups and resource users (i.e. fishers) have
maintained more conservative views on the utility of dispersants.
Many opt for the "precautionary principle," believing that more
research needs to be conducted on the impacts of dispersants on
all types of biota, that baseline data on ecosystems must be
compiled prior to any dispersant use in order to determine long
term impacts, etc. A fisher from Prince William Sound who
testified during the Exxon Valdez hearings noted that the oil
industry made a strong push for dispersant use during the
response. She obviously thought this was inappropriate, stating
that dispersant use was "the preferred option for the oil
industry [because it rendered the oil] out of sight, out of
mind. ,,159
Thus the prevailing views of dispersants in the
environmental and industrial communities create the potential for
conflict regarding dispersant use during actual oil spills. This
potential for conflict is enhanced due to the difference of these
groups with regard to access in the oil spill response decision-
making system. The oil industry, as the entity responsible for
the spill and for the cleanup (the RP or responsible party), is
formally involved in spill management decisions as a bonafide
member of the Unified Command. 160 Environmental and other
159U. S. Congress, National Oil Spill Contingency Planning, 486.
160The "Unified Command System" is the response management system in
which several agencies and individuals with jurisdictional oil spill response
responsibilities work as a team to produce coordinated and effective decisions.
The current NCP, in Sect. 300.105(d), articulates this concept as the basic
framework for the response structure under the National Response System. In
the current response management literature disseminated by the Coast Guard
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interest groups have no formal access to the response management
system. Because these groups have limited opportunity to
influence decisions at the time of the spill, they are more
likely to emerge in other ways in order for their views to be
heard, making the need for resolving conflicts ahead of time even
more critical.
The third factor that creates the potential for conflict is
that dispersant use remains controversial. There is no disputing
that dispersant use involves trade-offs. People or groups
concerned with the conservation of various resources need to
participate in the planning to understand and appreciate the
necessary trade-offs so that the y might understand if and when
their resource might have to be sacrificed for another.
Lastly, dispersant use is a fairly technical issue. The
general public and many interest groups d o not full y understand
the issues surrounding dispersants . Thus the y may harbor
incorrect knowledge or, worse yet, they may be easily swayed to
oppose dispersant use during a spill due to information that is
distributed (by the media or o t h e r interest groups, for example),
that may not be factually accurate. Without specialized training
or some type of e ducation on the dispersant issue, interest
groups become a wildcard and may potentially interfere with spill
management decisions based on unfounded information.
Thus the potential for conflict regarding dispersant use
decisions is relativel y h i gh, a fact which underscores the
for the use by Area Committees, the Unified Command is considered to consist
of the federal government, the state government, and the responsible party.
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importance of both planning for dispersant use and including all
interested parties in this planning. The implications of failing
to plan for dispersant use decisions is, as we have seen, a
matter of history. Lack of pre-spill planning has resulted in
the inability to use dispersants in the United States, a
condition that has been recognized and addressed in the current
requirements for dispersant pre-authorization plans. The
implications of failing to involve all interested parties in
dispersant use planning are more a matter of speculation but can
be reasonably forecast.
Failure to involve interest groups in dispersant use
planning can be expected to undermine the success of these plans,
both over the short and long terms. Success of the plans is
deemed to be measured in terms of their ability to generate rapid
and beneficial dispersant decisions. In the short term context,
interest groups that have not been involved in planning decisions
may emerge at the time of the spill and interfere with decision-
making. Such groups are likely to raise concerns that were not
taken into consideration during the planning process but which
cannot be ignored by the FOSC. The result is that the FOSC must
consider these views at the time of the spill and, even if the
decision outcome does not change, precious time will have been
spent in the deliberations, thereby reducing the likelihood of a
quick and effective dispersant decision. Obviously such a
scenario would significantly handicap the dispersant pre-
authorization plan with regard to its successful implementation
at spill time. Instances of such interest group interference in
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dispersant use decisions are not abundant. This is because of
the scarcity of occasions upon which dispersants have even been
considered as a response option in the United States. The point,
however, can be sufficiently illustrated by the Exxon Valdez oil
spill response. As stated above, there was a dispersant pre-
authorization plan in place for the Valdez area when the Exxon
Valdez ran aground. When it came time for the FOSC to make the
decision regarding dispersant use, however, he was obliged to
consider the views of local fishers who had obviously not
participated to the extent necessary in the planning process to
preclude their emergence. Accounting for these new concerns
contributed to a rather slow decision by the FOSC, a decision
later claimed to be so slow that it prevented effective
dispersant use (see above) .
It could be argued that interest groups cannot be mobilized
quickly enough, or do not have the access to spill response
decision-makers, to directly interfere with spill-time dispersant
decisions. This might be true in certain instances. However, in
such cases these interest groups are likely to take actions while
the response is in progress, or af ter the spill, which are likely
to have negative consequences for dispersant pre-authorization
plans over the long term. Such groups may voice opposition to
the use of dispersants after they have been used on a spill,
which is likely to show up in the media due to the ability of
these groups to effectively use the media to achieve their
objectives. 161 As wa s stated above, bureaucrats, and therefore
161Wilson. 95.
6 1
oil spill managers, are extremely sensitive to negative public
reaction because of its political implications. Any of this kind
of "bad press" is likely to promote reluctance on the part of
FOSCs to make single-handed dispersant decisions despite their
ability to do so based on the pre-authorization plans. Instead,
FOSCs might simply disregard the plans and attempt to gain
agreement from all interested parties at the time of the spill so
that they can demonstrate support if the decision is later
criticized. Worse yet, they may disregard the option of
dispersant use altogether, feeling that it is too politically
risky, thereby leaving the dispersant pre-authorization plan on
the shelf to collect dust, a fate common to many contingency
plans. In either case, the dispersant pre-authorization plans
will not be used as intended and dispersants may never be a
viable response option, a long term potential impact of failing
to include interest groups in dispersant pre-authorization
planning.
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that interest
groups must be involved i n di spersant pre-authorization planning,
and spill response planning in general, for the planning to be
successful. Participation in dispersant u se planning will
increase general public knowledge on dispersants, help interest
groups form valid v i e ws on dispersant use, help spill responders
predict interest group reaction to di spersant use decisions, and
decrease the potential that they will interfere with decisions at
spill time or make vocal criticisms of the decisions after the
spill due to uncertainty about dispersants. However, while Area
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Committees are highly encourage d to involve outside interests in
the Area planning process, this is not a definite indicator that
such involvement has taken place or will take place. The amount
and level of outside involvement has been left strictly to the
discretion of each Area Planning Officer (a Coast Guard officer
in the coasta l zone). In most cases these officers have not
received additional training in group dynamics or in effective
methods to gain public participation in policy decisions,
subjects which are comple x and can be highly problematic. 162
Another complicating factor is that these officers are in most
cases overburdened with work and, despite the best of intentions,
may not be able to spend the time necessary to properly solicit
and include interest groups in the planning. Planning for
dispersant use poses a special problem in that the issues are of
a technical nature . For this reason, in some cases subcommittees
of specialists have been formed to de a l with these issues.
possible that interest groups may not have been invited to
participate because they are thought to lack the knowledge
It is
required to make informed decisions, and that group s that have
been invited may not attend, feeling they will not be able to
contribute effectively t o the di scussion. Th e result i s that
162There are many obstacles to gammg effective public participation in
policy-making. These include, among other things , the lack of motivation on
the part of some groups to participate, and the fact that they must be
"m ob il ized" rather than simply informed. See Rosenbaum, Walter, 91.
Participation may also be seen as inefficient by the bureaucracy , as it causes
increases in costs and delays in terms of policy-making, thereby creating
further obstacles. See Barry Checkoway and Jon Van Til, "What Do We Know
About Citizen Participation? A Selective Review of Research," in Citizen
Participation in America , ed. Stuart Langton (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1978), 33.
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interest group involvement in dispersant use planning today may
not be at the level necessary to preclude the type of
interference, at the time of the spill or afterward, that will
ultimately undermine the effectiveness of the dispersant pre-
authorization plans. If this is the case, it is important to
recognize it and attempt to remedy the situation. Such attention
is necessary to promote effective dispersant use, and to avoid
wastes in time, money and energy spent planning for dispersant
use, both on the part of government agencies and industry (i.e.
stockpiling and dispersant research), if this technology will
never realistically be used.
For these reasons, a study of the involvement of interest
groups in dispersant use planning in the Northeast United States
was undertaken. The study is discussed below.
Chapter 5 The Study
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5.1 BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The Northeast United States, from Maine to New Jersey,
comprises two federal regions and five Coast Guard Captain of the
Port (COTP), or Federal On-Scene Coordinator, zones (see Figures
5 and 6) . Also remember from above that each COTP zone comprises
an Area for the purposes of Area Contingency Planning.
Dispersant pre-authorization plans have been developed for each
of these COTP zones, although each differs in terms of the plan
provisions as well as the processes by which the plans were
developed. Currently the plans are in varying stages of approval
from their respective RRT concurrence networks. For example, the
New York/New Jersey and Long Island Sound plans have been
approved and in place since April of 1994 while the COTP
Providence, Boston, and Portland plans have been submitted to the
RRT but are (as of the writing of this paper) still awaiting
approval. 163 While the specific provisions of each plan are not
important, the processes used to develop the plans are relevant
and will be addressed here briefly.
Basically, the COTP New York and COTP Long Island Sound Area
Committees adopted the Federal Region II dispersant use
guidelines, which were established by the Region II RRT. The
development of these guidelines did not involve local
interests/interest groups per se. However, to the extent that
163Phone conversation with Scott Lundgren, First Coast Guard District
Science Advisor to the District Response Advisory Team and Regional Response
Team Representative, 25 September 1995.
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Figure 5
Standard Regional Boundaries for Ten Regions
&ot1TH DAKOTA
NORlll DAKOTA
Re .IX
Re .X
Source: U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, "National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Final Rule,"
Federal Register (15 September 1994), vol. 59 , no. 178, p. 47428.
Figure. 6
Captain of the Port Zones :.:.
...
COn' Portland
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First Coast Guard District
Seaward boundary extends to 200 miles or Canadian waters
ln1and boundary defined by USCG / US EPA interagency agreement
....... ;.:.:::.:.:
Source: First Coast Guard District Marine Safety Division, Boston, Massachusetts.
65
interest groups were involved in the Area planning, they may have
had a voice in whether or not these guidelines were accepted by
the Area Committee. COTPs Boston and Providence developed a
j oint dispersant pre-authorization plan for Massachusetts and
Rhode Island waters through a special chemical countermeasures
working group comprised of members from both Area Committees.
Lastly, the dispersant pre-authorization plan for the waters off
of Maine and New Hampshire was put together by members of the
COTP Portland Area Committee.
Because of the current stage of development of these
dispersant use plans, as well as the different processes used, it
would be instructive at this po int to investigate the actual
involvement of interest groups in this planning in order to
forecast, as explained above, the likelihood of success for these
plans . Again, it should be emphasized that there is no guarantee
that, if interest groups do n ot participate, they will emerge to
undermine the effective implementation of the plans at spill
time, nor if they do participate, that they will not emerge. The
logical assumption from the foregoing discussion, however, is
that interest group participation in the development of
dispersant use plans will de crease the potential for de structive
interest group interference (both at spil l time and afterward),
and will therefore increase the like l ihood that the new
dispersant pre-authorization plans will be able to be implemented
as expected .
Forecasting the su c cess of these plans i n terms of interest
group participation may reasonabl y be based on four factors.
Thus
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They are the difference between industry and environmental group
views on dispersant use, the present and potential involvement of
these interest groups in oil spill response and dispersant use
planning, the satisfaction of these groups with regard to their
participation in the planning process, and these groups'
confidence in governmental spill response decision-making.
the purpose of the study is to measure these factors and to
consider the implications of the results in terms of the future
success of the new dispersant use plans in the Northeast.
Another purpose is to determine the reasons for this involvement,
or lack thereof, and to provide recommendations if necessary to
enhance interest group participation and thus the likelihood of
success for these plans.
It should be noted here that several other factors may
potentially influence the future success of the dispersant use
plans. These include, for example, FOSC training and confidence,
the availability of dispersant equipment, and the potential
interference of private individuals or citizens in spill response
management. Such factors have not been addressed in this study
due to time and resource constraints, but may provide useful
subjects for future study.
5.2 METHODOLOGY
The study was limited to the Northeast region of the United
States to provide a practicable working area. Also, because the
activities and views of interest groups vary greatly among
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different geographic regions, 1M data from each Area within the
Northeast region was collected and interpreted separately,
allowing for comparison between the Areas.
The data were collected via telephone survey.165 One survey
was developed for environmental interest groups and resource
users, namely fishermen. These groups will be referred to as
"interest groups" for the purposes of the study. The survey
contains questions intended to measure the factors listed above.
A copy of this survey is included as Appendix A.
Subjects of the survey were determined as follows. Sampling
lists of appropriate interest groups were generated from the
lists of environmental interest groups and fishermen's
associations in each Area Contingency Plan (ACP). Groups on
these lists which obviously have no concern with oil spill
response were deleted. In addition, Coast Guard offices in
charge of compiling the ACPs were contacted to provide names and
telephone numbers of appropriate groups which may not appear on
the ACP lists. The names of additional groups appropriate for
the survey were obtained from other survey subjects during actual
interviews. Lastly, the first set of survey questions was used
as a screen to further determine the applicability of groups for
164Walker, Harrald, Ducey, and Lacey, 74.
165Two references which were useful in terms of writing effective
questions and useful questionnaires were Michael Quinn Patton, Practical
Evaluation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), chapters 5 and 6. and Earl
R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1989). Two good sources used for information on
telephone survey research techniques were James H. Frey, Survey Research
by Telephone, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), and Paul J.
Lavrakas, Telephone Survey Methods, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1993).
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the purposes of the survey. Only those groups which have an
interest in marine environmental protection and which have, or
might potentially, become involved in oil spill response issues
were administered the entire survey.
Another important aspect of this survey was that an effort
was made to interview someone within each organization
knowledgeable both on the issue of oil spill response as well as
the organization's involvement and interest in this issue. This
was successful for the most part as the majority of the survey
subjects held the position of Executive Director or one
comparable within the organization. This precluded to the
greatest extent possible inaccurate data which may have been
received had persons less aware of the organization's views and
activities been interviewed (such as a summer intern or the
receptionist) .
Surveys were conducted over two weeks and the data obtained
is that which was able to be collected over those two weeks. It
is stressed here that the sampling sizes used for this study were
relatively small and are not considered statistically valid.
There was no attempt t o contact each and every interest group in
each Area, nor to conduct random sampling of these groups, due to
time and resource constraints . Consequently, the results of the
study must be interpreted with care. The intention of the study
is simply to provide a general indication of the involvement of
interest groups in dispersant planning in the Areas of the
Northeast, and the probable c onsequences for the success o f these
dispersant use plans. The results of the study will not, and are
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not expected to, provide absolute conclusions with respect to
these issues.
A second survey was constructed for industry interest
groups, termed "industry groups" for the purposes of the study.
This survey, a copy of which is included as Appendix B, is much
less extensive than the interest group survey. Its main purpose
is to provide insight into the industry's perspective on
dispersant use in order to compare it with that of the other
interest groups surveyed. Also, the involvement of industry
groups in spill planning is not investigated in depth as it is
for the other interest groups, since it is the other interest
groups that are more likely to interfere with the effective
implementation of dispersant use plans at spill time . Industry
groups, on the other hand, are not likely to cause such problems
because they are generally in favor of dispersant use. In
addition, they are part of the actual decision-making hierarchy
during spills, making them less likely to emerge during a spill
with complaints about spill response decisions.
A sampling list of industry groups was compiled from a list
of major oil carriers in the United States held by the United
States Coast Guard Headquarters Vessel Re s p on s e Plan Division.
Because the vessels of these companies operate in waters all
around the country, they are not specific to the Northeast
region. However, they will serve to provide general indications
of the industry views on dispersant use. In addition, industry
groups specific to each Area were not used because they are more
closely associated with local oil terminal facilities, the
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managers of which are not likely to have a high interest in
dispersant use due to the nearshore nature of their spills
(dispersants are more an issue in terms of response to vessel
casualties offshore). Again, the industry group sampling size is
small and is not intended to reflect a statistically valid
sample.
Appendix C contains the standard call sheet used to keep
track of the number of calls made to each organization during the
survey, as well as the disposition of each call. This tool was
tremendously useful since several calls were necessary to the
majority of organizations before the call was answered or the
appropriate person was available, or the organization required a
call back at a specific time to complete the interview. The list
of sample groups appears in Appendix D. The groups contacted, or
with whom contact was attempted, are categorized by Area and then
by survey disposition (i.e. survey completed, refused, screened
out, etc.). For groups that completed the survey, the person
interviewed, their position, an d telephone numb e r is given.
5.3 RESULTS
The results of the study are displayed graphically in
Figures 7 through 15. Figure 7 shows the actual number of
interest groups and industry groups that completed the surveys in
order to give the reader a more concrete meaning of various
percentage s that are reporte d in the results. At the bottom of
Figures 8 through 15, the questions fr om the applicable survey
used to generate the graph are listed in order t o help e xplain
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Figure 7
Number of Completed Surveys by Area/Group
Area/Group
Maine/New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Long Island Sound
New York/New Jersey
Industry
Number of Surveys Complete
6
7
5
4
4
6
7 1
the manner in which the information was derived, as well as to
enhance the understanding of the graph's meaning.
Figures 8 and 9 depict the views of interest groups and
industry groups, respectively, with regard to dispersant use.
This information is useful as it can be used to gauge the
potential for conflict between these two sets of groups during a
spill, and therefore the need to pre-plan for dispersant use. As
expected, the data show a dichotomy between the two sets of
groups on this issue. While the majority (68%) of the interest
groups viewed dispersants as useful in certain situations and
over a quarter of them (28%) were not in favor, nearly all of the
industry groups (83%) were in favor of dispersant use with the
remainder viewing them as useful. Perhaps unexpected, however,
is the fact that the interest groups were not unequivocally
against dispersant use. In fact, only a small four percent of
those surveyed were opposed. This indicates that, although these
sets of groups differ in their views, the majority are not on the
opposite extremes of the spectrum as may have been thought. Two
basic points are thus derived from these figures. First,
interest groups and industry groups do differ in their views on
dispersant use, thereby increasing the potential for conflict
between these groups regarding dispersant use during oil spill
response. Second, on a more positive note, the fact that these
views are not diametrically oppos ed provides a degree of optimism
in that these groups may be able t o reach a g r e e me n t on the use of
dispersants if brought t ogether ahead o f spill time t o plan such
use.
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Figure 8
Views of Environmental/Interest Groups on Favorability of Dispersant Use for Oil
Spill Response
28%
68%
.In Favor
1:1 Trade-offs
II Not in Favor
a Opposed
Question (Interest Group Survey):
4c. Please Choose the statement which most closely accords with your
organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil spills.
1. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should never be used (Opposed).
2. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be used (Not in
favor).
3. Dispersant use involves trade-offs but can minimize the ecological
damage of oil spills in certain situations (Trade-offs).
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered as a first
response option for the majority of significant oil spills (In favor).
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Hgure 9
Views of Industry Groups on Favorability of Dispersant Use for Oil Spill Response
17%
83%
.In Favor
~Hrade-offs
II Not in Favor
E:::JOpposed
Question (Industry Group Survey):
2b. Please Choose the statement which most closely accords with your
organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil spills.
1. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should never be used (Opposed).
2. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be used (Not in
favor).
3. Dispersant use involves trade-off's but can minimize the ecological
damage of oil spills in certain situations (Trade-offs).
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered as a first
response option for the majority of significant oil spills (In favor) .
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Figure 10 also depicts the views of both interest and
industry groups with regard to dispersant use. In this figure,
however, two questions instead of one from the surveys were used,
and the responses were placed on a point scale from 0 to 15 (0
being Opposed and 15 being Strongly in favor of dispersant use)
In addition, the data were compiled for the interest groups in
each Area separately to allow for comparison between the Areas as
well as between the interest groups and industry. In Maine/New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Long Island Sound,
the average ratings for the interest groups fell directly in the
middle of the scale, meaning basically that they are not opposed
to dispersants but do feel that a careful/conservative approach
should be taken with regard to their use. The New York/New
Jersey Area differed in that the average was a couple of points
lower, indicating a stronger view toward caution in using
dispersants. The reason for this difference was not inherent in
the data and therefore may only be speculated upon. As will be
seen, the New York/New Jersey Area differed from the other Areas
on some of the other issues investigated as well. Thus any
speculation with regard to the reasons for these differences will
be reserved for the next section, in which conclusions for each
Area will be discussed. Again, in Figure 10 the industry rating
was significantly higher than that of the interest groups,
demonstrating the industry's propensity toward dispersant use
compared to the other groups.
The average level of involvement of interest groups in oil
spill response activities and issues, for both the present and
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Figure 10
Average Views of Interest and Industry Groups Regarding the Favorability of
Dispersant Use for Oil Spill Response
15
10
Favorability
Index:
15=Strongly
in Favor
O=Opposed
5
o
Me/NH MASS RI LIS NY/NJ Industry
Area/Group
Questions (both surveys)
4c /2b. Please Choose the statement which most closely accords with your
organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil spills
1. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should never be used (0 pts.).
2. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be used (5 pts.).
3. Dispersant use involves trade-offs but can minimize the ecological
damage of oil spills in certain situations (10 pts.).
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered as a first
response option for the majority of significant oil spills (15 pts.).
4d/2c. My organization/company seeks to or would:
1. Encourage dispersant use (15 pts.).
2. Encourage careful consideration before dispersants are used (10 pts.),
3. Discourage any use of dispersants for oil spill response (0 pts.).
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the future, by Area, is shown in Figure 11. 166 In all Areas
except New York/New Jersey, the past involvement averaged between
the medium and the low range, with Rhode Island showing medium
involvement, Massachusetts showing low involvement, and Maine/New
Hampshire and Long Island Sound falling in between. The past
involvement of the New York/New Jersey groups fell between the
level of medium and high involvement. Interestingly, the groups
in all but one Area expected increased involvement in oil spill
response issues in the future. In fact, the future involvement
of groups in Maine/New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Long Island Sound is expected to be at the medium level. The
future involvement of groups in the New York/New Jersey Area is
expected to be nearer the high level. Significant information
can be yielded from this figure in terms of the importance of
including interest groups in spill response planning. These
groups have been interested and involved in oil spill response
issues, at least to some extent, in the past . In addition, their
involvement is expected to increase in the future. This provides
evidence in support of the notion d i s c u ss e d above that interest
groups are demanding a larger role i n oil spill response
decision-mak ing an d t hat, if not s omeh ow i n c l uded in the process,
they are not likely to sit back an d remain quiet.
Figure 12 deals specifically wi t h the involvement of
interest groups in each Area in oil spill response planning, both
166In Figure II , the level of past/present involvement was obtained by
averaging the responses from question (2aa ) among all the groups in each
particular Area. The level of future involvement was obtained by averaging
the responses from question (2bbb) among all the groups in each Area .
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Figure 11
Average Involvement of Interest Groups in Oil Spill Response Activities/Issues
15
10
Involvement
Index:
15=High 5
10=Medium
S=Low
O=None
o
Me/NH MASS RI
Area
LIS
IIIIII
NY/NJ
• Past/Present
t::IFuture
Questions (Interest Group Survey):
2aa. I would rate my organization's past involvement in oil spill response and
associated issues as:
1. Very Active (l5 pts.)
2. Somewhat Active (10 pts.)
3. Marginally Active (5 pts.)
4. Active Only Under Certain Circumstances (0 pts.)
2bbb. If tomorrow a large tanker had an accident off the coast of my state and
began to spill a significant amount of oil into the coastal waters, my
organization would:
1. Become actively involved in the response actions in order to best protect
the marine environment (15 pts.)
2. Monitor the situation and become involved in the response if specific
concerns of my organization were not being addressed (7 pts.)
3. Not be concerned nor become involved in the spill response (0 pts)
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Figure 12
Involvement of Interest Groups in Oil Spill Response Planning
100
90
P 80
e
r 70
c 60
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a 30
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Me/NH
33% 33%
MASS
40%
RI
Area
50%
·~~~I~~l~
111111 0%
...........
LIS
75%
C Area Contingency Planning
IDI Dispersant Use Planning
NY/NJ
Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3a. Does your organization participate in the oil spill response planning
activities of your local Area Committee?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
4f. Members of my organization have participated in the planning process to
determine when and where dispersants should be used.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
74
general Area Contingency planning and dispersant use planning. 167
In terms of Area Contingency planning, a fairly low percentage of
the groups surveyed participate (33% in Maine/New Hampshire, 33%
in Massachusetts, 40% in Rhode Island, and 50% in Long Island
Sound). Excepted is New York/New Jersey, in which 75% of the
groups surveyed do participate in the Area Contingency planning.
While the percentages of groups participating in Area Contingency
Planning in most of the Areas is not enormous, at least some
participation is evident. On the other hand, the percentage of
groups participating in dispersant use planning is significantly
less in all but one Area. In Rhode Island, Long Island Sound,
and New York/New Jersey, none of the groups interviewed had been
involved in dispersant use planning.
percentage involved was a small 17 %.
In Maine/New Hampshire the
This time Massachusetts was
the anomaly, showing 33 % participation among the groups
interviewed. The difference between zero participation and some
participation, albeit small, in dispersant planning among the
Areas is in part understandable. Since both the New York /New
Jersey and the Long Island Sound adopted the dispersant use plan
developed by the Region II RRT, it is no surprise that local
interest groups were not involved in the development of that
plan. On the other hand, in area s where the dispersant plan was
developed by a portion of the Area Committee (which remember is
encouraged by directive to include out side interests in the
167The percentage depicted in Figure 12 is the percentage of groups that
responded affirmatively to question (3a) or (4f), with regard to their
involvement in Area Contingency Planning or dispersant use planning,
respectively .
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planning), such as Massachusetts and Maine/New Hampshire, at
least some participation would be expected.
Nonetheless, the results in Figure 12 indicate a
questionable future in terms of effective implementation of these
dispersant use plans. According to the foundation that has been
laid above, there is significant potential in the Areas of Rhode
Island, Long Island Sound, and New York/New Jersey for interest
groups to undermine the utility of the dispersant use plans, both
over the short and long terms, because they have not participated
in the development of the dispersant use plans . And while the
potential for destructive interest group interference with regard
to dispersant use in the Areas of Maine/New Hampshire and
Massachusetts is somewhat less, it is still significant due to
the minimal level of interest group participation in dispersant
use planning in those Areas as well.
Besides the actual level of interest group involvement in
dispersant use planning, two other factors which are likely to
impact the successful implementation of the dispersant use plans
were measured in the study. The first is the satisfaction of the
interest groups regarding their input into the planning process.
Logically, the less satisfied these groups feel in terms of their
opportunity to participate in dispersant use planning decisions,
the more likely they will feel the need to voice their concerns
at the time of a spill or afterward, actions which could
undermine the dispersant use plans.
Figure 13 charts the satisfaction of these interest groups
in terms of their participation in both Area Contingency planning
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Figure 13
Satisfaction of Interest Groups Regarding Their Input into the Planning Process
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Satisfaction
Index:
15=High 5
10=Medium
5=Low
o
rn Area Contingency Planning
III Dispersant Use Planning
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Area
LIS NY/NJ
Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3d. The concerns of my organization with regard to proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment have adequately been taken into
account in the planning process.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.);
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
3f. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
into how oil spill response in the marine environment will be handled.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
4g. The concerns of my organization have been adequately taken into account
in the current dispersant use planning process.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.); Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
4i. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
with regard to when and where dispersants should be used.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
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and dispersant us e planning. I68 In all Areas, the level of
satisfaction with regard to the Area Contingency Planning ranged
between the medium level and about midway between the low and
medium level. By comparis on, in all Areas the satisfaction with
participation in dispersant use planning was less. In Maine/New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and New York/New Jersey, this level of
satisfaction was basically on the low mark. In Massachusetts and
Long Island Sound, this level fell about midway between the low
and medium marks. Generally this figure shows that most interest
groups are not particularly satisfied with the opportunity they
have to participate in oil spill response planning, especially
dispersant use planning. Again, this lack of satisfaction
increases the likelihood that these interest groups may voice
their opinions at spill time, serving to interfere with the
effective implementation of AC o r dispersant use plans.
The ne xt factor examined was the c onfidence of interest
groups that the government would adequately represent the ir
interests at spill time, both for general oil spill response and
for dispersant use. Confidence in government decisions is
important b ecause it can be assumed to impact the emergence of
interest groups at spill time. For example, interest groups that
have confidence in the government in terms o f spill response will
be less likely to interfere with the response management team
decisions at the time o f the spill. This may be the ca se even if
1681n Figure 13 , the responses to questions (3d) and (3f) were averaged, by
group and then Area, to determine the average satisfaction level in each Area
with regard to Area Contingency Planning. The responses to questions (4g)
and (4i) were averaged, by group and then Area, to determine the average
satisfaction level in each Area with regard to Dispersant Use Planning .
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the group has not been i nvo l ve d in the spill response or
dispersant use planning. Thus confidence provides another
measure of potential emergence, and is depicted in Figure 14. In
terms of general oil spill response, the level of confidence in
all Areas ranged from the medium level to midway between the
medium and low level, with the New York/New Jersey Area showing
the lowest confidence. The results for dispersant use compared
to those for general oil spill response are interesting. In
Maine/New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Long Island Sound, the
confidence level of government decisions on dispersant use
exceeds or is the same as that for general oil spill response.
Also, in Massachusetts the confidence level is nearest the medium
level, signifying fairly good confidence. The most probable
reason for this trend of fairly good confidence with regard to
government dispersant decisions is that most of the public, and
public interest groups, have very limited knowledge about
dispersants, ho w they work, or the issues surrounding dispersant
use. In fact, man y of the interest group s s u r v eye d admitted that
they knew very little about dispersants. Perhaps interest groups
are willing to be more generou s in terms of t heir confidence in
governmental decisions surrounding a technical is sue such as
dispersants because they do not have the knowledge to make
informed decision s themselves. While thi s i s an unproven
hypothesis, it is interesting to con sider. Co n f i den c e due to
ignorance can be unpredictable. For example, blind public
confidence may be quic kly eroded if the public or public interest
groups are fed, or become aware of, information which portrays
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Figure 14
Average Confidence of Interest Groups That Govemment Will Adequately
Represent Their Interests at Spill Time
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Index:
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Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3e. The concerns of my organization in terms of proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment will be adequately represented by
state or other officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.); Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
4h. The concerns of my organization in terms of dispersant use and protecting
the marine environment will be adequately represented by state or other
officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
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detrimental impacts of government decisions during actual oil
spills. Thus, although the data show relatively good public
confidence in terms of government decisions on dispersant use,
this confidence should not be relied upon and should not be
expected to maintain public support for spill response decisions
over the long term. Returning to Figure 14, groups in the New
York/New Jersey Area, in contrast with the other Areas, showed a
rather low level of confidence in government decisions on
dispersant use. This is most likely because the groups in the
New York/New Jersey Area are more familiar with dispersants than
the groups from the other Areas, therefore making them more
critical of government dispersant decisions.
Finally, Figure 15 combines the two factors of satisfaction
with input into the planning process and confidence in the
government decisions. The graph depicts the percentage of groups
in each Area that were both dissatisfied with their input into
the planning processes and lacked confidence in government spill
response decisions. 169 If these two factors are accepted as
indicators of potential interest group emergence and consequent
undermining of dispersant use plans as described above, those
169In Figure 15, depicted are percentages of groups that were dissatisfied
with their input into the Area Contingency planning process, as indicated by
responses of "disagree" or "strongly disagree" to questions (3d) and Of), AND
not confident that the government would represent their interests in terms of
Area Contingency Planning, as indicated by responses of "disagree" or
"strongly disagree" to question Oe). Likewise, the percentages depicted for
Dispersant Use Planning reflect those groups that were dissatisfied with their
input into the dispersant planning process, as indicated by responses of
"disagree" or "strongly disagree" to questions (4g) and (4i) , AND were not
confident that the government would represent their interests in terms of
dispersant use planning, as indicated by responses of "disagree" or "strongly
disagree" to question (4h).
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Figure 15
Percentagage of Interest Groups Dissatisfied with Input in the Planning Process
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Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3d. The concerns of my organization with regard to proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment have adequately been taken into
account in the planning process.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
3e. The concerns of my organization in terms of proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment will be adequately represented by
state or other officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
3f. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
into how oil spill response in the marine environment will be handled.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
4g. The concerns of my organization have been adequately taken into account
in the current dispersant use planning process.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
4h. The concerns of my organization in terms of dispersant use and protecting
the marine environment will be adequately represented by state or other
officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
4i. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
with regard to when and where dispersants should be used.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
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groups that show both dissatisfaction and low confidence have the
greatest potential for this interference. The results here are
extremely variable. No groups in Maine/New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, or Long Island Sound demonstrated both of these
characteristics with regard to Area Contingency Planning. For
Rhode Island and New York/New Jersey, 20 % and 25% of the groups
respectively showed both of the characteristics . In terms of
dispersant use, two Areas (RI and LIS) contained no groups which
exhibited both dissatisfaction and lack of confidence together.
The other Areas, however, had significant percentages of groups
that exhibited both characteristics, thereby indicating an
increased potential for the Areas of Maine/New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and New York /New Jersey to experience problems
with the interference of interest groups in the implementation of
their dispersant plans.
5 .4 SURVEY CONCLUSIONS
Based on the foregoing, some basic conclusions can be made
regarding the probability for the future success of the current
dispersant use plans in each Northe ast Area. Again these
conclusions are not intended to be a bsolute. The y are provided
with the caveat that they are based on a limited st udy of only a
small number of interest g r o up s from each Area. In addition they
are based on the concepts established throughout the paper, and
supported both by logic and people in the fiel d of oil spill
response (although not neces sarily p r o ve n ) , that participation in
planning, a s we l l as satisfaction wi t h regard to the opportunit y
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to participate and confidence in government decisions, will
impact the potential of interest groups to emerge and undermine
the successful implementation of dispersant use plans.
The conclusions for each Area will be discussed in turn. In
the Maine/New Hampshire Area the dispersant use plan is not
likely to be successful. While the involvement of interest
groups in oil spill response issues can be expected to be
significant in the future (Figure 11), the involvement of these
groups in dispersant use planning was low (Figure 12) . In
addition, one-third of the interest groups in this Area were both
dissatisfied with their opportunity to participate in dispersant
use planning and were not confident that the government would
adequately represent their interests in its decisions. The
combination of these factors leads to the conclusion that
interest groups are likely to emerge to undermine the successful
implementation of the dispersant use plan in this Area.
In the Massachusetts Area, past involvement of interest
groups in oil spill response issues has been relatively low.
However, this involvement is expected to increase to a
significant level in the future (Figure 11). In terms of the
involvement of Massachusetts interest groups in dispersant use
planning, a fairly substantial number (33 %) have been involved
(Figure 12). This seems to indicate that the Massachusetts Area
Committee has done a good job of including these groups in the
planning. In fact, this Area had the highest level of interest
group involvement in dispersant use planning. Nonetheless,
forty-three percent of the interest groups surveyed were both
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dissatisfied with their involvement and lacked confidence in
government decisions on dispersants (Figure 15), indicating that
the potential for emergence is still significant among these
groups. Thus the dispersant use plan in the Massachusetts Area
can be expected to encounter problems during implementation.
The probability for the success of the Rhode Island
dispersant use plan is good based on the data collected. The
interest groups in the Rhode Island Area have been involved in
oil spill response issues in the past and are expected to
continue this level of involvement in the future (Figure 11)
And while none of these groups have participated in the
dispersant use planning in this Area (Figure 12), they are not
likely to emerge to undermine the plan. This is because all of
them are either satisfied with their involvement in the
dispersant planning or are confident in the government's
dispersant use decisions (Figure 15) . In other words, even
though these groups have not been involved in the dispersant use
planning, and demonstrate low average satisfaction with regard to
this involvement (Figure 13), they are generally confident that
government a ge nc i e s will adequatel y represent their interests at
spill time. Thus, on the whole, the interest groups in Rhode
Island are not likel y to emerge and the Rhode Island dispersant
use plan has a fairly good chance for successful implementation.
The Long Island Sound Area results basicall y mirror those
seen for the Rhode Island Area. The involvement of the Long
Island Sound interest groups has been significant and is expected
to increase in the future (Figure 11). Similar to the Rhode
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Island groups, even though they have not participated in the
dispersant use planning (Figure 12), they are reasonably
confident in the government with regard to dispersant use
decisions (Figure 14). Again, since none of the groups are both
dissatisfied with their input into dispersant plans and not
confident in the government dispersant decisions (Figure 15),
emergence is unlikely and implementation of the dispersant use
plan should operate as intended.
Lastly, the likelihood of success for the dispersant use
plan in the New York/New Jersey Area is low based on the study
data. The past and expected future involvement of interest
groups in this Area is extremely high (Figure 11). In this case,
none of interest groups participated in the dispersant use
planning (Figure 12) because the planning was conducted at RRT
proceedings, which normally do not include local interest groups.
Also, they showed average low satisfaction regarding this
participation and generally low confidence in the ability of the
government to represent their interests in terms of dispersant
use during spills (Figures 13 & 14). In fact, fifty percent of
the groups surveyed were both dissatisfied with their input into
dispersant plans and lacked confidence in government dispersant
decisions (Figure 15). This indicates a significant potential
for interest group emergence and interference with dispersant
plan implementation.
Out of all the Areas surveyed, the New York/New Jersey Area
demonstrates the lowest likelihood of successful implementation
for its dispersant use plan. Also, as alluded to above, the
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results for this Area differed greatly in many respects from
those of the other Areas. While only speculation, these
differences may be explained by a few general observations.
First, the New York Area is known for its politically active,
vocal, and progressive public. They know how to make their views
known and how to "get their hands in the pie." Thus the New
York/New Jersey interest groups are extremely active in oil spill
response issues, and environmental issues in general, much more
so than the generally smaller and less sophisticated groups in
the other Northeast Areas . These facts help to explain the
results in Figure 11, that the present and future involvement of
interest groups in oil spill response issues in the New York/New
Jersey Area is extremely high compared to the other Areas. They
also help to explain the very high percentage (75 %) of groups
involved in the Area Contingency Planning in this Area compared
to the other Areas (Figure 12).
Other differences in the New York /New Jersey Area are most
likely due to the fact that dispersant use has been discussed in
this Area for many years while the other Areas have worked on the
issue only since the passage of OPA '90. For example, as early
as 1983, work was being conducted in the New York area on
guidelines for considering and authorizing the use of chemical
dispersants. 170 Part of this work included a dispersant workshop
170LTJG Robert F. Corbin and Gary Ou, "Federal Region II Regional
Contingency Planning for a Dispersant Decision Process. " in Proceedings of
the 1985 Oil Spill Conference (Washington. D. C. : American Petroleum
Institute, 1985), 4 I 7. This planning was initiated by the Third Coast Guard
District Marine Environmental Response Branch . COTP New York was at that
time pan of the Third Coast Guard District. which no longer exists .
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on Governor's Island, New York, in 1983, which was attended by
over one hundred representatives from various agencies and groups
with interest in oil spill response. I7 I This is important because
these efforts served to educate much of the oil spill response
community, including environmental interest groups, on the issues
of dispersant use. Thus, at this point in time, many of these
groups are knowledgeable about dispersants, which helps to
explain their desire to become more involved in dispersant use
planning as well as their lack of confidence in government
decisions on dispersants (Figures 13 and 14). This is logical
because if the groups understand the issues surrounding
dispersants they are more likely : (1) to have distinct opinions
on dispersant use and, (2) to realize if and when the
government's views do not necessarily correspond with their own.
On the other hand, groups less knowledgeable on dispersants, such
as those from the other Areas, may be more willing to let the
government officials take care of the planning because they do
not feel equipped to make sound de cisions (thus the average
satisfaction w/regard to input scores in Figure 13). Also, as
discussed above, they may show higher confidence in government
dispersant decisions because they figure that the government
knows best with regard to such an issue (as shown by the good
confidence levels in Figure 14). These suppositions are actually
supported from information received during the surveys. For
instance, during the i nterviews the majority of groups from the
Maine /New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Long Island
I7Ilbid .. 418 .
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Sound Areas admitted that they knew very little about
dispersants. By comparison, the majority of groups surveyed in
the New York/New Jersey Area claimed to be knowledgeable about
dispersants and were generally conversant with regard to
dispersant issues.
One last conclusion deals with the difference between
general Area Contingency (AC) planning and dispersant use
planning. The two types of planning were depicted separately in
Figures 12 - 15 in order to illustrate vast differences in terms
of the results in many cases. Generally there was more interest
group involvement in AC planning compared with dispersant
planning, and generally greater satisfaction of interest groups
in terms of the opportunity to participate in AC planning
compared with dispersant planning. This is significant because
it shows that the ideal of incorporating non-governmental
interest groups into Area Contingency planning has been generally
accepted and is being practiced . However, this participation has
not for the most part mapped over to dispersant use planning,
even though the dispersant planning is actually part of Area
Contingency planning. Proposed reasons for this problem and
recommendations for its resolution will be discussed in the next
section.
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS
Before considering recommendations to improve the dispersant
planning process and to increase t he potential for success of
dispersant use plans, it is necessary to understand the
underlying r easons for the pre s e nt problems .
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Probable cau ses
will be di scussed on the basi s of information obtained from the
study questionnaires, interviews with Coast Guard Planning
Officers in each of the study Areas, and general concepts
regarding public participation in policy- making. The reader is
cautioned that the study did not attempt to establish definitive
cause and effect relationships between the various factors that
will be discussed and the lack of interest group participation in
dispersant use planning. Rather the purpose of the information
is simply to outline some potential causes of poor participation,
those which should be considered by anyone attempting t o deal
with public participation processes.
Problems with interest group participation in planning stem
from the actions and perceptions of both government agencies and
interest groups. The ob s t a c l e s t o effective participation
generated or perceived by interest group s will be di scu ssed
first.
One basic problem discovered in the study is that a large
portion (81 %) o f the interest groups surveyed stated that they
had not been invited t o participate in the dispersant use
planning. This is interesting becau se all o f the Coast Guard
Planning Officers interviewed stated that they had at some point
in time invited environmental interest groups t o participate. 172
172Phone conversation with LT Echol s, Response Offi cer, Coast Guard
Marine Safety Office Portland. ME. 17 February 1995; Phone conversation with
LT Victoria Huyck. Marine Environmental Response Officer, Coast Guard
Captain of the Port New York, NY. 16 February 1995; Phone co nve rsat ion with
LCDR Paul Jewell, Response Officer. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office
Providence. RI, 16 February 1995 ; Phone conversation with LT William
Moeller, Response Officer. Coast Guard Captain of the Port Long Island Sound,
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In fa ct, the o f f i c e r from COTP Portland was ver y angry about the
whole situation, stating that his office had made several
attempts to enlist the involvement of these groups but they had
not been interested. His office has thus resorted to sending the
interest groups copies of proposed plans as they are developed,
hoping to get their comments or at least make them aware of what
is going on in order to be able to squash them should the y emerge
with disputes at spill time. I?3 This discrepancy between
government and interest groups regarding invitations t o
participate can be explained relatively easily. First, the
groups invited may not be the same a s those interviewed. Also,
personnel from the interest groups interviewed may not have been
aware of such an invitation, or may have forgotten about it,
especiall y if the group had only received one invitation at one
point in time. In any case, the dilemma here is that the
government agencies perceive (1) that the y have done their job
(by inviting the interest groups to participate, usuall y b y
sending a letter), and (2) that the interest groups simply are
not interested in taking part in reaching oil s p i l l response
decisions before the spill occurs. On the other hand, the
interest g r o up s perceive that they have not been included in the
process at all. Obviousl y s ome work needs to be done to repair
this disconnect. As the director of one conservation group in
Rhode Island stated, man y times environmental g r o up s must be
NY, 17 February 1995; and Phone conversation with LTJG Robert Seale,
Planning Department, Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Boston. MA , 16
February 1995.
I73Phonecon LT Echols, 17 February 1995 .
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enticed to commit their resources to a particular pursuit.
Usually a letter in the mail is not enough; it may take a
personal phone call from the government agency to the Director
explaining why this group's participation is important and
requesting its contribution to the process. 174
Unfortunately, simply being invited may not result in
increased participation due to other constraints or obstacles for
these interest groups. A significant fifty-eight percent of the
groups surveyed, when asked if they would participate if given
the opportunity, replied negatively or replied positively with
various caveats (i.e. they would participate if they had the
time, or more people, etc.). The reasons for these replies
varied. Most groups suffer from severe resource (money, people,
time) constraints and therefore many simply stated that they did
not have the resources to participate in dispersant use planning.
The other aspect of this constraint is priority. Many groups
stated that oil spill response is not a priority for their
organization, even though many expect to become involved in the
issues at the time of a spill . Another obstacle is the
perception of these interest groups in terms of their ability to
influence the outcome of the planning process. A few groups
claimed that they would participate only if they could be assured
that their views would be seriously taken into account. The fact
that interest groups are non-voting members of the Area Committee
(and therefore the dispersant planning subcommittees as well)
174Phone conversation with Mr. Curt Spaulding. Director , Save the Bay,
Providence , RI, 01 June 1995.
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seems to breed discontent, mistrust, and alienation among some of
these interest groups. Their reluctance to participate in
dispersant use planning is thus understandable. These groups
would be foolish to waste scarce resources on activities that are
not likely to have an impact. The last factor dealing with
interest groups is their lack of knowledge on dispersants and
dispersant issues. Many of the groups admitted during the survey
that they knew very little or nothing about dispersants. Also,
based on two survey questions, fifty-eight of the people surveyed
were found to lack general knowledge about how dispersants work
and the issues surrounding dispersant use. This is a problem
because, as was pointed out by some groups, a group cannot
participate effectively in dispersant use planning if it does not
have a sufficient knowledge base. Understanding the issues is
important so that the group can establish a position and then
attempt to influence decisions to coincide with its position.
Since many groups at this point in time are not educated on
dispersants, they have no incentive and may be reluctant to
participate in dispersant use planning.
Aside from the interest groups, lack of participation in
dispersant use planning may be precipitated by obstacles created
by government agencies . First, as was discussed above, Coast
Guard Planning Officers often have a whole host of
responsibilities and may find it too difficult to spend the time
necessary to solicit appropriate representation from all
interested parties for dispersant use planning. Another problem
is that any type of public participation in policy-making is
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inherently ineffi cient and therefore contrary to the progress-
seeking goals of government bureaucracies. As stated by one
author on public participation in policy-making,
" .. . participation is seen as the antithesis to the administrative
values of ef f iciency, economy, and control. 11175 Government
agencies may be reluctant to seek widespread participation
because it usually increases the time involved in producing
outcomes (plans), may result in deadlock among players or
outcomes that the agency does not favor, or may cultivate
criticism of the agency's planning, mission, and professional
judgment. 176 While it does not appear that government agencies
have been actively trying to avoid interest group participation
in dispersant use planning for these reasons, these factors could
c onceivably create a subconsci ous reluctance on the part of
agency planners to aggressively pursue interest group
participation. Lastly, the perception on the part o f bureaucracy
that citizens and interest groups lack information and
professional e xpertise is yet another obsta cle. 177 Because
dispersant use is a comple x and fairly t echnical issue,
government agencies may feel that they can make the best
decisions for so c i e t y based on their knowledge, and that poor
decisions may result fr om the participation of uninformed public
entities in dispersant us e decision processes. Again, such
perceptions could easily preclude e f fe c t i ve interest group
participation.
175Checkoway and Van Til, 33.
176Rosenbaum. Walter , 90 .
177 Checkoway and Van Ti I, 33.
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Thus there are ma ny obstacles that stand in the path of
effective interest group participation in dispersant use planning
both in the Northeast and elsewhere in the United States. As was
demonstrated in the study, the result in the Northeast has been
widespread lack o f interest group participation in dispersant use
planning, and the subsequent doomed fate of the majority of the
dispersant use plans currently in existence. There are
definitely no easy answers to this dilemma, especiall y since the
problems stem from both government agencies and interest groups.
However, two general approaches to deal with dispersant use
planning in the future seem possible.
The first is to continue on the path that has been foll owed
thus far in the Northeast, in o t he r words to half-heartedly
attempt to involve all interested parties in the dispersant
planning. Once such an attempt has been made, government
agencies can c l a i m that they did their part and c a nn o t be
"blamed" if interest groups o r others do not agree with the
contents of the plan. This is in fact happening. Several FOSCs,
while at the OSC Cr i s i s Management Co u r s e in Virginia, stated
that they would simply i gnore interest group opposition or
protests against action s approved in c o nt i nge n c y plans because
these group s "had the ir chance (to provide input)" and f a i l e d to
take it. 178 Althou gh thi s approach se e ms fair, it is not
practicable wi t h i n our present political s ystem. As discussed
above, any government leader is bot h obligated and placed under
178Phone conversation with LCDR Steve O'Malley, Instructor at OSC Crisis
Management Course. Coast Guard Reserve Training Center, Yorktown, Virginia,
31 May 1995.
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tremendous political pressure to listen to such groups in a
crisis situation, no matter what the previous behavior of the
groups. Thus, while some FOSCs may want to ignore these groups,
the reality is that in most cases they will not be able to do so,
not without jeopardizing their reputations and their careers.
The other reality is that during very significant spills, the
FOSC's normal decision-making authority will most likely be
supplanted by that of a very high ranking Coast Guard officer
(such as an Admiral), whose concerns will be more intensely
political than those of the FOSC.179 Thus this approach does not
address the underlying dilemma of interest group concern with
dispersant use, and their potential emergence during spills. It
also does not adequately consider the political atmosphere in
which oil spill response in the United States operates, a factor
which allows interest groups to influence (directly or
indirectly) spill response decisions whether or not they have
chosen to be involved in planning processes. Such an approach
will obviously be ineffective in terms of assuring the successful
implementation of current dispersant use plans.
The other approach, simply stated, is to make interest
group participation in the process work. This is difficult
because it involves altering the present behavior of both
government agencies and interest g r o up s . While government
agencies can alter their own behavior to improve the situation,
altering that of interest groups is significantly more
179Walker, Harrald, Ducey, and Lacey, 37-8.
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challenging. However, this appears to be the most plausible way
to develop usable dispersant use plans.
This approach will require tremendous effort, initially on
the part of the Coast Guard Planning Officers, and later on the
part of all involved. The first step in this process is to
identify resources that may practicably be used to carry out the
necessary tasks of organizing meetings and enlisting the
participation of appropriate interest groups. Since Coast Guard
Planning Officers are in charge of ensuring the Area Contingency
Plans, and dispersant use plans, are developed, the burden of
coordinating and activating interest group participation in
dispersant use planning most properly falls on their shoulders.
The problem with this, as noted above, is that some of these
officers are overtasked with various duties. This can be easily
overcome, however, especially at this point in time.
Presently the Area Contingency Planning process, which began
formally in 1 99 2, is well established in most Areas and most
sections of the ACPs are fairly well complete, as they have been
worked on steadily for the past three years. Thus, even though
each ACP must be revised annually until 1997 (and then every 5
years) ,180 these planning officers, some of which have staffs as
well, now have the time to concentrate specifically if not solely
on dispersant use planning. This seems like a logical course of
action for officers filling the planning billets established as a
result of OPA 90, now that the original ACP planning burden is
largely completed. The decision to devote extensive resources to
180U. S. Coast Guard, Commandant Notice 16471, Para . (0).
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dispersant use planning, however, must be made individually at
each command. Each commanding officer would have to be committed
to the process and would have to ensure that their planners were
able to devote the time and energy necessary for such an endeavor
by not a l l o wi ng them to be assigned other primary duties. In
addition, the command leadership must foster positive working
relationships with local interest groups by foregoing the
statutory non-voting status of these groups in the proceedings.
Trust and cooperation can only be built by showing these groups
that their voice does count and will not be ignored. Without such
an understanding, interest groups are li kely t o remain distant
and uninterested in dispersant use planning.
The other problem with e xpecting Coa s t Guard planning
officers to develop dispersant use plans based on the
participation o f all interested parties is that they are not
trained in the complex art of consensus building a mo n g groups
with disparate viewpoints. To overcome this problem, each Area
planning officer could be tra ined in this area of e xpertise.
While this training would not need t o be extensive, and therefore
would not be o v e r l y costly, the fact that new officers fill the
planning billets every three o r four ye a r s (and in s ome cases
even more fre quently) makes this a burdensome requirement . A
better solution wo u l d be to train a fe w publi c
participation /group dynami cs specialists for positions at the
Headquarters level. These peopl e c ould the n act as fa c ilitators,
attending the dispersant planning meeti ng s in various Areas in
order to hel p direct the di scussion and c han ne l participants'
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energy into positive outcomes. Another option would be to hire
private consultants to perform the facilitator function. The
primary responsibility for planning and organizing the meetings,
as well as leading the discussion and compiling the results of
the meetings into actual plans, would remain with the Area
Planning Officers. This is important because the local
government agencies and the local interest groups need to
establish a good rapport in order to increase the potential for
cooperation, mutual understanding, and efficiency during an
actual oil spill emergency. These types of effective working
relationships among local entities are tremendously beneficial in
oil spill response situations and would not evolve if, for
instance, a "dispersant use planning team" from Headquarters were
to be tasked with the entire dispersant use planning process in
each Area.
In order to begin the process in the Northeast Areas, the
following specific sequence of events is recommended. These
actions are recommended for all five of the Northeast planning
Areas, despite the differing results from the study. This is
because each Area would benefit by increasing its current level
of interest group participation in dispersant use planning. For
example, even though the study found that the Rhode Island and
Long Island Sound Areas are less likely to encounter problems
with the implementation of their dispersant use plans, these
Areas still showed nominal interest group participation.
Increasing interest group participation in all of the Areas will
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decrease further the chance that interest groups may emerge and
undermine the dispersant use plans at spill time.
First, each Area Committee/Planning Officer must identify
appropriate interest groups in each Area. This will require
investigation into what groups are in existence, as well as into
the potential involvement of various groups in oil spill response
issues. In order for future planning to be successful, all such
groups that might potentially emerge with concerns at spill time
must be identified. Such an effort has not yet occurred. The
current lists of environmental groups and other interest group
organizations (i.e. fishermen's associations) in the Area
Contingency Plans are severely inaccurate and incomplete. One
Northeast planning officer admitted that the lists in his ACP
were thrown together rather haphazardly in order to meet planning
deadlines, and the other ACP lists seem to have been prepared in
a similar manner.
The next and vitally important step is education. Interest
groups must be made aware of how dispersants work, the issues
surrounding dispersants, and why it is important that dispersants
be available for use in the United States. This will allow
interest groups to develop informed views on dispersant use and
will enable them to participate in future planning in an
effective manner. Both of these factors should increase the
willingness of interest groups to participate in future
dispersant planning. Organizing an education workshop will
involve a large time commitment. Each interest group should be
contacted by telephone and convinced that they have an interest
in attending.
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In addition, the Planning officer/organizer should
stress that each group's invol vement is important in order to
ensure the future integrity of the nation's water resources.
While this seems like a monu mental task, such education efforts
are not unheard of. The workshop held on Governor's Is land in
1983 (see above) was such an effort. Also, more recently, a
similar workshop was held in Massachusetts, although the audience
was limited t o oil spill agency officials and
scientists /academia, and the purpose was primari ly to discuss the
impacts of dispersants on marine species protected under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Sp e c i e s Act. 181
Thus, while some education and dispersant discussions are
underway, dispersant education needs to be pursued more
aggressively in e a c h Area and to encompass all varieties of
interest groups.
Once the education phase has b een accomp lished, similar
workshops should be held to de velop new, o r r e vise e xisting,
dispersant plans. These workshops can be s cheduled for any time,
as Area Commi tt e e s may adopt re visions to ACPs whenever the
Committee deems it appropriate. Again, all interested groups
must b e ent iced t o participate through personal phone calls or
other legal coercion methods . In addit i on, specially trained
facilitators from Headquarters should be present at the workshops
to help channel the dis c ussion and work through d isagreements or
181 Mantzaris, Christopher, Chief, Habitat and Protected Resources Division
of NOAA, to Captain P. A. Turlo, Commanding Officer, Coast Guard Marine Safety
Office Providence, RI, of April 4, 1995 . Letter invitation to attend the Protected
Marine Specie s and Oil Spill Countermeasure Innovat ions Workshop.
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stalemate. The outcome of such workshops will be a set of
criteria delineating when and where dispersants should be used or
not used, agreed upon by all parties, that will then be compiled
into a formal contingency plan to be approved by the concurrence
network. A plan created through this process will provide
responders with confidence that the plan can be implemented at
spill time without hesitation, and without fear that actions
taken in accordance with the plan might be questioned or
criticized b y groups outside the spill management team. Such
confidence is necessary if dispersants are ever to be used
effectively and more frequently in the United States.
Chapter 6 Summa..ry and CencIusiens
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As has b e e n seen, dispersants have not been highl y regarded
nor utilized in the United States as an o i l spill response
op t ion . With o n go i ng resear ch and de ve lopme nt , ho wever, previous
c o n c e r n s rega r ding dispersant t oxicit y an d effecti veness ha ve
been somewhat alleviated, and t oday a large portion of the
response communit y recognizes that d i s p e r s a nt s can indeed be
useful. Whil e not advi sable f or u s e under c ertain conditions and
in certain habitats, dispersants can o f f e r signifi cant advantages
over traditional cleanup methods in appropriate situations.
These a dvantages can inclu de the mi n imiz a t i o n o f damages, lower
relative c o s ts , ea se o f applica tion and the a bility to reach a
large spill area relativel y rapidly, and waste reduction.
Dispersant u se policy has evolved in keeping with this
growing b o d y o f knowledge c o nce r n i ng di spersant s and the s h if t in
attitude regarding their ut i l i ty . Inf l uence d b y toxicity fears
and the poor reputation of dispersants, past dispersant use
po licies s t r essed c a u t i o n , t outed mech a n ica l cleanup a s the
favored re sponse method, an d es tabl i s hed an unworkabl e d e c i s ion
hierarchy that basically precluded e f f e c t i ve dispersant use from
197 0 to 1 990. Current poli cy, however, c o n s i de r s the
prerequisite s of effective di s pers ant u s e an d man dates that these
issues be re s olved before a s p i ll o ccur s t o ens u r e the exi stence
of a true di spersant use capability. Most notably, OPA 90
requires t h a t Area Commit tee s a nd RRTs c o ns ide r whe n a nd where
dispersant u s e would be appropriate, and t hat the y develop
dispersant pre-authorization plan s . Through this planning
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process and pre-agreement among authori zing agencies, it is hoped
that quick dispersant use decisions can be made, thereby
increasing the chances for successful responses in situations
where dispersant use is warranted.
Unfortunately, the de v e lopmen t of contingency plans is not a
guarantee that they will be implemented as expected. In the case
of dispersant pre-authorization plans, the v i e ws of interest
groups must be considered. Interest groups, especially
environmental organizatio n s, are s t a ke holde rs in oil spill
response decisions. In addition, a s a re sult of the general
increasing desire of the American public to participate in
governmental decisions a s well as the growth of environmental
concern in the United States, interest group s have, and can be
expected to, become i nvolved in oil s p i l l issue s and decisions.
Also recognized is that the se int erest groups are a powerful
political force an d while the y may have no direct ro le in oil
spill response decisions, the y certainly can influence these
decisions indirectly. Thus the c on clusion i s that the views of
these interest g roups must be incorporated int o the dispersant
planning process in orde r to preven t their i nterference at the
time of the spil l o r afterward which woul d undermi ne the
successful implementation of these plans.
The survey described in this paper was de signed to examine
the participation o f interest groups in the di spersant pre-
authorization planning in the Northeast Un i t ed States. The
surve y results conclude that t h e requisite i nt ere st group
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involvement in dispersant use planning in the Northea st has not
been met. While g overnment agencies ha ve made attempts t o
include these groups in the planning processes, they have not
been effective in securing the groups' i nvo l vement no r in
establishing a meaningful dialogue with these groups. As seen in
Figure 12, t h e percentage of interviewed groups which participate
in dispersant us e planning is ve ry smal l or zer o for a ll o f t he
Areas. Also, Figure 15 shows that in the Areas of Maine/New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Ne w York /Ne w Jerse y, significant
percentages of the groups interviewed are both dissatisfied with
their input in t o the dispersant p l a n n i ng process, and not
confident that the government will represent their interests
during di spersant use planning. Thus, in the Areas o f Maine /New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York /New Jersey, interest
groups are likel y to emerge at s p i l l time with c oncerns that have
not been considered in the dispersant use planning process, and
these plans are not likely t o b e s u cce s s f u l ly implemented at
spill time . The dispersant pre-authorization plans developed in
the Rhode Island and Long Island So und Area s ha ve a b et t e r c ha n c e
of success, howe ver, their effective implementation is still
ques tionable du e to the l ow le ve l of i nterest group p articipation
in the dispersant u s e planning i n these Areas.
Since the b l a me f or p oo r i ntere st group pa r t ic i p a t i on lies
both with g overnme nt age ncie s a nd the i nterest gro up s themselves,
b oth sides must c ontribute to a more reliable planning process.
Thi s p a p e r c o nclude s t hat the b es t r out e a t thi s p o i n t is for the
government to i nc rease the awareness and knowledge of interest
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groups with regard to dispersants, to work harder at enticing the
attention of these groups and obtaining their participation in
planning meetings, and to invest resources in facilitators who
can help produce positive outputs from such meetings and ensure
that no group feels as if its views have been ignored in the
process.
Obviously dispersant use planning, together with appropriate
interest group participation, will be a long and slow process
that will require dedi cation, perseverance, and commitment by all
interests . The necessary effort will be well worth it, however.
Dispersants are a great resource which can enhance the mitigation
of environmental damage from oil spills, and successful
dispersant use planning can improve the p otential effectiveness
and efficiency of oil spill response in the United States. While
the abilit y to use dispersants is important, it is more important
to dis c over what response tool s ca n practicably be put to use in
each Area of the country. The act u a l outcome is not as important
as the planning process. Far b e t t e r it will be to discover that
dispersant us e in a particular Area will never be accepted, and
to adopt that as the plan, rather than wast e time and money
planning for dispersant use and stockpiling resources just to
encounter opposition /obstacl es a t s p i l l time. Re a l i z i n g up front
that dispersant us e will never be widel y acce p t e d in an Area is
beneficial in that resources can then be used to con c entrate o n
prepari ng f or alternate response a c t i v i t i es (such as mechanical
c l e a n up ) .
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Dispersant use planning itself can only be successful if all
interested parties take part. While OPA '90 and the current NCP
require the development of dispersant use plans, plans
established in a hurried manner by small groups of s p e c i f i c
interests are not likely to be successfully implemented in the
heat of an oil spill crisis. Rather, these types of plans, such
as those developed thus far i n the Northeast, are more l ikely to
lead to confusion at spill time because the responders will find
that the plan cannot be implemented as expected. Als o, they will
lead to frustration on the part of planners, responders, and
industry, all who have ded i c a t e d numerous hours and many dollars
toward planning and preparing for dispersant u se . Co nv e r s e l y ,
c arrying out the planning process as de s c r i b e d above wil l c r e a t e
understanding between various interests, as well as
predictability with regard to how these interests are li kely to
react to certain response actions . If dispersant plans are
written to be acceptable to all, there shoul d be little or no
discussion at spill time, allowing for quick decisions and
efficient r espons e.
Becaus e of the promisin g nature of dispersant s, the United
States is not likel y t o ban the u se of thes e s ubstances, a n d they
will continue t o loom elusively over the heads of all o i l spill
responders. Therefore the current challen ge is to b ring
dispersants d own fr om their precari ou s p o si ti o n t o one within the
practicabl e o il s p i l l r espons e arsenal. This can o n l y b e
accomplished thr ough extensive education and detailed planning
involving all interested parties, and the subsequent development
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of fully implementable dispersant use plans in each Area. The
commitment should be made, and the planning should begin
immediately, in the Northeast and elsewhere around the country.
The time is approaching for another major spill in U. S. waters.
How shameful it would be not to have resolved the dispersant
issue, and to perhaps miss the opportunity to significantly
impact the outcome of our nation's next oil spill disaster.
Appendix A
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Questionnaire: Environmental & Interest Groups
Introduction: Hello, my name is Tina Burke and I am a graduate
student at the University of Rhode Island. I am doing a research
project on the involvement of interest groups in oil spill response
and planning. May I please speak with someone who could talk to
me about your organization's interest, views, and activities in the
area of marine environmental protection and oil spill response.
IF ANOTHER PERSON TAKES CALL: Hello, my name is Tina Burke and
I am a graduate student at the University of Rhode Island. I am
presently doing research in the area of interest group involvement In
oil spill response issues and policies to protect the marine
environment. This is an important issue that faces the federal
government as a result of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
If you don't mind, I would like
subject in the form of a survey.
minutes, okay?
to ask you some questions on thi s
The interview will last only 10
IF NO: May I please schedule a time to call you to conduct this
interview. Your input is important for the validity of my research
and it will also help to provide insight into how future responses to
significant oil spills can adequately consider all interested views .
THE SURVEY
1. TOPIC: Interest of organization in protection of the marine
environment.
1a. What IS the mission or purpose of your organization?
OK, Please respond to the following statements by choosing the
best answer for your organization :
1b. My organization is interested in protection of the marine
environment and/or resources within the marine
environment.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Other (explain )
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1c. Oil spills from tank vessels pose a significant threat to the
marine environment.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
l d. The nation's oil spill response policy is important in terms
of protecting the marine environmen t from tanker spills.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4 . strongly disagree
II. TOPIC: Involvement/potential for involvement in oil spill
response or oil spill response issues.
2a. Members of my organization have in the past been
involved in oil spill responses, or in discussions on oil spill response
issues.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know (ask to speak w/someone else)
If YES: 2aa. I would rate my organization's past
involvement in oil spill response and associated
issues as:
1. very active (15 pts)
2. somewhat active (10 pts .)
3. marginally active (5 pts. )
4. active only under certain circumstances
(5 pts.)
(such as significant spill size, etc .) - PLEASE
EXPLAIN:
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2b. The chance or likelihood that my organization may become
involved in spill response issues in the future IS:
1. definite (15 pts.)
2. highly likely (10 pts.)
3. likely only under certain conditions -
WHAT ARE CONDITIONS? (5 pts.)
4. Not likely-------WHY? (0 pts.)
What, if anything, might cause your
organization to become involved in oil spill
response issues? (SKIP to Sect. III)
IF answered 1,2,or 3 above : 2bb. I expect the level of my
organization's involvement in future oil spill response issues
to be:
1. very active (15 pts.)
2. somewhat active (10 pts .)
3. marginally active (5 pts .)
AND, 2bbb. If tomorrow a large tanker had an accident off the
coast of my state and began to spill a significant amount of oil into
the coastal waters, my organization would:
1. Become actively involved in the response actions in order to
best protect the marine environment (15 pts.)
2. Monitor the situation and become involved in the response
if specific concerns of my organization were not being
addressed; or (7 pts.)
3. Not be concerned nor become invol ved in the spill response
(0 pts.)
4. Other: EXPLAIN:
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III. TOPIC: Organization's involvement In planning for oil spill
response actions.
Since the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Area
Committees have been formed to develop appropriate response
actions to significant oil spills. These committees are made up of
members of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as local
interest and industry groups. The participation of all of these groups
is intended to ensure all views are taken into consideration when
developing oil spill response policies.
3a. Does your organization participate in the oil spill response
planning activities of your local Area Committee?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
If NO : 3b. Has your organization been invited to participate In this
planning?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
3c. Would your organization be interested in participating In
Area Committee planning for oil spill response in the
future?
1. Yes
2. No - WHY??
3. Don't know - EXPLAIN:
Please respond to the following statements by choosing the best
answer:
3d. The concerns of my organization with regard to proper oil
spill response actions to protect the marine environment have
adequately been taken into account in the planning process .
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts. )
3. disagree (5 pts.)
4. strongly disagree (0 pts.)
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3e. The concerns of my organization in terms of proper oil spill
response actions to protect the marine environment will be
adequately represented by state or other officials at the time of a
spill.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts.)
3. disagree (5 pts.)
4. strongly disagree (0 pts.)
3f. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to
provide input into how oil spill response in the marine environment
will be handled.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts.)
3. disagree (5 pts.)
4. strongly disagree (0 pts.)
IV. TOPIC: Dispersants as an oil spill response method.
4a. Are you familiar with dispersants and how they work?
1. Yes
2. No - explain issue of dispersants and SKIP
to question 4d.
Please respond to the foll owing statements by choosing the
best answer.
4b. Dispersants:
1. remove oil from the water VIa a chemical
reaction.
2. break up surface oil slicks into tiny
droplets which spread out in the upper
water column; or
3. remove oil from the water's surface by
causinc it to sinko
111
toxic to manne life and should never beDispersants are
used. (0 pts)
Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be
used . (5 pts.)
Dispersant use involves trade-offs but can minimize the
ecological damage of oil spills in certain situations. (10 pts.)
Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered
as a first response option for the majority of significant
oil spills. (15 pts.)
2.
3.
4.
4c. Please choose the statement which most closely accords
with your organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil
spills.
1.
4d. My organization
1.
2.
3.
seeks to/ would:
encourage dispersant use (15 pts)
encourage careful consideration before
dispersants are used; or (7.5 pts.)
discourage any use of dispersants for
oil spill response (0 pts.)
4e. My organization is familiar with the dispersant use policy
currently being developed for response to oil spills off the Northeast
coast of the United States.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
4f. Members of my organization have participated in the
planning process to determine when and where dispersants should
be used.
1. Yes
2. No
IF YES: 4ff. Has being involved in this planning changed your
organization's view of dispersants with regard to
their usefulness? EXPLAIN:
1 1 2
IF NO: 4fff. Has your organization been invited to participate
in dispersant use planning?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
If invited, would your organization be interested
in participating in the future?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know - explain:
Please respond to the following statements by choosing the
best answer:
4g. The concerns of my organization have been adequately
taken into account in the current dispersant use planning process :
1. strongly agree (15 pts)
2. agree (10 pts)
3 . disagree (5 pts. )
4. strongly disagree (0 pts. )
4h. The concerns of my organization in terms of dispersant use
and protecting the marine environment will be adequately
represented by state or other officials at the time of a spill.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (l0 pts.)
3. disagree (5 pts. )
4 . strongly disagree (0 pts.)
4i. My organization IS satisfied with the opportunity it has to
provide input with regard to when and where dispersants should be
used.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts. )
3. disagree (5 pts)
4. strongly di sagree (0 pt s.)
1 1 3
4j. It may be necessary for my organization to express its
views on dispersant use during an actual spill in order to protect the
marine environment and/or the public interest.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
Name of Respondent:
Position in organization:
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Questionnaire: Industry Groups
Introduction: Hello, my name is Tina Burke and I am a graduate
student at the University of Rhode Island. I am currently conducting
research on the involvement of interest groups in oil spill response
and planning, specifically regarding the use of dispersants. May I
please speak with someone who could talk to me about your
company 's oil spill response planning activities, and its views on
dispersant use for oil spill response.
If you don't mind, I would like
subject in the form of a survey.
minutes, okay?
ask you some questions on this
The interview will last only 5
IF NO: May I please schedule a time to call you to conduct this
interview? Your input is important for the validity of my research
and will also help to identify how controversial response
technologies, such as dispersants, may be better used in the future.
THE SURVEY
1. TOPIC: Company's involvement in Area Contingency Planning .
As you may well know, since the passage of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, entities called Area Committees have been formed to
develop appropriate response strategies for oil spills around the
country .
1a. Do members of your company participate in the oil
response planning activities of any of these Area
Committees?
1. Yes
2. No - WHY?
IF NO: How does your company's input on how best to respond
to an oil spill become included in these contingency
plans?
1 1 6
II. TOPIC: Dispersants as an oil spill response method.
Please respond to the following statements by choosing the
best answer.
2a. Dispersants:
1. remove oil from the water VIa a chemical
reaction;
2. break up surface oil slicks into tiny
droplets which spread out in the upper
water column; or
3. remove oil from the water's surface by
causing it to sink.
2b. Please choose the statement which most closely accords
with your company's feelings on dispersant use for
offshore oil spills.
1. Dispersants are toxic to manne life and should never be
used. (0 pts.)
2. Dispersants are toxic to manne life and should rarely be
used. (5 pts. )
3. Dispersant use involves trade-off's but can rmrnmize the
ecological damage of oil spills in certain situations. (10 pts.)
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered
as a first response option for the majority of significant
oil spills. (15 pts .)
2c. My company seeks to
1. encourage dispersant use (15 pts.)
2. encourage carefu I consideration before
dispersants are used; or (7 .5 pts.)
3. discourage any use of dispersants for
oil spill response (0 pts.)
2d. My company is familiar with the dispersant use policies
currently being developed for response to oil spills off the coasts of
the United States.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Other - explain:
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2e. Members of my company have participated in the planning
process to determine when and where dispersants should be used in
various areas around the country.
1. Yes
2. No
IF YES: 2ee. Has being involved in this planning changed your
company's view with regard to the usefulness of
dispersants? EXPLAIN:
IF NO: 2eee. WHY?
2f. The views and concerns of my company with regard to
dispersant use have been adequately taken into account in the
current dispersant use plans
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
2g. My company is satisfied with the opportunity it has to
provide input with regard to when and where dispersants should
be used.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. di sagree
4. strongly disagree
Respondent:
Position in the company:
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Calf Sheet.
Area:
Organization:
Interest
and
Group Participation jn QjJ
Dispersant Use Planning
Spill
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Response
Phone Number:
Point of Contact:
Contact Attempt
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Notes:
Date/Time
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
!
I
I
I
I
Disposition Code
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List of Survey Subjects
1. Maine/New Hampshire Area
A. Completed Telephone Questionnaire
1. Friends of Casco Bay
Cheryl Seavie/Joe Payne
(207)799-8574
2. Maine Marine Mammal Rescue Center
Dennis Dorsey, Director
(207) 883-4562
3. Sierra Club, Maine Chapter
Joan Sacks, Director
(207) 871-8254
4. Quoddy Spill Prevention Group
Steve Crawford, President
(207) 853-6238
5. The Nature Conservancy, Maine Chapter
Jim Dow, Field Representative
(207) 374-2998
6. Maine Lobstermen's Association
Patton White, Executive Director
(207) 363-6783
B. Survey Not Applicable (screened out)
1. Maine Association of Conservation
(207) 622-5330
2. Maine Audubon Society
(207) 781-2330
3. Maine Marine Alliance
(207) 443-6222
4. Natural Resource Council of Maine
(207) 622-3101
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C. Unable to Reach by Telephone
1. Maine Marine Trades Association
(207) 865-4575
II. Massach usetts Area
A. Completed Telephone Questionnaire
1. Massachusetts Audubon Society
Robert Buschbaum, Coastal Ecologist
(508) 927-1122
2. The Massachusetts Lobstermen
Bill Adler, Executive Director
(617) 545-6984
3. Salem Sound 2000
Sam Cleaves , Program Coordinator
(508) 741-7900
4. Save the Bay/Baywatch
Bruce Berman, Baykeeper
(617) 451 -2860
5. The New England Aquarium
Maggie Mooney-Seus, Con servation Department
(617) 973-5229
6. Massach usetts Cetacea n R esea rc h Un it
Mason Weinrich, Executive Director
(508) 281 -6351
7. Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group
Paul Burns, Director of Toxics Program
(617) 292-4800
B. Survey Not Applicable (screened out)
1. Conservation Law Foundation
(617) 350-0990
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C. Unable to Reach by Telephone
1. The American Littoral Society
(508) 457-1499
2. Sierra Club, Massachusetts Chapter
(617) 227-5539
3. Gloucester Fish Commission
(508) 283-0857
4. New England Gillnetters
(508) 922-3941
D. Refused Telephone Survey
1. The Nature Conservancy
(617) 423-2545
2. G r e en pea c e
(617) 266-0098/2021
III. Rhode Island Area
A. Completed Telephone Questionnaire
1. Save the Bay/Baykeeper
John Torgan, Baykeeper
(401) 272-3540
2. Atlantic Offshore Fishermen's Association
Richard Allen, Vice President
(401) 783-9977
3. Association for the Preservation of Cape Cod
Susan Kadar, President
(508) 289-2329
4. Coalition for Buzzard's Bay
Mimi McConnell, Executive Director
(508) 759-1440
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5. The Offshore Mariner's Association
Howard Nickerson, Executive Director
(508) 990-1377
B. Survey Not Applicable (screened out)
1. Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative
(401) 782-1500
IV. Long Island Sound Area
A. Completed Telephone Questionnaire
1. Long Island Sound Lobstermen's Association
John German, Sr., President
(516) 286-3335
2. The Nature Conservancy, CT Chapter
Leslie Corey, Jr., Executive Director
(203) 344-0716
3. The Connecticut Environmental Caucus
Mylin Bull
(203) 259-6305
4. The Southern New England Fishermen's Association
Arthur Madeiras, President
(203) 535-3150
B. Survey Not Applicable (screened out)
1. Long Island Sound Task Force
(203) 327-9786
2. Connecticut Citizen's Action Group
(203) 561-6006
C. Unable to Reach by Telephone
1. Sounds Conservancy, Inc.
2. People Against Pollution
3. Friends of the Bay
(212) 206-11 06
4. The Long Island Sound Keeper
(800) 933-7686
V. New YorklNew Jersey Area
A. Completed Telephone Survey
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1. New York Harbor Baykeeper/American Littoral
Society
Andy Willner, Baykeeper
(908) 291-0176
2. Natural Resources Defense Council
Nina Sankovitch, Consulting Attorney
(212) 724-4329
3. New York City Audubon Society
Peter Mott, President
(718) 543-5000
4. Clean Ocean Action
Cindy Ziph, Executive Director
(908) 872-0111
C. Unable to Reach by Telephone
1. Hudson River Fis hermen' s Associ ati on
VI. Industry Groups
1. Sun Transport
Tom Crawford
(610) 859-1004
2. Exxon
Dave Whims, Response Advisor
(713) 656-9905
3. Shell
Jay Lumbert/Dr. James Beela
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(713) 241-2666
4. Texaco
Mark Weller, Manager, Worldwide Emergency Response
(914) 838-7254
5. Mobile
Robert Leary, Coordinator, Crisis Response Planning
(703) 846-2761
6. OMI Corp.
Dick Holuska, Vice President of Safety Quality and Risk Mgt.
(212) 986-1960
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ABSTRACT
Dumping of wastes into the ocean has gone on for years
especially in the New York Bight. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is mandated by Title II of
the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972 to investigate the effects of
ocean dumping on the marine environment. However, there is
a perception within Congress, the public and other agencies
that NOAA is not meeting it's responsibilities with regard
to ocean dumping research.
The effectiveness of NOAA's ocean dumping policies and
programs and the difficulties in implementation experienced
by the agency are evaluated by applying George Edwards'
theory of policy implementation. According to this theory,
four factors - communications, resources, dispositions and
bureaucratic structure - are critical in understanding the
implementation process. In this case study, NOAA's present
lack of participation in the ocean dumping issue can be
analyzed by examining the historical events of the past
twenty years as they apply to the policy implementation
theory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Dumping of wastes into the ocean has gone on for years
especially in the New York Bight. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as the federal
government's primary source of data and information
concerning problems of the ocean and atmosphere, has a
responsibility to investigate man's introduction of wastes
into the marine environment. This has been mandated not
only in the agency's mission' but also by Title II of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 2
However, perceptions within Congress, the pUblic, other
agencies and within NOAA itself are that NOAA is not meeting
its responsibilities with regard to ocean dumping research.
There are three major questions that arise in this
discussion. How have NOAA's ocean dumping pOlicies been
shaped? What difficulties have arisen in the implementation
of those research policies? Finally, how have these
difficulties shaped NOAA's present role in the ocean dumping
situation? As the science of ocean dumping evolved and
impacted the regulatory process, confusion was created as to
NOAA's role in both processes. This paper, therefore, will
examine NOAA's policies (science or regulatory?) and the
resultant implementation by using a theory developed by
George Edwards in his book Implementing Public Policy.3
Edwards believes that four factors influence effective
policy development and implementation. These are
communications, resources, dispositions and bureaucratic
structure. This study of NOAA will examine the scientific
and historical events relating to ocean dumping as they
apply to the above factors in the context of Edwards'
theory. The format of this paper will include a discussion
of Edwards' theory followed by an overview of ocean dumping
and the historical events that shaped NOAA's policies.
Finally, the development and implementation of NOAA's
policies will be analyzed using each of Edwards' factors as
they apply to this case stUdy.
NOTES
1. Robert G. Fleagle, "NOAA's Role and the National Interest",
Science. Technology and Human Values, Vol. II, John Wiley and Sons,
Spring 1986
2. Public Law 92-532: Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972" (hereafter "Ocean Dumping Act")
Public Policy,
"Edwards") .
3 . George C . Edwards I I I , =I.:.:m::..l:po.::l::.;e::.m=eo=.n:...:t::.:l~·n=q_--=--===-=_--=--=-=:::.=.:.......
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980 (hereafter,
2
CHAPTER II
OCEANOGRAPHIC AND DUMPSITE BACKGROUND
A discussion of ocean dumping cannot be complete
without a basic description of the oceanographic
characteristics of the New York Bight and the dumpsites
contained within it. Although the Bight is a receptacle for
the disposal of dredge spoils, construction debris (commonly
called cellar dirt) and industrial wastes, for purposes of
this discussion ocean dumping refers only to sewage sludge
generated by municipal sewage treatment plants and dumped at
the 12 and 106-Mile dumpsites.
The New York Bight and 12-Mile Dumpsite
The New York Bight extends from Delaware Bay to the
eastern end of Long Island and out to the 200 meter depth
contour. The Bight's apex, where since 1924 most of the
ocean dumping has taken place, is an area bounded to the
south by 40° north latitude, to the east by 73°15' west
longitude, on the north by the Long Island shore, and on the
west by the New Jersey shore. 1 until 1986 when the phase-
in of sludge dumping at the 106-mile site began, all of the
sewage sludge generated by New York city and surrounding
municipalities was dumped at the 12-mile dumpsite. 2 This
area (Fig. 1) is located twelve miles east of Sandy Hook,
New Jersey on the east slope of the Christiaensen Basin in
3
relatively shallow water (less than 25 fathoms).
Circulation of the water in this portion of the inner
New York Bight is strongly influenced by that of the whole
Bight (Montauk Pt. to Cape May) and by that of the Middle
Atlantic Bight (Nantucket Shoals to cape Hatteras).
However, there are some local influences which have
significant effects on the circulation, principally the
bathymetric configuration of this corner of the Bight and
the flow from the Hudson-Raritan estuary.3
Water mass properties of this portion of the Bight are
influenced by circulation, weather and effluent reaching the
coastal marine waters. Besides the dumping of wastes,
contaminants enter the water column by way of estuarine
effluents and atmospheric fallout. 4
The 106-Mile Dumpsite
The 106-mile dumpsite is a deep ocean dumpsite located
between 38°40 'N to 39°00 'N and 72°00'W to 72°30W or
approximately 106 mile southeast of Sandy Hook, New Jersey
(Fig. 1). The site is seaward of the continental shelf
break and water depths range from 1000 to 1400 fathoms. The
site was used predominantly for dumping of acid and
alkaline-based industrial wastes from 1961 to 1987. 5
Presently, no industrial concerns hold permits for
industrial waste dumping. As of December 1987 all sewage
sludge originally dumped at the 12-mile site began to be
4
dumped at the l06-mile site. 6
Oceanographic conditions at the l06-mile site are
variable, depending upon the water mass occupying the site.
Slope water is the predominant water mass, however, shelf
water incursions do occur, especially in the spring when
fresh water runoff and wind forcing cause offshore movement
of the shelf/slope front. Northward meandering of the Gulf
Stream can cause Gulf Stream water to invade the site
although this phenomenon is rare. More commonly, warm core
rings may traverse the region from northeast to southwest,
aperiodically bringing strong currents and Gulf Stream or
Sargasso Sea water to the site.?
5
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Fig. 1. Chart showing the 12 and 106-Mile dumpsites in
relation to oceanographic features in the New
York Bight region.
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NOTES
1. united States, National Marine Fisheries Service, "Response of
the Habitat and Biota of the Inner New York Bight to the Abatement
of Sewage Sludge Dumping - Progress Report, JUly 1986 -June 1987",
1987
2. Edward D. Santoro, "Status Report - Phase out of Ocean Dumping
of Sewage Sludge in the New York Bight Apex", Marine Pollution
Bulletin 18: 1987 pp.278-280
3. Memorandum
Branch, National
Oceanography of
(hereafter cited
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CHAPTER III
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION THEORY
Edwards describes public policy implementation as the
stage of policyrnaking between establishment of a policy and
the consequences of the policy for the people it affects'.
If the objective of a policy is to alleviate a problem and
the results are unsuccessful it may be a fault of either the
policy or the implementation of that policy. Often it is
both. In the case of ocean dumping, the establishment of
policy culminated in the passage of the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (also known as the
Ocean Dumping Act) and the enactment of the related
regulations. While Congress had originally intended to
phase out ocean dumping in five years, the difficulties
faced by NOAA, as the science agency, and EPA, as the
regulatory agency, in the implementation of that policy may
have contributed to the continuation of ocean dumping
today.2
The four factors Edwards believes influence effective
policy and implementation are communication, resources,
dispositions and bureaucratic structure and each are
discussed below.
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COMMUNICATIONS
The first requirement for effective policy
implementation is ensuring that those who are to carry out
policy know what they are supposed to do. This might entail
Congress passing laws that are clear in their intent so that
misunderstandings by the implementors are avoided.
Similarly, this same type of clarity of communication is
important within the confines of an agency or office.
Disagreements and misunderstandings about policies can lead
to distortion of communications within all levels of
government. Lack of clarity in policymaking can also result
from ambiguous court decisions, public opposition, competing
goals and unfamiliarity with new programs. All these
factors can upset communications and in turn restrict
implementation. 3
Decentralization of bureaucracy often leads to
communication difficulties. The more steps there are in the
implementation process, the more likely it is that the
policy will be watered down. 4 In the case of ocean
dumping, the 1972 law mandated the involvement of no less
than four federal agencies in the implementation of the
country's first ocean dumping policy.s
Finally, lack of consistency between lawmaking and
subsequent implementation orders can result in confusing
results. 6 Environmental policymaking in the Reagan
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administration has largely ignored congressional intent,
judicial standards and public preferences. 7 Therefore,
when implementors receive inconsistent instructions, they
will inevitably be unable to meet all the demands made upon
them.
RESOURCES
Implementation orders may be accurately transmitted in
a clear and consistent manner but if implementors lack the
resources to carry out the policies, implementation is
likely to be ineffective. Resources are traditionally
thought of as funding, staffing and skills8 but as seen in
the case of ocean dumping good information on inputs (i.e.
what and how much is being dumped where)9 is as important a
resource to the decisionmaking process. Unfortunately, the
four limiting resources are often interrelated. Without
enough staff or funding an agency cannot acquire the
necessary information to accurately implement policy. The
ability of NOAA to supply this needed resource is the major
question of this section.
Because of the complexities involved in the bUdgetary
and personnel processes of the government I intend to
briefly touch on this aspect of the resource problem as it
relates to policy implementation.
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DISPOSITIONS
In effective policy implementation, the implementors
must not only know what to do and have the resources
available, they must also have the desire to carry out a
policy. Differing attitudes and perspectives exist in all
levels of government, from top decisionmakers down to
individual bureaucratic units and these, in turn, affect
policy at various points. 10
Bureaucratic units may disagree over responsibility for
an activity thus hindering implementation. During the early
years of the ocean dumping controversy the competitive
atmosphere between NOAA and EPA made it difficult for the
two agencies to follow out the mandate set forth in the
Ocean Dumping Act." Although specific departments within
each agency worked closely and well together (for example
EPA's region II office and NOAA's MESA) there was tension in
Washington as the two agencies competed for the various
responsibilities and limited funds. 12
The mission of a specific agency mandated to carry out
a policy may conflict with that policy. An example of
dispositional problems can be seen between various
departments within NOAA during the early 1980's when NOAA
ocean dumping policy changed from protection of the ocean to
a belief that under certain circumstances, ocean dumping was
a viable alternative to the sewage sludge disposal issue. 13
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BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE
The prominent characteristics of bureaucracies, namely
standard operating procedures (SOP's) and fragmentation, are
seen by Edwards as possible deterrents to effective policy
implementation. SOP's are defined as routines to help
public officials to make numerous everyday decisions.
However, SOP's can inhibit change and are often obstacles to
action. Fragmentation is described as the dispersion of
responsibility for a policy area among several
organizational units. It can lead to diffusion of
responsibility and can make coordination of policies
d i.f f Lcul t.c !"
In the context of NOAA's involvement in the ocean
dumping issue, the inherent problems of bureaucratic
structure have played a significant role. From the Marine
Ecosystem Analysis project (MESA) to the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), the fragmentation of NOAA has
contributed to its inability to meet its responsibilities.
Similarly, interagency problems existed between NOAA and EPA
as both agencies struggled with the difficulties of a new
poLicy i P
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CHAPTER IV
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Public policies result from sequences of decisions
based on political decisions and legislative mandates often
as a result of social and executive pressure. Environmental
policymaking is not only governed by those factors, but by
natural and man-induced events and by scientific findings.
In examining NOAA's ocean dumping policies it can be shown
that all of the above factors have either contributed to or
inhibited the implementation of that policy'. This chapter
discusses, chronologically, the significant events that have
shaped NOAA's policies in preparation for the analysis of
implementation processes in the following chapter.
The Early 1970's
In the late 1960's an increasing awareness of the need
to strengthen the federal government's marine biological and
technological capabilities led to a presidential commission
recommending a unified agency to oversee the oceans and
atmosphere. 2 NOAA was formed by executive order in 1970 by
President Richard Nixon3 and encompassed such agencies as
the National Weather Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey,
Bureau of Sport Fishing and Wildlife (parts of which were
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incorporated into the National Marine Fisheries Service) and
others.
NOAA was barely a year old when furor over a report on
conditions of the New York Bight thrust the agency into the
public eye. The paper, called the "Sandy Hook Report" was
prepared for the u.S. Corps of Engineers by the Sandy Hook
Marine Laboratory to examine the effects of dredge spoil and
sewage sludge dumping in the inner New York Bight. The
results of the study showed that conditions in the Bight
were polluted enough that no macrofauna could exist in
dumpsite areas (including both sewage sludge and dredge
spoil areas) 4 and that a "dead sea"s had been created in
the area. Disagreements ensued between agencies,
politicians and the public over the significance of the
report and the actual degradation of the Bight and created
controversy that led to congressional investigations and new
Leq i.sLat.Lon",
During this same period the Food and Drug
Administration banned shellfishing in the inner New York
Bight (Fig. 2). The FDA's decision was based on total and
fecal coliform bacteria levels which exceeded those
recommended by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration for estuarine waters used for shellfish
harvesting and cUltivation? These findings were in part
taken from the "Sandy Hook Report' and from other studies
done by the Sandy Hook Lab.
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Fig. 2. Location of the 12-mile sewage sludge
dumpsite, dredge materials dumpsite and
area closed to commercial shellfishing
in 1970 in the NY Bight8
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In response to the ongoing controversy in the New York
Bight and in recognition of the global impacts of ocean
disposal of wastes, the President's Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) issued it's 1970 report, "Ocean Dumping: A
National Policy,,9. This report stated "[i]f no action is
taken and ocean dumping continues to increase, the long term
damage to the marine environment will be great. 11'0 These
strong words not only set the tone for the national policy
of the early 1970's, they also embodied the growing belief
at the time that the oceans were to be protected and that
dumping was a temporary stop-gap measure to be eliminated as
rapidly as possible".
As a direct result of the CEQ Report Congress enacted
The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA). The Ocean Dumping Act, as it is more commonly
referred to, in Title I directed the Environmental
Protection Agency and Corps of Engineers to establish and
implement regulatory programs for ocean dumping. Title II
required EPA and NOAA to conduct comprehensive research and
monitoring regarding the effects of ocean dumping and to
investigate and study alternative disposal methods'z. The
agencies were also to determine methods of minimizing or
ending as soon as possible the ocean disposal of any
"material which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment,
ecological systems, or economic potentialities .... ,,'3.
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Already recognizing the need to study the effects of
human interference in marine environments, NOAA had created
the Marine Ecosystem Analysis Project (MESA) in early 1973.
The program's goals were 1) to establish an environmental
baseline, 2) to monitor, predict, and support efforts to
control conditions that degrade the environment and 3) to
alert responsible officials of the onset of environmental
change14 • The New York Bight was selected for MESA's five
year pilot program because of i t 1s acute environmental
problems but was considered independent of NOAA's
requirements under Title II of the Ocean Dumping Act15 •
Other areas such as Prince William Sound and Puget Sound
were considered as likely sites for MESA studies after the
completion of the pilot program16 •
Not only a scientific data collection and analysis
program, the MESA/New York Bight Project also provided
funding for other research that would identify and answer
pertinent environmental questions about the New York Bight.
More importantly, perhaps, the Project was responsible for
the synthesis of the available information about the Bight,
putting it into a form that could be used by those
developing policy and regulations. The original intent of
the project was to focus on the Bight as an ecosystem, that
is, look at physical and biological processes and
anthropogenic effects on those processes. Ocean dumping was
seen as only one aspect of the Bight's dynamics1?
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In 1973 all this changed. Dr. William H. Harris, a
geochemist from Brooklyn College announced findings that
sewage sludge dumped at the 12-mile site was, over the three
years of his study, working it's way inshore toward Long
Island beaches18 • National interest was sparked by
newspaper articles describing an uninterested and
unconcerned EPA and threats of a IIsludge monster ll defiling
Long Island's south shore beaches19.
In the middle of all this controversy was NOAA's MESA
program. Dr. Larry Swanson, director of the MESA program,
testified at an EPA pUblic hearing that there were
potentially deleterious effects from sewage sludge and
indicated an "urgency and importance [in] determining more
accurately the extent of sludge contamination, the oceanic
factors influencing sludge movement, and the extent to which
sludge is impacting or jeopardizing marine life and
beaches. 1120 His conclusion, though, regarding likelihood
of sewage sludge migration of towards shore, was
understandably vague due to the fact that there was little
information available at that time to make any jUdgments21 •
These determinations, arguably inconclusive, were used by
both EPA and the opponents of ocean dumping to argue their
respective cases and brought NOAA into odds with both
factions. As a result of it's role as "scientific expert",
and with the increased congressional and media attention,
NOAA was forced to place more focus on the NY Bight project
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sewage sludge work and less on the original intent of the
MESA program22 •
In response to the increased controversy and negative
scientific data EPA decided that sludge should be dumped
further offshore. In 1974, NOAA was called upon to find two
possible sites and reluctantly examined sites between 28 and
70 miles offshore. Eventually NOAA decided upon one 60
miles offshore although it was never considered by NOAA to
be a viable alternative to the 12-mile site. EPA
established a deadline of July 1976 for cessation of dumping
at the 12-mile site and earlier if the findings of Dr.
Harris were proven true. All dumping would be moved to the
60-mile site until December 1981 at which time all dumping
would cease. NOAA continued to oppose EPA's decisions
regarding the offshore site and when MESA was able to prove
that sludge was not, in fact, migrating shoreward, EPA
rescinded it's plans for the alternate sites. By now it was
clear NOAA's findings and decisions had become integral in
shaping EPA's policies and regulations and in congressional
and public investigations into the ocean dumping issue23 •
Renewed controversy erupted in 1976 after a series of
"floatable" incidents fouled the Long Island south shore.
The resultant beach closures fueled pUblic outrage and
required the New York Bight project to once again respond to
heightened media and political attention. These episodes
were quickly attributed to a series of isolated events in
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Bight area and within seven months an in-depth analysis was
available to the public. This quick response was credited
to the directed attention of the NY Bight Project and it's
growing understanding of the complexities of the New York
Bight~.
The second incident of the summer of 1976 illustrated
that there was still much to learn about the processes at
work in the region. A massive fish kill along the New
Jersey coast clearly identified the potential impact of
human interference in the marine environment. The event
offered the NY Bight Project the opportunity to study oxygen
depletion conditions and raised difficult scientific
questions regarding anthropogenic versus natural occurrences
of this type. While this large scale event was determined
to be of natural origins, similar pollution-related smaller
scale events illustrated the risks to the Bight. Subsequent
MESA reports contributed greatly to the understanding of
oxygen depletion conditions. 25
1977 to 1981
The year 1977 was a confusing yet significant time for
the formulation and implementation of NOAA ocean dumping
policy. For five years (since the 1972 passage of the Ocean
Dumping Act) NOAA's ocean dumping programs had remained
unfunded. All work was carried out under other programs and
authorizations. Finally, NOAA's FY 1977 bUdget included
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approximately $1.4 million dollars for ocean dumping
research and monitoring26 • with this funding NOAA
established the Ocean Dumping Program whose vague goals were
to assist EPA by providing data for dumpsite analysis and
support of that agency's regulatory process as mandated by
Title II of the Ocean Dumping Act27 • This department was a
separate entity from the MESA/NY Bight Program.
NOAA ocean dumping research continued in the NY Bight in
1977. MESA/NY Bight Project findings indicated little
improvement would result in the Bight if ocean dumping were
stopped, especially if no action took place to control other
pollutants input. It also strongly opposed any movement of
sludge dumping to another continental shelf site but
considered the 106-mile site suitable for emergency dumping.
(This actually took place in 1977 and 1978 when Camden, New
Jersey was forced to dispose of its sludge at the offshore
site.) Another branch of NOAA, the National Ocean Service
(NOS), had been conducting surveys at the 106-mile site to
determine baseline environmental conditions since industrial
wastes had been dumped there for years and little was known
about the area28 •
Concern was growing about the likelihood of actually
"getting out of the ocean" since the search for viable
alternatives to ocean dumping was proving fruitless. NOAA
was not involved in research into alternatives since most
were land-based and fell under EPA's purview. Even though
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the 1977 amendments to the Ocean Dumping Act reaffirmed
congressional intent to end ocean dumping that unreasonably
degraded the marine environment by December 1981, the once
protectionist attitude of the government as a result of a
strict interpretation of the law was now in a state of
reappraisal. A change in the research focus at the 106-mile
site in 1977 and 1978 illustrated these changing attitudes.
Baseline environmental studies were replaced by
investigations into broader use of the site for ocean
disposal~. The Ocean Dumping Act's call for "off-the-
shelf sites whenever possible ll provided a mandate for this
action and a possible viable alternative to the 12-mile
site. Concern within the Congress and the scientific
community over the unknowns of dumping in the deeper ocean
were outweighed by the known deterioration of the inshore
dumpsites and the resultant desire to end the contribution
to that degradation. EPA's new permit renewal process
reflected this change in policy by allowing continued ocean
dumping based on need, status of available alternatives and
an acceptable plan for phase-out within the time frame of
the law. NOAA's 1977 policy, although still in a state of
flux, was modified to parallel these changes:
"1. It is NOAA policy to oppose ocean disposal of
sewage sludge; the agency endorses EPA's policy to
terminate this dumping by 1981.
2. NOAA shall continue to oppose moving the existing
sewage sludge dumpsite in the New York Bight on the
basis that to date we have developed no conclusive
evidence that dumping at that site has resulted in
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threat to public health or a danger to local beaches.
However, as dumping at that location continues, such a
threat could materialize, necessitating rapid
relocation. We believe that the problem of sewage
sludge dumping in the New York Bight should be resolved
in the framework of the Interstate Sanitation
Commission's Sewage Sludge Disposal Management Plan.
However, in the event EPA makes the decision to move
that dumpsite, and the choices are either DWD-106 or
the 6o-mile site, then NOAA favors the use of DWD-106
in order to avoid despoiling a new area.
3. NOAA will not oppose any interim permits issued
by EPA to allow dumping of sewage sludge at DWD-106 on
a temporary basis by the cities of Philadelphia or
Camden in order to allow those municipalities time to
develop their rcroposed land-based disposal
al ternatives. " a
All of these changes, though, were still governed by the
December 1981 deadline. The use of the oceans for dumping
of certain substances was only seen as the best disposal
option for the immediate future.
The passage in 1978 of the National Ocean Pollution
Planning Act (NOPPA) mandated the establishment of NOAA's
National Marine Pollution Program . The focus of this new
program was to:
- prepare and update every three years a comprehensive
five-year plan for the overall Federal effort in ocean
pollution research, development,and monitoring (Section
4) ;
- provide financial assistance for such activities if
they received high priority in the five-year plan and
are not being addressed adequately by any existing
Federal programs (Section 6);
- establish a comprehensive, coordinated, and effective
ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring
program (Section 5) ;
- insure that results, findings, and monitoring
programs are disseminated in a timely manner and useful
form to Federal and user groups having an interest in
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such information (section 8) .31
Programs such as the status and Trends Program, National
Shellfish Register and Consequences of Contaminants Program
emerged later as a result of this legislation. All had
similar goals as the original MESA program but with more
directed objectives. While the MESA/NY Bight Project
continued to address the very specific issues of ocean
dumping in the New York Bight this legislation intended to
bring a more national focus to NOAA ocean pollution
research, development, and monitoring programs32 • The
NOPPA legislation also resulted in the establishment of the
Office of Marine Pollution Assessment (OMPA) at NOAA
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. The goals of this
program were the same as the legislation and brought NOAA in
line with the new law. Since ocean dumping was included,
the Ocean Dumping Program was incorporated into this
department.
In September 1979, the NY Bight Project field
operations ended after almost seven years, two years longer
than the original intent. In that time, though, the
program was responsible for collecting more information
about the New York Bight than any other program of its type.
It contributed greatly to the establishment of federal ocean
dumping policy and regulations and was highly regarded for
it's research results regarding both ocean dumping and other
environmental processes at work in the New York Bight33 •
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With the end of the NY Bight Project NOAA transferred
the MESA program to NOAA headquarters under OMPA. In 1981
the MESA program officially ended and it's responsibilities
and mission objectives were absorbed into OMPA. No other
estuaries were studied by this program as had been
originally envisioned when MESA was formed in 1973. During
this same period, NOAA administrator, John Byrne, attempted
to move the Ocean Dumping Program to Seattle, Washington, a
move that was presented as an attempt to strengthen NOAA's
pollution programs in the northwest. congressional
disapproval prevented it from happening and later that year,
OMPA was reorganized into Ocean Assessments Division (OAD) ,
a department that continues today (Fig. 4) .34
Two events in 1981 contributed significantly to the
future direction of federal and program ocean dumping
policies. The first was the National Committee on Oceans
and Atmosphere (NACOA) report titled "The Role of the Ocean
in a Waste Management Strategy". The report recommended a
"multimedia" approach to the disposal of wastes with an
emphasis on a determination of costs versus benefit or risk.
The report specifically recommended that EPA reverse its
policy that no ocean dumping permit be issued when a land-
based alternative exists. It went on to say that ocean
dumping by barge or outfall should be allowed to continue in
areas where no unreasonable degradation has resulted if
appropriate conditions existed and there was adherence to
26
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adequate safeguards and monitoring practices. It advised
EPA to consider the cost and feasibility of land-based
alternatives versus those of ocean disposal and determine
the relative risk of either to the degradation of the
environment and to human health. This report, therefore,
encouraged policy and management decisions be made in the
context of risk assessment and with a less strict
interpretation of the applicable laws36 •
The second event of 1981 responsible for a change in
policy was the judicial decision made by Federal Judge
Abraham Sofaer in CITY OF NEW YORK v. EPA. 37 Since 1973,
New York city's sewage sludge had failed to meet EPA's
environmental impact criteria for a special permit to be
disposed of at sea. This was because the levels of PCB's,
hydrocarbons, and other pollutants exceeded EPA standards.
New York city had, nevertheless, been dumping using an
interim special permit which allows waste to be dumped at
sea even though it violates the criteria for the special
permit and if there is no land-based alternative for
disposal. In 1980 EPA denied New York's application for an
interim permit based on the new stricter regulations imposed
since 1977. In response, New York challenged EPA's interim
permit process and evaluation criteria. The final court
decision was in favor of New York city, stating that EPA's
criteria for determining whether New York's ocean dumping
would unreasonably degrade the marine environment,
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ecological systems and economic potentialities was
"arbitrary and capricious"~. The decision further stated
that the EPA must consider equally the nine statutory
criteria used to evaluate all permit applications.
Essentially, the include the environmental effect of the
proposed dumping, the need for a permit, the availability
and potential impact of alternative methods of disposal and
the effect of the proposed action on aesthetic, recreational
and economic values.~
The presumed desire of the Ocean Dumping Act was to
protect the oceans from increased degradation as a result of
ocean disposal of waste. It also intended that EPA be
delegated broad discretion in its duty to prevent and
strictly regulate ocean dumping4o • The results of this
court case and the decision by EPA not to appeal Judge
Sofaer's rUling, while betraying the original intent of the
Ocean Dumping Act, more importantly, perhaps, contributed to
an emerging national policy, one of non-preferentia l
treatment of the ocean as a waste disposal medium41 •
1982-1988
The new attitudes towards ocean dumping, brought about
by the events of the previous three years, were accompanied
by increased activity in research and policy-making. EPA
extended dumping at the 12-mile site for New York City and
six New York and New Jersey municipalities. NOAA-sponsored
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research at the 106-mile site indicated the environmental
feasibility of dumping sewage sludge there. Finally, some
cities (Boston, Baltimore and Washington, D.C) were
exploring the possibility of the disposal of their wastes at
sea42 •
In May 1983, NOAA, in a major shift of policy, issued
this statement:
"Waste disposal practices should be chosen to avoid
significant risk of harm to living and nonliving
resources in any environmental medium - oceans, land,
fresh water, and air. If it is determined that
disposal is the preferred option to a potential waste
problem, then disposal practices likely to cause least
risk of significant harm regardless of medium should be
chosen. NOAA does not oppose selection of the ocean as
a disposal site if comparative assessment of all
reasonable disposal options indicates that the ocean
option poses the least risk of significant harm. If
disposal in the ocean is currently causing or
contributing to conditions that cause significant risk
of harm to the marine environment, NOAA urges the
timely assessment of alternative disposal practices and
the selection of an environmentally acceptable
practice. "43
This mirrored the already growing trend to include the
oceans in a waste management strategy, exactly as the NACOA
report had suggested44 •
During the same time , at a congressional hearing, NOAA
testified as to the desirability of moving dumping from the
12-mile to the 106-mile dumpsite. In the past, NOAA had
maintained a policy that little recovery of the 12-mile site
would be observed unless the input of other pollutants was
to be halted. Moving dumping out of the 12-mile site was
considered unwise if it meant compromising another area.
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However, new data had been collected that indicated that it
was environmentally feasible to dump sewage sludge at the
deeper dumpsite. These included:
- dumped sewage sludge could be diluted by a factor of
104 within a few minutes and 105 within a day;
- laboratory and field experiments do not find
significant low level effects at these concentrations;
- there would be negligible benthic effects;
- the concentration and distribution of contaminants
would not be such as to cause much accumulation in
migratory or residence fish, although a few
contaminants (e.g. PCBs) in sewage sludge probably
contribute to bioaccumulation; and
- there would be no apparent threat to human health. 45
NOAA testified that it's newest policy, based on the above
information, meant that it not only favored use of the deep
water site over the 60-mile site (EPA had begun to consider
this site again) it also favored it above the 12-mile
site~.
From 1983 to 1985 investigations into transferring
sewage sludge disposal to the 106-mile site continued. The
result was that in April 1985 EPA issued a final denial of
petitions to re-designate the 12-mile site along with a
request that the nine municipalities still dumping at the
12-mile site transfer their operations to the 106-mile site.
The principal factor in this decision was that if dumping at
the 12-mile site were to continue in the manner that would
meet the limited permissible concentrations requirements it
had the potential for creating navigational hazards. In
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addition, it was shown that the primary source for sewage-
related contaminants found in the Christiansen Basin and
ocean floor north of the site to within five nautical miles
south of Long Island was a result of ocean dumping of sludge
at the inshore site. Along with the continued closure of
shell fishing beds in the area, increased levels above the
normal ambient levels of heavy metals and halogenated
hydrocarbons were observed at the site. An orderly 1 1/2
year phase-out schedule was negotiated with the dumpers the
controlling factor being the lack of ocean-going barges
necessary for transport of the sludge to the offshore site
required a 1 1/2 year step-wise schedule47 • Completion of
the change-over to the 106-mile site was accomplished on
December 31, 1987.
Since early 1988, controversy has once again erupted
over ocean dumping. Fishermen claim that catch totals are
down and the incidence of disease in shellfish is on the
increase in the northeast as a result of environmental
degradation from dumping at the offshore site. Coastal
communities are angered over episodes of medical wastes
washing up on the beaches from New Jersey to Rhode Island
and incorrectly blame sewage sludge dumping. Scientists,
baffled by large-scale occurrences of dolphin deaths along
the Atlantic coast, have looked to the disposal of wastes at
sea as a possible culprit. 48 Finally, as a result of these
events, pUblic outrage has fueled congress into amending,
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once again, the Ocean Dumping Act in an attempt to close the
loopholes that allowed for the continuation of dumping for
the last eight years.
The Present Ocean Dumping situation
The pendulum has, once again, swung back to a policy of
non-use of the oceans for waste disposal. In response to
the renewed controversy over movement of sludge dumping to
the lOG-Mile site the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988,
actually an amendment to the 1972 Ocean Dumping Act, was
produced, setting a date of December 31, 1991 for the
cessation of ocean disposal of sewage sludge and industrial
wastes. In particular, this amendment specifically avoided
the controversy surrounding the determination of
"unreasonable degradation" and benefit and risk comparisons
of waste disposal media by banning ocean dumping outright
and making it economically infeasible to continue dumping
much beyond the cutoff date. The key provisions include:
- No new dumpers of sewage sludge or industrial waste.
- No dumping of sewage sludge or industrial waste
without a permit and compliance or enforcement
agreement.
- Dumping fees imposed starting 270 days from the
enactment of the Act and continuing until December 31,
1991.
- Financial penalties imposed for dumping after 1991.
The fees, which are expected to be considerable, are
divided amongst EPA, NOAA, and the Coast Guard for
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monitoring, research and surveillance activities. Part of
the fees will go to coastal states clean ocean funds and
part will be held in trust to be returned to the dumpers to
support their development of alternatives. Probably the most
important aspect of the legislation lies in the consent
decrees that have been entered into by the dumpers stating
their plans and schedules for implementing alternatives to
ocean sludge disposal, which legally bind them to their own
p Lana ,"?
This brings us to the present. It is clear that
historical events have been cause for action and reaction by
both policy-makers and implementors. The following chapter
examines in depth those responses that have affected NOAA's
role, politically and scientifically, as it relates to the
ocean dumping issue.
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CHAPTER V
NOAA POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS
Establishment of public policy can be in many forms,
such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuance of an
executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision or
the promulgation of a regulatory rule. However, that is
only the first step. Since policies are rarely self-
executing, their implementation is left to government
agencies to establish programs or regulations to carry out
the policy. Unfortunately, this process is difficult and
the end result may differ greatly from the original intent
of the law or policy.'
The inhibition of effective policy implementation can
be explained by George Edwards theory, as discussed in
Chapter 2. The four factors that can impede the policy
process are:
1. Communication - Lack of or unclear communication
disrupts policy implementation. For example,
communication difficulties can result from laws and
judicial decisions that lack clarity. They can exist
between heads of departments and their employees or
between collaborating agencies.
2. Resources - If those responsible for carrying out
policy lack the resources to do so, policy
implementation will suffer. For this paper, resources
are defined as funding, information, and authority.
3. Dispositions - In effective policy implementation,
the implementors must have the desire to carry out a
policy. Disagreements within or between agencies can
disrupt the implementation process.
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4. Bureaucratic structure - The structure of
bureaucracies, namely standard operating procedures and
fragmentation can constrain implementation by
inhibiting change and diffusing responsibility.
NOAA is the federal government's primary source of data
and information concerning problems of the ocean and
atmosphere. This section examines the specific issue of
NOAA's involvement in the implementation of ocean dumping
policy and discusses the agency's own implementation process
as it has been shaped by both the intensely controversial
events of the past twenty years and their relation to
Edwards theory.
Policy Implementation DifficUlties in the Early 1970's
The fledgling NOAA, in the midst of administrative
uncertainty, had little or no bureaucratic structure in
place to link the already existing environmental programs
now under it's purview not to mention develop any new
programs. The ocean dumping issue, both politically and
scientifically challenging, was only one of many faced by
the new agency.
An early example of both dispositional and
communication difficulties surrounding the ocean dumping
issue arose between the Corps of Engineers and the Sandy
Hook Marine Lab over the "Sandy Hook Report" . In 1968, the
Corps commissioned the then u .s. Fish and wildlife Service
39
Laboratory at Sandy Hook to study the dumpsites in the New
York Bight (the Corps was, at the time, the closest thing to
a coastal ocean agency; its responsibilities included
maintaining the navigability of U.S. waters). The purpose
of the report, supposedly, was to help the Corps determine
the advisability of continuing dumping operations at the
present disposal site. The study was to take two years and
was to assess the ecology of the site by performing chemical
analyses of the water and sediments and pelagic and benthic
studies.
The 1970 report indicated that the dumpsite areas were
severely degraded, a fact that, seemingly, the Corps was
unprepared to accept. Nor was it prepared to deal with the
controversy the report created2 • In an attempt to minimize
the negative impact the COE characterized the report as
"tentative, incomplete and subject to change"3. Further,
in an interview for BIOSCIENCE, Kenneth Osborne, a COE staff
marine biologist, stated that "the competence of Sandy Hook
is only in fishery biological research. The Corps only
wrote one contract with Sandy Hook .,. they tried their best
hydrographically but what is needed now is the highest type
of physical oceanography." When asked why the Sandy Hook
Lab was chosen in the first place, he stated "Sandy Hook was
chosen because they had their own vessels and the Corps
would not have to pay for the purchase of such vessels by
another organization. [The Corps] would only have to pay
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for the cost of using vessels and not the cost of
purchasing. "4 Since no policy existed, either within the
lab or at the federal level, the Sandy Hook Lab could only
react by defending its studies both to the Corps and to an
outraged public (a pattern that has seemed to exist ever
since) .
The above example illustrates how differences in the
organizational viewpoints (dispositions) and unclear
communications can impede effective policy development and
implementation. Specifically to ocean dumping, however, the
early controversy with the COE (as a result of the report)
contributed to a somewhat defensive posture that was
necessary for NOAA to maintain in regard to it's ocean
dumping research. The Sandy Hook Lab was a fisheries
biology research facility, wholly interested in the study of
habitat, predation, life cycles and the many other aspects
of marine life. The Corps' focus was on construction and
maintenance of marine engineering projects and it had little
experience dealing with environmental impacts of these
projects especially ocean dumpsites.
Similarly, it was not surprising that communication
difficulties also would arise between two agencies with
vastly different missions. Edwards states that one of the
pitfalls of communication is lack of clarity: transmitted
instructions are vague and often do not specify when or how
a program is to be carried outs. This also seemed to be
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part of the problem between Sandy Hook and the COE.
It is important to note that perhaps these early
events, that is, those prior to the enactment of MPRSA and
the formation of MESA, are less significant to NOAA's
present position in ocean dumping research. However, these
patterns seem to exist throughout the next twenty years and,
as this paper examines, has contributed to many of NOAA's
problems in effectively contributing to and implementing a
national ocean dumping policy.
Implementation of The Ocean Dumping Act (MPRSA) 1972-1975
The 1970 CEQ report and the escalating controversy over
ocean dumping were, in part, responsible for the passage of
the MPRSA in 1972. Through this legislation the country had
established a form of national ocean dumping policy.
However, NOAA, whose responsibilities under MPRSA were
significant, had distinct difficulties in those early few
years developing any kind of implementation plan.
To begin with four Federal agencies shared major
responsibilities for the overall implementation of the Ocean
Dumping Act. Because interagency coordination was seen as
essential to this mission, the Ocean Disposal Program
coordinating Committee was formed in April 1973 and was
comprised of EPA, NOAA, COE and the Coast Guard6 • This was
the first attempt to bring together four diverse
bureaucratic units in both an attempt to avoid duplication
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of research effort and, more importantly to encourage a high
order of interaction. NOAA was charged with heading this
committee since it was also lead agency in the research and
monitoring of ocean dumping.
Unfortunately this well-intentioned effort to combine
forces was a distinct disappointment7 • A NOAA evaluation
described the committee as such:
"While the committee has been useful as a forum for the
exchange of ideas and discussion of common problems, it
has met infrequently and the productivity and pace of
the committee have been disappointingly low. Reliance
on the four-agency committee for speedy resolution of
substantive problems of ocean disposal is simply not
possible. liB
Edwards describes two possible reasons why this
important attempt at cooperative policy implementation did
not work. First, within most organizational units there is
often a dominant opinion about the organizations primary
mission. Focus is placed on those functions of primary
interest leaving those considered as secondary functions
with lesser allocations of time and resources. Secondly,
bureaucratic units often try to achieve autonomy in carrying
out their responsibilities. For this reason they do not
want to be controlled by officials outside their
organization or to have to coordinate closely with other
organizations. 9
NOAA's attempt to develop it's own program designed to
address the legislative mandates of the Ocean Dumping Act
seemed equally as difficult. Edwards describes the
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development of new programs:
"Often the passage of a new policy is followed by a
period of administrative uncertainty in which there is
considerable time lag before any information on
program[s] are disseminated. This period is followed
by one in which rules are made but are then changed
quickly as high-level officials attempt to deal with
the unforseen problems of implementing the policy and
of their own earlier directives."'o
For NOAA this process took nearly three years. In 1975
the agency finally published its program issue paper, the
purpose of which was to:
"1) outline the program being developed under the
requirements of P.L. 92-523 [the Ocean Dumping Act],
Title II;
2) provide support and justification for the FY 77
bUdget request for the ocean dumping program; and
3) identify a number of issues which still require
resolution in further development of the program.""
NOAA admitted in this document that its process was slow in
developing. The failure of the Ocean Disposal Program
Coordinating Committee to provide coordination between
agencies left NOAA with sole responsibility for determining
areas of duplicative research as well as areas of inquiry
which were not being adequately covered, all necessarily
addressed in the new ocean dumping program.
NOAA interpreted its role of monitoring and research as
one designed to support and complement the regulatory
programs mandated by the first section of the Ocean Dumping
Act. A close association between NOAA and EPA therefore was
necessary for effective implementation of this new policy.
Unfortunately, delays in the establishment of an official
relationship between NOAA and EPA headquarters stalled the
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necessary interaction. Like NOAA's own program development
plan, it took nearly three years before the two agencies
were able to develop an interagency agreement outlining in
detail the steps each agency would take to satisfy their
responsibilities under the MPRSA.
Interagency agreements between bureaucratic units are
often important tools to help define their respective roles
in a policy area. Bureaucracies, Edwards describes, are
often dependent on standard operating procedures (SOP's),
that is, internal responses developed because of a desire
for uniformity in the operation of complex and widely
dispersed organizations. 12 NOAA's interagency agreements
could be described as a form of SOP's since they establish
specific responsibilities, avenues of communication and
funding sources when working with other agencies. While
SOP's can inhibit changes in policy or generate undesired
actions they are a necessary form of bureaucratic structure.
In NOAA's case the lack of an interagency agreement and the
bureaucratic steps necessary to establish one have both been
cause for inaction 13
While the establishment of the interagency agreement
developed some guidelines for continued interaction, basic
dispositional difficulties still existed between NOAA and
EPA. Some authors describe this as a tendency of scientists
to focus on uncertainties which provide opportunities for
discovery, whereas the public and managers tend to desire
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more certainty about their environment and in their
decisionmaking. 14 In this particular case it could be seen
as a sort of scientific disposition versus a regulatory
disposition. NOAA's lack of support for EPA's decision to
move the 12-mile site out to 60 miles is an example of these
attitudes. NOAA's policy, concurrent with the protectionist
attitude at the time, did not support possible contamination
of a relatively pristine area of the continental shelf . Its
findings suggested no significant improvement in water
quality would result at the 12-mile site with the cessation
of sludge dumping only since the input of other contaminants
from the Hudson-Raritan estuary would continue. Overall,
NOAA insisted that anticipated regulatory decisions should
be based on the best available scientific information. 15
EPA, while supporting this concept, was influenced by more
than purely scientific data. The highly visual image of a
"sludge monster" devouring congested Long Island beaches was
but one of these influences, generating social and political
pressure and forcing EPA into decisions that may not have
completely considered the scientific realities. 16 While
NOAA's data was finally instrumental in EPA's decision not
to use the 60-mile site the whole process once again placed
NOAA in an defensive role and illustrated the difficulties
of integrating science into regulatory decisionmaking.
Another responsibility of the Ocean Dumping Act
(Section 203) which originally fell upon NOAA's shoulders
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was the exploration of alternatives to ocean dumping such as
recycling, new industrial processes, incineration, and other
forms of land disposal. NOAA stated, however, that the
development of these technologies fell outside the
background, mission and competency of the agency. Since
both the Corps of Engineers and EPA were already involved in
the research of alternatives any involvement by NOAA was
seen by the agency as duplicative. Besides, NOAA had no
resources for such an endeavo~7. This "disposition", that
is, the perception that the search for alternatives was
outside it's primary mission, seemed to justify NOAA's
decision to remove itself from the obligation of the law.
In turn, it left in limbo one important aspect of the Ocean
Dumping Act; the exploration of means of minimizing or
ending all dumping of materials into the ocean.
MESA/NY Bight Project
NOAA's Marine Ecosystem Analysis Program (MESA) was
probably one of the most effective implementation tools
available to NOAA during the early years of the ocean
dumping issue. Its well thought-out mission, its ability to
adapt to new directions and its tightly organized structure
were responsible for its success in providing a better
knowledge of the New York Bight and the impact of waste
disposal in it.
Unlike other programs in NOAA, MESA was blessed with an
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extensive development plan produced by Westinghouse Electric
Corporation. 18 This report detailed the scope of MESA and
provided a valuable foundation from which to build this
program. In many ways this plan could be likened to a
standard operating procedure, providing specifics on the
program's management and scientific approaches and the
technical resources available. The report went so far as to
outline each identified task with it's specific objective,
approach, list of recipients, relationship to other tasks
and it's start and end dates. 19
The MESA/NY Bight Project could be described as a
successful implementation tool because it avoided many of
the pitfalls outlined by Edwards. To start, communications
were consistent and clear because it was a small, cohesive
group located at the site of the problem. It's products
were applicable and readily available to the users, the
largest being the EPA. The resources were already available
for the MESA program when it's focus was narrowed to ocean
dumping in the NY Bight. It had talented people with the
proper skills for the tasks. Because of it's close
proximity to the problem it received the information
necessary to function properly, either from EPA or from it's
supervised field work. Because of NOAA's mandate under
MPRSA the program met an immediate need. Probably most
important, however, was that the program generated quality
information that was used.
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other factors contributed to MESA's success. The
differing viewpoints between NOAA and EPA common at the
headquarters level were mainly confined to Washington. MESA
was able to maintain a fairly close working relationship
with EPA Region II throughout most of tenure. MESA's
program development plan was not so restrictive or firmly
entrenched in the agency's infrastructure that the program
could not effectively pursue the new direction it was thrust
into at the beginning of the ocean dumping crisis. Although
Edwards describes it as a pitfall, fragmentation may have
been a benefit for MESA. The physical and bureaucratic
separation from NOAA headquarters may have isolated MESA
from some of the disruptive business of government.
Even in light of its accomplishments, however,
circumstances surrounding the success of the program may
have been partly responsible for the difficulties in policy
development and implementation that later contributed to
NOAA's lack of presence in today's study of ocean waste
disposal. Within two years of it's inception, MESA was
already considered the "expert" in the study of ocean
dumping in the New York Bight and it's data was used
extensively by EPA in it's regulatory decisions. Since
these regulations were under almost constant challenge
whenever they were at all controversial or went against
political desire or popular beliefs NOAA was often put in
the position of defending it's science to both a summoning
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congress and an investigatory press. Similarly, it's easy
accessibility to EPA, the pUblic and the media was
responsible for continually drawing NOAA into the ocean
dumping spotlight, ~ fact that made people in NOAA
headquarters in Washington very uncomfortable. According to
Dr. Larry Swanson, then director of the MESA/NY Bight
Project, most of NOAA's other programs and policies were
lacking in controversy leaving the agency both unprepared
for and extremely intimidated by the attention placed on
ocean dumping. He fully believes that when the time came
for the NY Bight Project to end, NOAA officials "breathed a
sigh of relief". He also saw the reorganization of MESA and
the physical move of the program as a "retreat" to
Washington, out of the limelight, so to speak, where it
could be better controlled by NOAA officials. MESA's
incorporation into already existing programs seemed to mark
the beginning of the end of NOAA as a significant
contributor to both ocean dumping science and, ultimately,
pol icy decisions. 20
Resources: Funding, Information, and Authority
Resources, or lack of them, have also played a
significant role in both the early development and continued
presence of NOAA in the ocean dumping policy process. In
1972 the Ocean Dumping Act allowed a scant one million
dollars for the research necessary to support regulation of
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ocean dumping. At this time NOAA asked the Department of
Commerce (DOC) for $4.1 million either as a supplemental
"add-on" or amendment to the fiscal year 1974 congressional
submission, but was disapproved. NOAA asked for no funding
under the Ocean Dumping Act in 1975. In 1976, DOC approved
$2.0 million of a $5.7 million request by NOAA but the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) disallowed the funds.
Five years after the passage of the Ocean Dumping Act NOAA
requested and Congress finally approved $1.37 million as an
initial appropriation under the Act. 21 It was only then
that NOAA began the Ocean Dumping Program.
It is unclear whether lack of funds was the reason for
the failure to develop a specific NOAA program tasked to
meet the requirements of the Ocean Dumping Act or the lack
of programmatic development stymied the acquisition of funds
necessary to effectively carry out the legislative mandates.
What is clear is its detrimental effect on the acquisition
of the information necessary to support effective policy
implementation.
All work on ocean dumping research up to this point was
conducted using resources from other programs including
MESA, National Ocean Survey (NOS) and NMFS. MESA resources
were directed to the immediate problems in the New York
Bight in the first five years (see discussion below) as a
result allowing NOAA to meet its requirements under the
Ocean Dumping Act. However, dispositional issues and
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fragmentation of funding and information sources inhibited
further policy implementation, a consequence still felt
today. For example, NOS conducted the early baseline
surveys at the 106-mile dumpsite which contained extensive
analyses of the chemical and physical properties of the
site, the office's area of expertise. only limited
information was included on the biological activity in the
region since this was not an NOS area of expertise.
Personnel within NMFS, at the time, were vehemently opposed
to ocean dumping and therefore did not support research
which was being conducted on the effects of ocean dumping
both at the 12 and 106-mile sites because it might be
construed as supporting continued dumping. Dr. Robert
Edwards, director of the NMFS Northeast Fisheries Center,
was one of the most outspoken critics thinking NOAA should
not involve itself in dumping matters unless the agency's
position was strictly that of "no dumping".~ Edward's
theory seems to explain the dynamics of this type of
situation:
"Different bureaucratic units are likely to have
different views on policies. Intra- and interagency
disagreements inhibit cooperation and hinder
implementation. Within a single policy area, each
relevant agency probably has different priorities,
different commitments, and different methods of
handling problems. Similar differences may arise
between those within different program responsibilities
within an agency. These differences are not conducive
to creating the mutual trust and close working
relationships that are freguently necessary for
effective implementation."
In reality, the consequences of such dispositions have
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had long-term ramifications. While the baseline studies by
NOS at the 106-mile dumpsite continue to provide pertinent
information on the physical ocean such is not the case for
the biological ocean at the site. In a recent statement to
a congressional hearing on amendments to the Ocean Dumping
Act NMFS admitted little information on benthic fauna in the
dumpsite region is available after 1976 and in-fact these
early measurements can only provide limited benchmark
information. It went on to admit that these measurements
should have been accomplished prior to extensive dumping and
at continued intervals after the onset of dumping24 •
The above examples show that important information may
not have been available for incorporation into the
decisionmaking process. As policies within NOAA shifted
over time from protectionism to reappraisal and ultimately
to a benefit and risk assessment attitude, in line with
national policies, a greater burden has been placed on the
importance of information required to implement new
programs. The greater use of the oceans for waste disposal
demands a better knowledge of the processes at work.
Edwards theory views authority as another important
resource in the implementation of policy. Authority can
vary from program to program and comes in many different
forms: the right to issue sUbpoenas, issue orders to other
officials, provide or withdraw funds from a program, or take
cases to court. Implementation problems can exist when two
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agencies falling within the same jurisdiction have to share
authority. 25 As provided by the Ocean Dumping Act, EPA
clearly maintains authority to issue permits and institute
regulations regarding ocean dumping. It is less clear,
however, what role was played by the scientific information
and continued monitoring necessary to support those actions.
Certainly during the MESA days NOAA's opinions were heavily
relied upon. EPA's decision not to allow dumping at the 60-
Mile dumpsite based on NOAA's findings, illustrates how
NOAA's scientific involvement affected policy and
regulations. Clearly, the greater the role that scientific
information plays in the regulatory process the greater is
it's "authority". While nowhere in the Ocean Dumping Act
was NOAA given any kind of mandated authority, a sense of
control may have developed as EPA decisions relied upon
NOAA's scientific findings. 26 After the ocean dumping
program responsibilities moved to Washington, D.C. this
issue seemed to disappear probably due to the lack of
cooperation between the two agencies at the headquarter
level.
NOAA Structure and Policies: 1977-1981
According to Edwards theory, the reorganization of
NOAA's ocean dumping programs from 1979 to 1981 could have
contributed significantly to policy implementation problems
within NOAA. The incorporation of MESA into the Office of
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Marine Pollution Assessment (OMPA), the attempted move of
the ocean dumping program to the northwest, and the
sUbsequent reorganization of OMPA into the Oceans Assessment
Division quickly diluted a viable working program of ocean
dumping research. While both of these pollution assessment
programs were NOAA's attempt to address broader ocean
pollution issues, the immersion of the ocean dumping
programs into the broader-based pollution programs was seen
by those within the organization as an attempt to distance
the agency from the immediate controversy of ocean dumping.
Edwards reasons that if the disposition of officials within
a bureaucracy is against a policy or the policy's
ramifications to that agency, effective implementation will
suffer. If, in fact, as Dr. Swanson stated, the attention
NOAA was receiving regarding ocean dumping was intimidating
to the agency, a possible solution would be to lessen the
program's visibility. The facts are that by 1982 no program
existed within NOAA that dealt exclusively with ocean
dumping.
In actuality, it is not clear what the motivation was
for the reorganization discussed above or the rapid
disappearance of an ocean dumping program within NOAA.
However, on a broader scale the whole time period from 1977
through 1982, when numerous changes in the Federal ocean
dumping policy were taking place, may have made it difficult
for NOAA to keep abreast of and respond to the events and
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decisions of the moment. Edwards theorizes that
inconsistency in policy and implementation orders can
effectively inhibit the process and send mixed signals to
the agencies attempting to perform their roles. The
established ocean dumping law (and one must assume, policy)
was made stronger by EPA and Congress in 1977 so that all
dumping that "unreasonably degraded" the oceans would end by
December 1981. It was also hoped that this would provide an
added incentive to develop alternative disposal techniques.
It had an added effect, however. 27 At the same time as
seemingly restrictive measures were being taken at the
inshore dumpsite increased focus on the 106-Mile Site as one
alternative to the inshore site was also taking place.
Camden, New Jersey was allowed to dispose of their municipal
waste at the 106-Mile site on an emergency basis and
industrial waste continued to be dumped at the site. NOAA
involvement in the studies of each of these events produced
conclusions suggesting that the highly dispersive nature of
the site could accommodate the kinds and amounts of sludge
dumped at the 12-Mile site. 28 All this seemed to result in
NOAA finding itself supporting limited ocean dumping through
its research into ocean dumping effects all the while
favoring EPA's December 1981 deadline for the cessation of
sludge dumping. A particular example, while perhaps
anecdotal, nevertheless illustrates the results of
inconsistent and unclear policymaking. In the first half of
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1977 an internal memorandum from the Acting Administrator
for Marine Resources (dated May 20, 1977) titled "ls Ocean
Dumping Really That Bad" stated:
"Our position on this sUbject has always been that we
are supposed to be the protector of the oceans, but
this may not be reasonable if one takes a broader
context. How will New York City dispose of their
sewage sludge? Can they come up with a new plan in
four years? .. Suppose we take a position that ever~one
should dump sludge at the 106-Mile site? Why not? 9
Inexplicably, at the same time a NOAA issue paper dated May
3, 1977 intending to identify NOAA's policy on ocean
dumping, in part stated:
"It is NOAA's policy to oppose ocean disposal of sewage
sludge; the agency endorses EPA's policy to terminate
this dumping by 1981. ,,30
Edwards policy implementation theory, applied to the
two major events in 1981 (namely the NACOA Report and the
"Sofaer Decision"), illustrates how these events affected
both the formulation of NOAA policy and, in turn, the
implementation of that policy.
Edwards discussion about unclear and inconsistent
policies is borne out in NACOA's report on ocean dumping:
" Because it is impossible to implement all five
statutes [namely Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
MPRSA, Safe Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act and the Clean Air Act] simultaneously,
the implementation of each statute has shifted the
burden of receiving society's waste products to the
medium least regulated at the moment .... NACOA is
concerned that this medium-by-medium approach may have
produced groups of regulations whose primary objective
is to protect a particular medium from use as a waste
disposal medium, without any regard for the impact of
these regulations on other media. 1131
If, in fact, this observation by NACOA was true it could
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have contributed to difficulties for NOAA (or any other
agency for that matter) involved in the implementation of
these laws.
The "Sofaer Decision ll 32 , for the purposes of this
discussion, serves to illustrate 1) the difficulties that
can be encountered by an agency attempting to translate the
language of laws into actions and 2) the role of the courts
in the policymaking process. Edwards theory addresses both
issues. In the first, he acknowledges that laws are often
unclear, sometimes leaving it up to the implementors to
determine the true intent of the law. Sometimes, however,
the complexity of the issue warrants a certain vagueness.
He reasons:
"Neither executives nor legislators have the time or
expertise to develop and apply all the requisite
details for implementing policy. They have to leave
most (and sometimes all) of the details to
subordinates. 1133
One of the major criticisms made by the "Sofaer Decision"
was EPA's interpretation of the language of the Ocean
Dumping Act, specifically, regarding sewage sludge which
"unreasonably degraded II the environment . Discussions about
JUdge Sofaer's decision argue that the law acknowledged
scientific and environmentally sensitive regUlations were
necessary for proper implementation of the law and correctly
deferred that responsibility to EPA. 34 In the second
issue, Edwards states that the narrow definitions made by
the courts can significantly impact policy and, in turn, the
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respective implementation. 35 In this particular case,
while the court did not attempt to change the 1981 deadline
for the cessation of dumping, it did focus on EPA's
consideration of the factors involved in the issuance of
ocean dumping permits. 36 Of course, the results of the
court's ruling are well known.
NOAA Policy Issues from 1982 to the present
NOAA's policies in the 1980's certainly reflected the
realities of the law and emerging scientific conclusions
regarding expanded use of the oceans as a waste disposal
option. The major policy reversal that oceans should not be
accorded a preferential treatment in waste management
decisions was ironically, for a time (in 1983), contrary to
EPA, who proposed special treatment for the ocean with
respect to other disposal media. In general, though, there
was less problem with coordination between the respective
agencies in the 1980's although this may be reflective of
the fact that there was less coordination. 37
One problem area for NOAA throughout this period and,
most likely, throughout the whole twenty years of ocean
dumping history, was the definition of monitoring. Similar
to the problems EPA encountered regarding the Ocean Dumping
Act's use of the term "unreasonable degradation", the law
did not clearly define what monitoring meant. While NOAA
was charged with the responsibility of conducting
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comprehensive research and monitoring regarding the effects
of ocean dumping, in 1984, EPA contracted with Battelle
Ocean Services, a private ocean research firm, to conduct
research, in part to support it's ocean dumping permitting
process. Discussions with people in EPA have indicated that
EPA employed Battelle because it was not receiving the
necessary information from NOAA. The present contract
between EPA's Office of Estuarine Protection and Battelle is
for $48 million over three years, a substantial portion of
which goes directly toward monitoring and research at the
106-Mile Site.~
After the reorganization of NOAA's ocean dumping and
marine pollution programs in 1981, the disposition within
the newly formed Ocean Assessment Division was that ocean
dumping was more of a political and social issue and less of
a scientific one. The Status and Trends, Mussel Watch, and
other marine environmental monitoring programs, while
including the dumpsite areas, were concerned with nation-
wide data acquisition and analysis. Consequently, little
more was done specific to ocean dumping in the New York
Bight.
The discussion/conclusions that follow will attempt to
summarize and coalesce the application of Edwards theory to
the events of the past twenty years.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
liThe history of evolving pOlicy on ocean dumping by NOAA
reveals the workings of a federal agency attempting to
reconcile its views on protection of the ocean environment
with legislative mandates, new scientific findings, and the
realities of the given waste disposal situations.'
Philip Cohen
1986
The original premise of this paper that NOAA has not
met its responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act with
regard to ocean dumping research and monitoring is based on
three questions. 1) How have NOAA's ocean dumping pOlicies
been shaped? 2) What difficulties have arisen in the
implementation of these policies? 3) How have these issues
shaped NOAA's present role in the ocean dumping situation?
NOAA's policies did not evolve in a void. They were
concurrent with the three distinct phases of national
policies. The first approached ocean disposal as a
temporary measure to be eliminated as soon as possible.
Political and social pressure notwithstanding, NOAA saw
itself as a protector of the ocean and its actions reflected
that attitude. The second phase came about as the realities
of scientific evidence and the lack of practical
alternatives made ocean dumping more feasible for some
substances. NOAA's decision to not exclude the ocean as a
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disposal medium under certain conditions was the third phase
and followed a national pOlicy that waste management
decisions should be based on a reasonable and comprehensive
assessment of comparable benefits and risks. With the
passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act, we have, perhaps,
returned to the original phase; non-use of the ocean for
waste disposal. It is interesting to note that political
determinations were the framework for the decisions to "get
out of the ocean" while those of science found a place for
sewage sludge in the marine environment.
Neatly laying out the direction of pOlicy over the
twenty years, while generically valid, does not include a
portrayal of the often difficult implementation process
associated with policies. George Edwards emphasized an
explanation of the factors that adversely affect policy
implementation. This paper, in turn, identifies the
problems associated with the particulars of NOAA's attempts
at implementation and, in effect, overlays them onto Edwards
theory.
While all four factors in Edwards theory have played a
role in this discussion, communication and disposition
problems have most significantly affected the direction of
implementation. The Ocean Dumping Act assigns NOAA three
responsibilities: 1) monitoring the effects of waste dumped
into the ocean, 2) conducting research programs on long-
range effects of pollution and human-induced changes on the
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marine environment, and 3) the search for alternatives. In
the early years (1970-1972) NOAA's research plans focused on
ecosystem-wide studies into the effects of human activities
on coastal waters. However, vague ocean dumping policies
made it difficult for the newly-formed NOAA to respond to
the growing ocean dumping crisis. After 1972, more specific
studies at the 12-mile dumpsite were the major focus of
NOAA's research. Much of this work was in response to
sludge-induced crises, real or imagined . The understanding
of the dynamics of the New York Bight by MESA/NY Bight
Project was an added benefit received by the monitoring
activities of ocean dumping. Within the realm of policy,
the Ocean Dumping Act established a statutory-based national
policy with a fair amount of discretion accorded to the
implementing agencies. In 1974, NOS conducted the first in
series of studies (often referred to as baseline studies) at
the 106-mile site. Most research was still specific to
montoring of ocean dumping. This continued until the
reorganization of NOAA ocean dumping and marine pollution
programs in 1981. However, dispositional difficulties
between and within agencies, along with unclear policies,
provided roadblocks.
It is the period after 1982 that seems to mark the end
of NOAA's ocean dumping-specific monitoring/research
programs. In NOAA's Ocean Assessment Division FY 1986
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Report to Congress on Ocean Pollution, Monitoring, and
Research they state:
"During the past year the OAD program has continued to
develop the operational capabilities necessary for
analysis of marine and estuarine environmental quality
problems in a national context. It has directed NOAA's
environmental quality assessment and monitoring efforts
toward coastal and estuarine areas where problems are
more immediate than in the open ocean." [emphasis from
quoted text]
A thorough search of literature revealed no other ocean
dumping studies performed by NOAA either site or activity
specific until 1987 when the 12-mile dumpsite recovery study
by NMFS was undertaken. Of all studies related to or in the
vicinity of the 106-mile dumpsite conducted after 1984 none
was either sponsored or performed by NOAA. The studies that
only incidentally incorporated the dumpsites into the
overall sampling strategy, such as MARMAP, NEMP, and status
and Trends were essentially ecosystem-wide monitoring plans.
Ocean dumping influences were considered as only one of the
many pollutant inputs studied.
There is not a clear picture as to whether NOAA failed
in its ocean dumping mandate in some way. Its original
intent in 1972 with the creation of MESA was to conduct
"ecosystem-wide" research, by including all the factors that
influence the health of a system. The agency's present-day
programs are similar in that respect. NOAA is, in fact,
fUllfilling that part of its ocean dumping mandate that
instructs it to conduct long-term research into man's impact
on the marine environment. However, insofar as NOAA has
69
removed itself from the monitoring of ocean dumping, it has
not seemed to have lived up to its mandate. The
acknowledged lack of information regarding benthic fauna,
the non-existence of any recent dumpsite studies, and EPA's
employment of Battelle to conduct it's research in support
of the permitting process all seem to support this premise.
There is renewed interest by NOAA in the deepwater
dumpsite since the passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of
1988. A cynical person might suggest that this interest
stems from the large influx of money as a result of the
dumper's user fees. A hopeful person might believe that
this represents a golden opportunity to delve deeper into a
relatively unknown area. It might be suggested there are
certain realities to both.
NOTES
1. from "NOAA Pol icies" p , 10. This seems to summarize the
difficulties facing NOAA as a scientific agency. It seemed like an
appropriate quote for the conclusion.
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